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Abstract
The United States has a long history of domestic terrorism, yet U.S. counterterrorism
policy has focused almost completely on the threat from international terrorism. The gap
in the literature was the absence of an empirical evaluation of U.S. counterterrorism
policy on domestic terrorism in general. The purpose of this quantitative study was to
describe the impact of 21st century U.S. counterterrorism policy on incidence, lethality,
and cost of domestic terrorism using data from the Global Terrorism Database. The
multiple streams framework and the power elite theory were used. In this longitudinal
trend study using secondary data analysis, domestic terrorism data were analyzed from
749 terrorist attacks using descriptive statistics, visual analysis, and the series hazard
model to examine any changes in the frequency and hazard of domestic terrorism in
relation to the following 5 policies: USA PATRIOT Act, USA PATRIOT Improvement
and Reauthorization Act, Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and USA FREEDOM Act. The results
empirically supported the greater threat of domestic terrorism and showed that domestic
terrorism changed in relation to counterterrorism policy. Further, the addition of the
series hazard model in the analysis of domestic terrorism following policy
implementation added additional depth to the results. This study contributed to positive
social change by providing policy makers and counterterrorism agencies with an
empirical, evidence-based method for evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy and for a
non-partisan, non-political, evidence-based method for quantitatively determining
terrorist threat.
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the person I am today in part because of you.
I dedicate this dissertation to all of the victims of terrorism, in the United States
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preventing future attacks and contribute towards a more resilient society and a culture of
peace.
When facing the terrorist threat and responding with resilience, I am reminded of
the following words of the late martial artist, actor, and philosopher, Bruce Lee: “Be like
water making its way through cracks. Do not be assertive, but adjust to the object, and
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Terrorism is a ubiquitous problem that has existed since antiquity (Hoffman,
2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Domestic terrorism involves terrorism perpetrated by
citizens of the nation of which and within which they are targeting. In the United States,
the majority of terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by domestic terrorists; however,
U.S. counterterrorism policies have focused on threats from international terrorists
(Crenshaw, 2001; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; Hewitt, 2003, 2005; Hoffman, 2006;
Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Elements of these U.S. counterterrorism policies focusing on
international terrorism may have impact on the operations of domestic terrorists. In this
study, I examined the impact that U.S. counterterrorism policy has had on domestic
terrorism in the 21st century by using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).
This study contributes to positive social change by providing an empirical model for
evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy’s impact on domestic terrorism. By relying on
empirical data, this study offers an evidence-based approach to evaluating
counterterrorism policy.
Beginning with discussion of the background of domestic terrorism and U.S.
counterterrorism policy, in Chapter 1 I build up the rationale for this quantitative
longitudinal study by stating the problem, identifying the purpose of the study, listing the
research questions and hypotheses, and describing the theoretical frameworks that were
employed. From these elements, I continue Chapter 1 with a description of the nature of
the study, operational definitions for key variables, assumptions of the study, the scope
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and delimitations of the study, and the limitations of the study. I conclude Chapter 1with
the significance of the study for creating positive social change.
Background of the Study
Research on terrorism has been increasing as data on terrorism have become more
accessible. In addition, as governments globally combat terrorism, counterterrorism
policies aimed at preventing, deterring, and responding to terrorism have increased in
frequency of implementation (Abrams, 2006; Bassiouni 1988, 2002; Bazan, 2004;
Berman, 2016; Bjelopera, 2017; Crenshaw, 2014; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017). What has
been missing from these policies, which tend to be costly, is any suggestion of a way to
evaluate the effectiveness of such policies. While examinations of the links between
government policy and political violence (extremism, terrorism, etc.) have increased,
much of the research has focused on the threat from international terrorism rather than
domestic terrorism (LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009; LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Silva,
Duran, Freilich, & Chermak, 2019). The studies that have examined domestic terrorism
have not been conducted as frequently for the United States (Avdan & Uzonyi, 2017;
Barros, 2003; Enders, Sandler, & Gaibulloev, 2011; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009;
LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Shor, 2016). Research that has focused on U.S. domestic
terrorism has not included an empirical analysis of domestic terrorist activity in relation
to existing U.S. counterterrorism policy, instead focusing on specific terrorist
organizations or ideologies (Berkebile, 2012, 2017; Carson, 2014; Carson, LaFree, &
Dugan, 2012; Despande & Ernst, 2012; Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero, 2005; Gonzalez,
Freilich, & Chermak, 2014; Hewitt, 2005; Hsu, Vasquez, & McDowall, 2018; Klausen et
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al., 2016; Klein, Gruenewald, & Smith, 2017; LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009;
Lemanski & Wilson, 2016; Makin & Hoard, 2014; Miller, 2017; Norris & GrolProkopczyk, 2018; Potter, 2013; Quinn, 2016; Subedi, 2017; Williams, 2018).
The U.S. counterterrorism policies I included in this study are those that have
provisions that may impact domestic terrorism either specifically or as an extension of
provisions aimed at curbing international terrorism. In addition, these selected policies
received major media attention, ensuring that information about these provisions was
readily available. These policies listed in chronological order are: the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA) of 2006, the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, and the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline over
Monitoring (USA FREEDOM) Act of 2015.
The gap in the literature is that changes in domestic terrorism have not been
evaluated in relation to the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21st
century. This research fills this important gap in the literature by utilizing empirical data
to examine the impact that 21st century U.S. counterterrorism policies have had on
domestic terrorism. This research provides policy makers with evidence on which to base
policy development in addition to making decisions regarding existing counterterrorism
policy.
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In this study, I used two theoretical approaches. Kingdon (2011) introduced the
multiple streams framework (MSF) in 1984 as a method of explaining agenda setting in
public policy. Since then, researchers have extended and applied MSF to a range of
governments, policies, and levels of governance (Zohlnhofer, Herweg, & Rub, 2015).
Birkland (1997, 2004, 2006) has used MSF to explain policy following focusing events
including natural disasters and acts of terrorism. However, MSF is unable to adequately
explain the inconsistency between U.S. counterterrorism policy’s focus on the threat of
international terrorism and the actual threat from domestic terrorism. Therefore, from
conflict theory in sociology, I used the power elite theory developed by C.W. Mills
(1956) and extended by Domhoff (1970, 1990) to assess the role that power plays in U.S.
counterterrorism policy. These two theoretical approaches complement each other by
compensating for each other’s weaknesses.
Terrorism has been a form of political violence globally for centuries. However,
identifying and defining what terrorism is has remained a challenge (Berkebile, 2017;
Bjelopera, 2017; Carpenter, 2018; Crenshaw, 1995, [2009] 2012; Crenshaw & LaFree,
2017; Enders, Sandler, & Gaibulloev, 2011; Gerwehr & Hubbard, 2007; Hewitt, 2003;
Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Norris, 2017;
Ronczkowski, 2018; Rummel, 1994; Sandler, 2014; Terrorism, 2011). Because the forms
that terrorism takes are diverse and have evolved, developing one agreed-upon definition
has been challenging. However, there are elements that are present in all definitions of
terrorism: premeditation; intentionality; the use or threat of use of fear, terror, and/or
violence; ideological, political, economic, religious, and/or social objectives; and its use
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as a means to an end. Terrorism may be perpetrated by the State as a method of social
control for its population, and it may be perpetrated by sub-national actors against the
State, a collection of nations, and/or other sub-national actors (Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman,
2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Rummel, 1994).
Difficulties in defining terrorism have led to variations in approaches to
countering the terrorist threat. In terms of non-State terrorism, a balance must be reached
between national security and civil liberties (Abrams, 2006; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman,
2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). In the United States, counterterrorism policy has
focused on the threat from international terrorists even though most of the terrorist
activity within and against the United States has been perpetrated by domestic terrorists
(Hewitt, 2003; LaFree, 2011; Silva et al., 2019). Furthermore, by its nature,
counterterrorism policy and approaches are costly (Brzoska, 2016; R.A. Clarke, 2004;
Crenshaw, 2001; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; Danzell & Zidek, 2013; Enders & Sandler,
2012; McGuire, 2013; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Nash, 2017; Pokalova, 2015;
Qvortrup, 2016; Ronczkowski, 2018). As such, it follows that there would be evaluation
of such policies to ensure that the money invested is justified; yet, such evaluation has not
been written into U.S. counterterrorism policy. Individual agencies that are part of the
counterterrorism effort may evaluate their own agency’s effectiveness regarding the role
they play in counterterrorism efforts, but those evaluations are only part of the larger
issue of whether counterterrorism policy is effective.
Attempts at evaluating counterterrorism policy have produced mixed results.
Variation in approaches, type of data used, conceptualization and operationalization of
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terms, and levels of analyses have complicated the creation of a standardized method of
evaluating counterterrorism policy (Brzoska, 2016; Crenshaw, 2001; Crenshaw &
LaFree, 2017; Danzell & Zidek, 2013; De Lint & Kassa, 2015; Dietrich, 2014; Dugan,
2011; Dugan et al., 2005; Enders & Sandler, 2012; Enders et al., 2011; Freese, 2014;
LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Lindahl, 2017; Lum, Kennedy,
& Sherley, 2006, 2008; McQuire, 2013; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Pokalova, 2015;
Qvortrup, 2016; Safer-Lichtenstein, LaFree, & Loughran, 2017; Sandler, 2014; Schwinn,
2016; Shor, 2016; Van Dongen, 2011; Williams, 2018). With such variability in past
attempts at evaluating counterterrorism policy, there is a need for a systematic, evidencebased, empirical method to evaluate counterterrorism policy.
With increased technological capabilities, more data on terrorist activity are
available presently than ever before. Some of these databases are open access, while
others remain classified. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START) has several databases available regarding the issues of
conflict, extremism, and terrorism. The GTD is a database of all non-State terrorist events
that have occurred around the world from 1970 to 2017 (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan,
2007). The database is updated annually and is organized such that researchers can use it
in empirical analyses of terrorism.
Researchers have primarily used the GTD to compare terrorism across nations or
examine terrorism within a single nation. The GTD can be used to evaluate domestic
terrorism within the United States, and Berkebile (2017) has offered a model by which
the data from the GTD may be filtered so that only domestic terrorist events are included.
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The GTD has been used in temporal analyses of terrorism (Hsu, Vasquez, & McDowell,
2018; LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009) as well as in case study analysis of terrorism
(DeLeeuw & Pridemore, 2018). In addition, researchers have proposed the series hazard
model as a method of evaluating the impact of interventions on temporal changes in
terrorism (Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005; Dugan & Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, &
Korte, 2009). Specifically, LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) used the GTD to examine
the effect of specific British counterterrorism interventions on terrorism in Northern
Ireland. I applied this model to the United States in this study.
With the costs of counterterrorism policies, the balance of national security versus
civil liberties, and the ongoing threat of terrorism, it would be useful for policy makers to
have an empirical method of evaluating existing counterterrorism policy. By providing
evidence upon which counterterrorism policy can be developed and evaluated, this study
fills the gap in the literature regarding evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy with
regards to the greater threat, domestic terrorism. The purpose of this study was to
examine U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21st century, focusing only on those policies
that have elements that may impact domestic terrorist activities and examining what, if
any, impact those policies have had on domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs.
Statement of the Problem
The GTD has logged non-State terrorism incidents from 1970 to 2017 and
provides researchers the opportunity to quantitatively analyze terrorism by a range of
variables (Berkebile, 2017; LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; National Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START], 2018b). Although
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researchers have used data from the GTD to evaluate counterterrorism policy in other
countries (Berkbile, 2012, 2017; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009) and have been applied
to assessing international terrorist threats to the United States (Hsu et al., 2018; LaFree,
Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009), the problem is that the GTD has not been used to examine the
impact that U.S. counterterrorism policies have had on domestic terrorism in general.
Governments face difficulties in effectively preventing and responding to terrorist
attacks. In the United States, terrorism had been treated like other crimes, with no special
status or prosecution until 1990 when international terrorism was added to the United
States Code (Antiterrorist Act, 1990; Federal Courts Administration Act [FCAA], 1992;
Hewitt, 2003; Naftali, 2005; Terrorism, 2011). Since then, counterterrorism policy has
focused on the threat of international terrorism including State-sponsored terrorism and
foreign terrorist organizations attacking the United States and its interests at home and
abroad (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act [AEDPA], 1996; Antiterrorist
Act, 1990; Hewitt, 2003; Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission,
2007; Naftali, 2005; Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act, 1986; Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism [USA PATRIOT] Act, 2001; Uniting and Strengthening America by
Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline over Monitoring [USA FREEDOM]
Act, 2015). It was not until 2001 that domestic terrorism was given special status for
investigation (Naftali, 2005; Terrorism, 2011; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001). Even though
the focus of much of the U.S. counterterrorism policy has been on international terrorism,
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elements of the policies passed following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks may
affect domestic terrorism.
Previous researchers have attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S.
counterterrorism policies but have not universally employed evidence-based evaluation
using empirical data even though there have been suggestions that such analyses are the
future of terrorism and counterterrorism analyses (Brzoska, 2016; Crenshaw & LaFree,
2017; de Lint & Kassa, 2015; Freese, 2014; Lum et al., 2006, 2008; Sandler, 2014; Van
Dongen, 2011). Because of the diversity of approaches to evaluating counterterrorism
policy, the results of such evaluations have been mixed. The gap in the literature is that
changes in domestic terrorism have not been evaluated in relation to the implementation
of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21st century. This research fills this important gap
in the literature and via my use of empirical data to examine the impact of 21st century
U.S. counterterrorism policies on domestic terrorism. Policy makers may use the results
from this study to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism policy and offer
empirical support for or against the continuance of existing policies or for development
of new policies. The social change implications of this study involve providing
policymakers with an empirical, evidence-based evaluation and enhancing safety within
the United States by identifying effective policies that reduce the threat of domestic
terrorism.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this quantitative study was to describe the impact of 21st century
U.S. counterterrorism policy on incidence, lethality, and cost of domestic terrorism. The
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independent variable was counterterrorism policy. Counterterrorism policy was
operationalized as U.S. legislation or policy aimed at preventing, reducing, countering, or
responding to acts of terrorism, domestic or international. The dependent variables were
incidence of domestic terrorism as measured by number of domestic terrorist incidents,
lethality of domestic terrorism as measured by whether there were casualties, fatalities,
and hostages taken during domestic terrorist incidents, and the costs of domestic
terrorism as measured by the amount of property damage incurred, ransom paid, and
monies budgeted and spent by the U.S. government for counterterrorism policy. I
operationalized domestic terrorism in the United States as premeditated, intentional acts
or threats of acts of violence intended to intimidate, coerce, or influence the civilian
population and/or the government to achieve some political, religious, economic,
ideological, and/or social objective(s) and perpetrated by a U.S. citizen or resident. A key
element of the operational definition of US domestic terrorism is the use of terror and
fear as a strategy of coercion. I analyzed U.S. domestic terrorism data from the GTD
using descriptive statistics and the series hazard model to describe the risk of domestic
terrorist activity (incidence, lethality, costs) following the implementation of U.S.
counterterrorism policy. All data were analyzed using SPSS software.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
This study addressed six central research questions (RQs). For each research
question, there are five sub questions (SQs), one for each specific U.S. counterterrorism
policy that I evaluated. The null and alternative hypotheses for each RQ and SQ are
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included below. The first three RQs were answered using descriptive statistics. The last
three RQs were answered using the series hazard model.
RQ1: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?
H01: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
H11: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S.
counterterrorism policy.
SQ1A: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
H01A: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
H11A: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
SQ1B: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?
H01B: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
H11B: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
SQ1C: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of the AETA of 2006?
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H01C: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of the AETA of 2006.
H11C: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
AETA of 2006.
SQ1D: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007?
H01D: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
H11D: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
SQ1E: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H01E: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H11E: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
RQ2: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following the implementation of
U.S. counterterrorism policy?
H02: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of U.S.
counterterrorism policy.
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H12: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S.
counterterrorism policy.
SQ2A: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
H02A: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
H12A: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001.
SQ2B: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?
H02B: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
H12B: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
SQ2C: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of
the AETA of 2006?
H02C: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the
AETA of 2006.
H12C: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the AETA
of 2006.
SQ2D: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?
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H02D: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
H12D: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
SQ2E: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of
the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H02E: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H12E: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA
FREEDOM Act of 2015.
RQ3: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?
H03: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
H13: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
SQ3A: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
H03A: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
H13A: domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
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SQ3B: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act
of 2005?
H03B: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005.
H13B: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005.
SQ3C: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following implementation of the AETA of 2006?
H03C: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change
following implementation of the AETA of 2006.
H13C: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of the AETA of 2006.
SQ3D: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007?
H03D: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007.
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H13D: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007.
SQ3E: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H03E: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H13E: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
RQ4: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change
following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?
H04: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
H14: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
SQ4A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
H04A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
H14A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
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SQ4B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act
of 2005?
H04B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005.
H14B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
SQ4C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change
following implementation of the AETA of 2006?
H04C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the AETA of 2006.
H14C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of the AETA of 2006.
SQ4D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007?
H04D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007.
H14D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
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SQ4E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H04E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H14E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
RQ5: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event occurring change
following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?
H05: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event increases following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
H15: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event decreases following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
SQ5A: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
H05A: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
H15A: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
SQ5B: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?
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H05B: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005.
H15B: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005.
SQ5C: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the AETA of 2006?
H05C: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the AETA of 2006.
H15C: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following
implementation of the AETA of 2006.
SQ5D: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007?
H05D: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007.
H15D: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007.
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SQ5E: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H05E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H15E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
RQ6: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
occurring change following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?
H06: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
H16: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
SQ6A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
H06A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
H16A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
SQ6B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005?
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H06B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005.
H16B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005.
SQ6C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?
H06C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.
H16C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of the AETA of 2006.
SQ6D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007?
H06D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
H16D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007.
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SQ6E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H06E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H16E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
Theoretical Frameworks of the Study
For this study’s theoretical frameworks, I employed the MSF from the field of
public policy and the power elite theory from conflict theory within sociology. The MSF
involves the convergence of three streams (problem, policy, and political) at a particular
period of time (policy window) that influence the development and implementation of
policy (Birkland, 1997, 2004, 2006, 2009; Herweg, Zahariadis, & Zohlnhofer, 2018;
Kingdon, 2011; Zahariadis, 2007, 2014, 2015; Zohlnofer, Herweg, & Hub, 2016;
Zohlnhofer et al., 2015). Conflict theorist C.W. Mills (1956) introduced his analysis of
how power operates at the national level in the United States and described the United
States as being under control of the power elite, which is comprised of the corporate elite,
the military elite, and the political elite. Domhoff (1970, 1990) extended Mills’ power
elite in terms of policy development and implementation in the United States, suggesting
that U.S. policy is influenced by factors outside of national interest, specifically factors
motivated by politics. Both of these theories were useful in examining how U.S.
counterterrorism policy is developed and adapted and why there has been an emphasis on
international terrorist threats rather than the most urgent of threats, domestic terrorists.
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Nature of the Study
I used a quantitative approach in this longitudinal trend study involving secondary
data analysis. I compiled a chronology of U.S. counterterrorism policy to use when
analyzing incidence, lethality, and costs of U.S. domestic terrorist incidents from the
GTD from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017 (START, 2018a). The U.S.
counterterrorism policies included were those that have provisions that may impact
domestic terrorism either specifically or as an extension of provisions aimed at curbing
international terrorism. These policies listed in chronological order are: the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005, the AETA of 2006, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007, and the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
My research methodology included a quantitative analysis of existing terrorism
data from the GTD in combination with a chronology of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
The examined trend data were incidence, lethality, and cost of domestic terrorism in the
United States from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017. To establish a baseline of
domestic terrorism prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, and because
data from 1993 are incomplete in the GTD, I used domestic terrorism data from January
1, 1994 to October 25, 2001 (START, 2018b). Using SPSS software, I organized and
analyzed the GTD data in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy by using descriptive
statistics and the series hazard model.

24
Definitions
The independent variables of this study were the following U.S. counterterrorism
policies: the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (enacted October 26, 2001), the USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (enacted March 9, 2006), the
AETA of 2006 (enacted November 27, 2006), Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (enacted August 3, 2007), and the USA FREEDOM Act of
2015 (enacted June 2, 2015). The dependent variables were the following indicators of
domestic terrorism: incidence, lethality, and costs.
Definitions of terrorism vary based on the individual or organization defining it
(Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos,
2016; Ronczkowski, 2018; Rummel, 1994; Sandler, 2014; Silke, 2019).
Terrorism is operationally defined as the premeditated, intentional use of or threat
of use of fear, terror, and/or violence in order to coerce or influence an audience beyond
the immediate victims towards a political, economic, religious, and/or social objective
(Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos,
2016; Ronczkowski, 2018; Rummel, 1994; Sandler, 2014; Terrorism, 2011).
Domestic terrorism is operationally defined as premeditated, intentional acts or
threats of acts of violence intended to intimidate, coerce, or influence the civilian
population and/or the government to achieve some political, religious, economic,
ideological, and/or social objective(s) and perpetrated by a citizen or resident of the
country within which the acts or threats are aimed. For U.S. domestic terrorism, the
perpetrators must be U.S. citizens or residents, and the attacks must be planned or

25
executed within the territorial boundaries of the United States (Berkebile, 2017;
Bjelopera, 2017; Carpenter, 2018; Crenshaw, 1995, [2009] 2012; Crenshaw & LaFree,
2017; Enders et al., 2011; Gerwehr & Hubbard, 2007; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006;
Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Norris, 2017; Ronczkowski,
2018; Sandler, 2014).
To measure U.S. domestic terrorism, I evaluated three indicators in relation to the
independent variables. These indicators are (a) incidence of domestic terrorism; (b)
lethality of domestic terrorism as measured by whether there were casualties, fatalities,
and hostages taken during domestic terrorist incidents; and (c) the costs of domestic
terrorism as measured by whether property damage occurred, the amount of property
damage incurred if available, ransom paid if applicable, and monies budgeted and spent
by the U.S. government for counterterrorism policy (Berkebile, 2012, 2017; Bjelopera,
2017; Brzoska, 2016; Crenshaw, 2001; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; Danzell & Zidek,
2013; De Lint & Kassa, 2015; Dietrich, 2014; Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005; Enders &
Sandler, 2012; Enders et al., 2011; Freese, 2014; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; LaFree
& Freilich, 2019; Lindahl, 2017; Lum et al., 2006, 2008; McQuire, 2013; J. Mueller &
Stewart, 2014; Pokalova, 2015; Qvortrup, 2016; Safer-Lichtenstein et al., 2017; Sandler,
2014; Schwinn, 2016; Shor, 2016; Van Dongen, 2011; Williams, 2018).
The GTD ranks property damage from a terrorist attack across four categories:
catastrophic (likely equal to or greater than $1 billion), major (likely equal to or greater
than $1 million but less than $1 billion), minor (likely less than $1 million), and unknown
(START, 2018b). If there were kidnapping and/or hostage-taking incidents that included
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the payment of ransom, I analyzed those expenditures. For ransom data, the GTD
provides the confirmed amount paid, if known (START, 2018b).
Prior researchers who have examined lethality have focused on measuring
lethality only as the number of fatalities; however, casualties (injuries) and hostagetaking should also be considered when determining lethality (Asal et al., 2015; Asal &
Rethemeyer, 2008; Carson & Suppenbach, 2018; Caspi, Freilich, & Chermak, 2012;
Edwards et al., 2016; Enders & Sandler, 2000; Nilsson, 2018; Olzak, 2016; Palfy, 2003;
Phillips, 2017; Sheehan, 2009; Simon & Benjamin, 2000; Wilson & Lemanski, 2013).
The choice to plan and take hostages increases the probability of someone being killed or
injured; thus, I coded hostage incidents as lethal. Hsu et al. (2018) specifically noted the
importance of utilizing data on injuries and fatalities for future research. Therefore I
examined fatalities, casualties, and hostages taken to determine lethality.
Assumptions
My first assumption was that the selected U.S. counterterrorism policies have
impacted U.S. domestic terrorist activities without accounting for other factors such as
internal dynamics within the terrorist organization, changes in law enforcement practices
and policies, availability of materials to execute an attack, and societal changes that
addressed the motivating factors of the domestic terrorists. For example, increases in
recycling, use of renewable energy sources, development and use of more fuel-efficient
vehicles, availability of vegan options at restaurants and in stores may have addressed
some of the motivating factors of some of the domestic eco-terrorists. Prior researchers
have approached the study of terrorism by utilizing a subset of indicators of terrorist
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activity in relation to governmental intervention, either through policy or military use
(Avdan & Uzonyi, 2017; Barros, 2003; Berkebile, 2012, 2017; Carson, 2014; Carson et
al., 2012; DeLeeuw & Pridemore, 2018; De Lint & Kassa, 2015; Despande & Ernst,
2012; Dietrich, 2014; Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005; Enders & Sandler, 2012; Enders
et al., 2011; Freese, 2014; Hewitt, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Hsu et al., 2018; Klein et al.,
2017; LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; LaFree,
Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009; Lum et al., 2006, 2008; Martin, 2018; McConnell, 2010;
Nacos, 2016; Nash, 2017; Quinn, 2016; Reed, 2013; Ronczkowski, 2018; SaferLichtenstein et al., 2017; Sandler, 2014; Shor, 2016; Van Dongen, 2011; Williams,
2018).
I made two assumptions regarding use of the GTD. The first was that the GTD
contains all U.S. domestic terrorist incidents within the time frame of interest for this
study (1994-2017). The second was that the information about these U.S. domestic
terrorist incidents are updated with the most recent and accurate information. The
START researchers provide transparency in the GTD codebook so that other researchers
have confidence in the accuracy of the GTD data as well as a clear understanding of how
the variables provided were identified and coded (START, 2018a, 2018b). Furthermore,
the GTD has been used in a range of studies examining terrorism either alone or in
combination with supplementary data (Avdan & Uzonyi, 2017; Berkebile, 2012, 2017;
Carson, 2014; Carson et al., 2012; DeLeeuw & Pridemore, 2018; Dugan, 2011; Dugan et
al., 2005; Hsu et al., 2018; LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; LaFree, Dugan, &
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Korte, 2009; LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009; Safer-Lichtenstein et al., 2017; Sandler,
2014).
Scope and Delimitations
In this study, I examined the entire population of U.S. domestic terrorist incidents
identified in the GTD from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017. Using the same model
and analysis used by LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) to analyze terrorism in Northern
Ireland in relation to British government intervention, I used the series hazard model to
examine the impact that five U.S. counterterrorism policies have had on domestic
terrorism. Berkebile (2017) identified the specific method by which the GTD could be
filtered to only include domestic terrorist events. The availability of the GTD, its use by
other scholars investigating terrorism, and the transparency with which the database
authors communicate their methods were the factors that influenced my decision to use
the GTD as the primary data source for this study. The U.S. counterterrorism policies that
I selected were a purposive sample of policies that included elements that may impact
domestic terrorist activity and those that received media attention. Therefore, applying an
established statistical analysis and model for evaluating governmental intervention on
terrorist activity to the United States was a logical next step in examining U.S. domestic
terrorism.
There has been a recent trend in researchers’ attempts to apply criminological
theory to terrorism; however terrorism is very different from traditional crime. Terrorism
is a strategy for change and thus the factors that motivate terrorists are different than
those that motivate most criminals. While there are some criminological theories that
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may be appropriate or applicable to terrorism, such as deterrence and rational choice
theory, my focus in this study was on the disconnect between the focus of
counterterrorism policy and the problem of domestic terrorism (see Decker, 2015;
Loughran, Paternoster, & Weiss, 2015; Ruggiero, 2006). Therefore, I did not use
criminological theories in this study. The study of terrorism is an interdisciplinary
endeavor which allows for a large array of theories to be used in its analysis. Because I
focused on counterterrorism policy in the United States, Kingdon’s (2011) MSF was an
appropriate theoretical framework to employ to address the varying factors that lead to
counterterrorism policy development. To address the weaknesses in the MSF for
addressing the paradox of U.S. counterterrorism policy and because of my emphasis on
social factors leading to terrorism, I employed the power elite theory from sociology’s
conflict theory. For the scope of this study, these two theoretical perspectives were the
best options for explaining the results.
For the statistical analyses of the data, time-series analyses and the use of
estimators of data have dominated this area of study; however, these analyses have
internal validity concerns (Dugan, 2011). In contrast, the series hazard model, which is
intuitively more appropriate to examine changes in risk based on specific policy
implementations while accounting for the passage of time, has only more recently been
used to examine the impact of policy on terrorism (Carson, 2014; Dugan et al., 2005;
Dugan, 2011; Dugan & Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). Because policy
evaluation is an event, the series hazard model may be a more accurate statistical
approach to other time series analyses (Dugan, 2011; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009).
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Limitations
There were several limitations to this study. The GTD does not list perpetrator
nationality in its public dataset, which required me to engage in supplementary research
on specific terrorist events to attempt to determine if they qualified as domestic terrorism.
The GTD does have codes to identify if an event was ideologically international,
logistically international, miscellaneous international, and any international (START,
2018b). However, these codes do not allow for clear understanding of what may be
considered domestic terrorism or not. For example, Puerto Rican separatist groups are
coded as not logistically international but ideologically international, which further leads
them to be listed as international under the miscellaneous and any categories (START,
2018a). However, Puerto Rican separatist groups are comprised of U.S. citizens engaging
in terrorism against its ruling government, thus it would fit the definition of domestic
terrorism. In addition, radical environmental and radical animal rights terrorists (i.e., ecoterrorists) are listed as ideologically international and although technically they are, most
do not execute attacks outside of their native country or country of residence. To address
this limitation, for terrorist incidents that occurred in the United States but did not have
perpetrator information associated with it in the GTD, I reviewed the sources listed by the
GTD as well as additional open source data to attempt to uncover more detail as to the
perpetrator nationality. Terrorist attacks with unknown perpetrator nationality were
labeled as unknown and analyzed separately.
In addition, there are limitations to using a database built on open-source data.
Media reports tend to occur in real time with limited and sometimes inaccurate

31
information provided in initial reporting (Dugan & Distler, 2017). Therefore, there is risk
that some of the events may include inaccurate or incomplete information. In addition,
because media studies have shown that consumers are disproportionately interested in
violent or sensational events, there may be selection bias in terms of which stories media
outlets report and publish online or in print (Chermak, Freilich, Parkin, & Lynch, 2012;
Dugan & Distler, 2017). However, it is precisely for those reasons that many terrorists
seek to gain the attention of the media and use it to spread their message to the larger
audience (Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016).
While there is variation in approaches to evaluating counterterrorism policy,
policy makers would find an evidence-based approach that involves empirical data to be
more useful compared to strictly theoretical assertions or the limited generalizability of
qualitative research. While qualitative research would uncover a more in-depth analysis
of each event, because of the longitudinal nature of this study, I preferred a quantitative
analysis. By using the methods and models employed by other researchers who have used
the GTD, I sought to contribute to the growing literature using the GTD for policy
analysis via the series hazard model. In addition, because I used public and open-source
data, policymakers who may not be affiliated with institutions that allow access to
classified or otherwise proprietary information will have an easier time accessing the
information that this study was founded on.
There is the possibility that I was biased in how I selected the specific U.S.
counterterrorism policies included in this study. I examined all policies related to
counterterrorism for the time frame of interest and included only those that contained
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elements that may impact domestic terrorist activities. It is possible that my interpretation
of what elements may impact domestic terrorist activities may have been too narrow or
too broad. In addition, because many pieces of legislation pass and frequently contain
provisions and elements unrelated to the main focus of the legislation, the new laws may
not be well-known to the general public and to terrorists. To correct for this limitation, I
focused on high-profile U.S. counterterrorism policies and examined any challenges to
those policies to identify areas of concern that may overlap with citizens’ rights and thus
would garner greater media attention. This way the media attention that the specific U.S.
counterterrorism policy generated would mean that the probability that domestic terrorists
have heard of the policy and its provisions are higher than if a counterterrorism provision
was added on to a piece of legislation unrelated to counterterrorism.
While this was a quantitative study, my choice to use the methods and models of
researchers associated with START and the GTD as well as those who have also used the
GTD as a data source may have some bias in terms of approach. While reviewing the
literature regarding evaluating counterterrorism policy, I found that there were distinct
groups of researchers who were entrenched in their approach while dismissing
alternatives. While I did not find any similar acrimonious writings with regards to the
GTD or the series hazard model, it is possible that a similar dynamic may exist with
regards to utilizing empirical data to study terrorism.
Significance of the Study
This research fills an important gap in the literature by linking empirical data on
domestic terrorism to U.S. counterterrorism policy. The results may be used in support of
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or in development of more effective counterterrorism policies by evaluating the
effectiveness of 21st century counterterrorism policy in the United States with regards to
domestic terrorism, thereby contributing to positive social change. Furthermore, the
model I employed in this study offers a non-partisan, non-political, evidence-based
method of quantifying the terrorist threat.
Domestic terrorism remains an imminent threat to U.S. citizens’ and residents’
daily lives, one that is not restricted to region, age, or socioeconomic status. Hewitt
(2003) observed that in the immediate response to the September 11, 2001 attacks,
terrorism was viewed by many Americans as something new and unexperienced, yet the
United States had experienced at least 3,000 terrorist incidents between 1954 and 2000.
The majority of these incidents were perpetrated by U.S. citizens and not foreign terrorist
organizations (Hewitt, 2003; LaFree, 2011; Silva et al., 2019). Building off of LaFree’s
(2011) examination of myths about terrorism globally by using data from the GTD, Silva,
Duran, Freililch, and Chermak (2019) examined empirical data to evaluate the veracity of
six beliefs found in popular discourse in the United States (specifically, beliefs that
terrorism incidents are increasing, terrorism incidents are becoming more lethal, terrorism
attacks are perpetrated by international terrorists, these international terrorists are
jihadist-inspired extremists, these terrorists are of Arab descent, and these terrorists are
operating in organized groups). Silva et al. found that rather than supporting the popular
discourse, according to empirical data analyzed from 1995 to 2017, terrorist attacks in the
United States are decreasing in incidence and are decreasing in lethality. In addition, the
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terrorists tend to be White, far-right extremists who are not members of an organized
group, but rather lone wolves (Silva et al., 2019).
These results, in combination with data from the GTD, show the continuing
higher incidence of domestic terrorism, yet the focus of counterterrorism policy and
strategy remains on international threats (START, 2018a). The gap in the literature is that
changes in domestic terrorism have not been evaluated in relation to the implementation
of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21st century, specifically in terms of incidence,
lethality, and costs of domestic terrorism. Therefore, there was a need to examine
domestic terrorism in the United States in relation to existing counterterrorism policy in
order to identify policy areas that may be useful in decreasing incidence, lethality, and
costs of domestic terrorism.
Identifying effective policies aimed at reducing the threat of domestic terrorism
would be an important step towards positive social change by enhancing safety within the
United States. Evaluating the impact of existing counterterrorism policy on domestic
terrorism may inform future counterterrorism policy aimed at domestic terrorism. A
unified model that can be employed by policy makers and counterterrorism agencies in
identifying and measuring the terrorist threat will better guide counterterrorism
approaches. Domestic terrorism is an imminent threat in the United States, and research
aimed at providing empirical evidence of the effectiveness of policies that may decrease
that threat inherently contribute to positive social change.
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Summary
Terrorism is a longstanding global problem. In the United States, the primary
threat comes from domestic terrorists, but U.S. counterterrorism policy has focused on
the rarer threat of international terrorism. Even though this paradox exists, U.S.
counterterrorism provisions continue to be developed and renewed without any specific
empirical data to support their effectiveness. This study fills the gap in the literature in
terms of using empirical data from the GTD to evaluate U.S. counterterrorism policy in
the 21st century. I used two theoretical approaches in this study: the MSF from public
policy and the power elite theory as part of conflict theory from sociology. I filtered and
analyzed the GTD data by using established measures (Berkebile, 2017; LaFree, Dugan,
& Korte, 2009). I used descriptive statistics and visual analysis to describe domestic
terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy. I used
the series hazard model to analyze the risk of domestic terrorism following the
implementation of five U.S. counterterrorism policies. Chapter 2 will provide a review of
the literature I used to (a) understand the MSF and the power elite theory, (b) clarify and
conceptualize domestic terrorism, (c) develop an overview of US counterterrorism policy
and approaches to evaluating counterterrorism policy, and (d) justify the methods I used
for this study.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Terrorism is a ubiquitous problem that has existed since antiquity (Hoffman,
2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). The focus of much of the U.S. counterterrorism policy
has been on international terrorism; however, elements of the policies passed following
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks may have affected domestic terrorism. LaFree
and Freilich (2019) noted that scholarly examinations of the link between extremism
(including terrorism) and government policy have been increasing recently. However,
most of these studies have focused on international terror threats or extremism and
terrorism in countries outside of the United States (LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Shor, 2016).
The gap in the literature is that changes in domestic terrorism have not been evaluated in
relation to the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21st century. The
purpose of this study was to examine and describe domestic terrorism in relation to U.S.
counterterrorism policy in the 21st century. In this research, I worked to fill an important
gap in the literature by using empirical data to examine the impact that 21st century U.S.
counterterrorism policies have had on domestic terrorism.
Researchers have used many theories to understand the policy process in the
United States; however, in the case of counterterrorism policy, the MSF is the most
appropriate. To complement the MSF and the aspects that it fails to account for, I also
used C.W. Mills’ power elite theory from sociology’s conflict theory. These theoretical
frameworks complement each other in their applicability to the evolution and
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
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Chapter 2 covers my analysis and synthesis of empirical research on the MSF and
power elite theory with regards to how they apply to U.S. policy regarding domestic
counterterrorism. The first section contains the foundation, evolution, and application of
the MSF and the power elite theory. The first section concludes with a review of the
literature examining the MSF and the power elite theory independently in relation to U.S.
policy process and counterterrorism policy specifically. In the second section, I describe
the problem of domestic terrorism, the controversy regarding how it is defined, and past
research approaches to describing this phenomenon. The third section contains
information about the GTD regarding its development and usage. Included in the third
section is my rationale for its use in this quantitative study. The fourth section covers the
evolution of U.S. counterterrorism policy with regards to elements relevant to countering
domestic terrorism. The fifth section provides a review of the literature examining
approaches to measuring effectiveness of counterterrorism policy as well as the
implications of each policy’s mandates. The final section covers the quantitative analysis
practices I used for this study.
Strategy for Searching the Literature
I reviewed primary sources including books, scholarly, peer-reviewed journal
articles, federal government websites, federal government publications, legislation, and
authoritative websites and reports. Federal government publications and legislation were
accessed from federal government websites, the U.S. Government Publishing Office’s
govinfo.gov service, and the Digital National Security Archive and HeinOnline research
databases. Using the Walden University library, I accessed articles from Google Scholar
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and the following research databases: Academic Search Complete, Business Source
Complete, Communication and Mass Media Complete, Criminal Justice Database,
GreenFILE, Homeland Security Digital Library, International Security and Counter
Terrorism Reference Center, Military and Government Collection, Political Science
Complete, Project Muse, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses Global, PsycARTICLES,
PsycINFO, Public Administration Abstracts, SAGE Journals, SAGE Stats, SocINDEX
with Full Text, and Taylor and Francis Online.
Database searches involved use of the following key terms and phrases, in
isolation and in combination: 9/11 commission, antigovernment, antiterrorism,
antiterrorism laws, antiterrorism policy, conflict, counterterrorism, counterterrorism
budget, counterterrorism evaluation, counterterrorism laws, counterterrorism policy,
counterterrorism spending, department of homeland security budget, department of
justice budget, domestic extremism, domestic terrorism, extremism, global terrorism
database, hate, homegrown terrorism, homeland security, national security, policy
evaluation, political violence, security, terrorism, terrorism data, United States, USA
PATRIOT, and USA FREEDOM. Variations of terms (e.g., terror, terrorism, terrorist)
were used to ensure comprehensiveness and exhaustion of search results. I reviewed
sources cited in relevant articles to ensure comprehensiveness of this literature review. I
established key word alerts through Walden University library to ensure notification of
newly published and newly accessed materials that may have been relevant to this study.
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Theoretical Frameworks
In this study, I incorporated two theoretical frameworks, the MSF from the field
of public policy, and the power elite theory from conflict theory from the field of
sociology.
Multiple Streams Framework
The MSF was developed as a framework for better understanding the policy
process—specifically, agenda setting. Kingdon (2011) introduced the MSF in 1984 and
since then, researchers have applied it to all areas of the policy process beyond agenda
setting (Zohlnhofer et al., 2015). Policy formation, from the identification of an issue in
need of addressing to the research into various options in addressing that issue to the final
development and implementation of policy, does not follow one path as it may appear to.
Social problems change in terms of awareness, scope, and priority and are often
intertwined with other social problems. Because many social problems are addressed
through the formation and implementation of public policy, it follows that the policy
process would manifest in a way that reflects the complexity of the social problem it
addresses and the complexity of contemporary society within which it is seated.
The MSF offers one approach to creating a model to explain the policy process
while remaining flexible enough to address a range of policies across a range of
sociohistorical contexts. Additionally, it is robust enough to be applied to a range of
systems (Beland & Howlett, 2016; Birkland, 1997, 2004, 2009, 2006; Howlett,
McConnell, & Perl, 2016; Herweg, Hub, & Zohlnhofer, 2015; Jones et al., 2016;
Mukherjee & Howlett, 2015; Winkel & Leipold, 2016; Zahariadis, 2007, 2015;
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Zohlnhofer et al., 2015). At its core, the MSF approach describes the policy process as
being informed by three, autonomous streams that converge at a critical time period to
influence the creation of public policy (Kingdon, 2011). According to Kingdon (2011),
the problem, policy, and political streams follow independent developmental trajectories
but do converge at critical junctures. It is out of that convergence of streams that grow the
largest policy changes (Kingdon, 2011). In the following subsections, I discuss the
various elements of the MSF that I applied to the issue of counterterrorism policy in the
United States.
Problem stream. Complex societies face numerous obstacles and social problems
that hinder a stable, peaceful equilibrium. Whether a particular problem gains enough
attention to warrant the formation of policy to address it depends upon numerous factors
including who is affected, how they are affected, and how this social problem impacts
other social institutions. While many social problems may be addressed due to regular
monitoring of indicators involving budgetary expenses, deaths, and so on, there are times
that a single event or string of events push a particular social problem to the forefront
(Kingdon, 2011). Focusing events are events, crises, disasters, and other incidents that
create pressure on policy makers to act and, depending upon the severity of the focusing
event, to act swiftly (Birkland, 1996, 2006; Kingdon, 2011). Focusing events may bring
attention to an existing social problem (the problem stream), providing an opportunity for
policy to be developed and implemented. Figure 1 shows how the three autonomous
streams converge to form policy.
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Figure 1. Multiple streams framework.
Policy stream. The policy stream is the idea stream where potential solutions to
social problems and policy issues are explored. At the heart of the policy stream are
policy communities. Policy communities are composed of specialists for a particular
policy issue or social problem. These specialists may be academics, researchers,
consultants, analysts, political staffers, think tanks, and others whose primary concern or
focus is on one specific policy issue or social problem (Kingdon, 2011). The diverse
make-up and motivation of the individual members of the policy community allow for a
variety of perspectives and an exchange of ideas and analyses regarding the specific
policy issue or social problem.
Policy communities may be close-knit social groups or fragmented social
aggregates. When greater fragmentation exists within the policy community, different
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groups of specialists will operate without the knowledge of what other specialists in the
same policy community are doing. When policy communities are close-knit, there runs
the risk of groupthink that may hinder alternative perspectives. Depending upon the
status of the specialist, different specialists’ ideas will gain more attention than others
(Kingdon, 2011).
The product of the policy stream is a policy proposal or a short list of policy
proposals. There are a range of factors that can impact the policy stream from policy
community size, cohesiveness, prevailing paradigms and ideologies, power, status, and
available technologies. Consensus for the policy stream is developed through persuasion
and diffusion (Kingdon, 2011).
Political stream. The political stream is composed of “public mood, pressure
group campaigns, election results, partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and
changes in administration” (Kingdon, 2011, p.145). With new administrations come new
agendas and the tabling or abandonment of prior agendas. The political stream is heavily
influenced by the agendas of political parties. The public mood involves how the public
demonstrates their agenda priorities, either through social movements, public opinion
polls, or direct contact with the media and politicians. According to Kingdon (2011), the
ways that the national mood is measured come from communication between elected
representatives and their constituents and from the rhetoric from politicians. Public trust
in the accuracy of politicians’ portrayals and interpretations of the national mood comes
from the understanding that the politicians’ jobs depend upon how satisfied their
constituents are. This electoral accountability, however, does not work in areas where
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there are no term limits, where gerrymandering is used, and where politicians run
unopposed.
Additional aspects of the political stream are the organized political forces of
pressure group campaigns from interest groups, political mobilization movements, and
how political elites behave (Kingdon, 2011). For example, heavy pressure campaigns and
mobilization from the pharmaceutical and health care industries successfully halted
health care reform during the Clinton administration (Kingdon, 2011).
For the political stream, consensus comes from bargaining (Kingdon, 2011).
Political coalitions are built and negotiate support for various acts of legislation by
bargaining over concessions and amendments or by bargaining for support for other acts
of legislation. Broad-based support, depending upon the political make-up of the
legislative branch is necessary to move agenda items forward to be enacted into law.
Therefore a policy entrepreneur’s rank and connection to the decision-making portions of
the political stream may impact which policy entrepreneur’s agenda is pushed forward
(Zahariadis, 2007; Zohlnhofer et al., 2016).
Policy entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs are individuals who dedicate
resources towards the implementation of a policy when the problem stream, policy
stream, and political stream converge. The policy entrepreneurs may not necessarily be
members of the political system, but will have connections within the political system to
get the policy on the agenda for consideration. Policy entrepreneurs may be members of
the policy stream community who communicate to the general public and the government
about the need for action on a particular problem (McGuire, 2013).
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Policy windows. A policy window is the period in time when the three streams
come together and create an opportunity for action on a particular policy. During a policy
window, a particular policy becomes a priority for action; however, when the window
opens and closes cannot be systematically predicted for all policy types. Policy windows
tend to be of short duration and only open infrequently (Kingdon, 2011). Some policy
windows cycle in a predictive pattern but others follow a more random path.
Focusing events. Birkland (1996, 2006) discussed the role that focusing events
played on the policy process, providing a more detailed analysis from when Kingdon
introduced the MSF in 1984. Focusing events are unexpected, unpredicted phenomena
that can influence public policy (Birkland, 1996, 2006; Kingdon, 2011). A key feature of
a focusing event is that it is a rare occurrence. Focusing events simultaneously make a
social problem known to the general public and the policy entrepreneurs. However, not
all catastrophic events are necessarily focusing events. Catastrophic events, including
major terrorist attacks, can become focusing events when there is a rapid reaction to those
events that lead to policy development and/or policy change (Birkland, 1996, 2006). For
example, the terrorist attack perpetrated by Al Qaeda on the USS Cole, a U.S. Navy
Destroyer that was anchored in Yemen, was not a focusing event; while the terrorist
attacks perpetrated by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 were considered to be focusing
events (Birkland, 2006; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Focusing events can
impact all of the streams in the MSF leading to the opening of a policy window, which
allows for rapid policy development and/or change. Focusing events are an important
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area of study because they can be easily identified as the catalysts for policy development
and/or change.
Assumptions of the MSF. There are three assumptions that must be articulated
when employing the MSF to policy analysis. The first assumption involves the
processing of information. From a micro level of analysis, information processing is
viewed as occurring serially and with individuals only being able to process one piece of
information at a time or attend to only one issue at a time (Zahariadis, 2007). However,
the MSF is a macro-level theory and thus it is important to consider how labor is divided
within a government. Because of this division of labor, rather than taking the view that
information processing occurs serially, it can be argued that the entire system is able to
process multiple pieces of information at the same time and attend to multiple issues
concurrently. Therefore, when examining the time line for the streams, information
processing should be understood as occurring in parallel (Zahariadis, 2007).
The second assumption of the MSF involves the time frame in which policy
makers have to act. In many cases, policy makers operate within time constraints and
especially in the context of crises must make decisions quickly. As such, they are not able
to rationally select which policy areas should receive attention, rather they must act when
a policy window opens and particularly after a focusing event (Zahariadis, 2007).
The final assumption of the MSF is the independence of the streams (Kingdon,
2011; Zahariadis, 2007). While the streams converge during policy windows, their
individual evolution and development occur independent of the other streams. The
political stream is more subject to national mood than the policy stream, which may focus
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solely on a particular policy, independent of national mood. For example, the policy
stream for counterterrorism had a policy ready for when the focusing events of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks occurred and the policy window opened. That is how
the USA PATRIOT Act, a major piece of legislation, was able to be developed and
passed within seven weeks (Howell, 2004; Naftali, 2005).
Application of the MSF to U.S. public policy. Kingdon’s (2011) original
introduction of the MSF involved the application of the framework to public policy issues
related to health and transportation. In the most recent edition, Kingdon applied the MSF
to the federal budget treatment from January to October of 1981, the tax reform act of
1986, the health care initiative in 1993, and health care reform initiative during the firstterm of the Obama administration. Birkland (1996, 2006) provided a more in-depth
analysis of focusing events in the MSF, which developed into a theory of focusing events.
Birkland applied the theory of focusing events to policy development and change
following disasters and other catastrophic events including natural disasters, nuclear
power plant leaks, and national security. Ellington (2011) utilized the MSF to examine
military policy during the George W. Bush administration in deciding to utilize private
military contractors.
According to Herweg, Zahariadis, and Zohlnhofer (2018), since 1984, the MSF
had been applied not only to U.S. public policy processes, but to public policy
development in other countries operating under different political systems outside of the
original purview of the framework. In addition, the MSF has been applied to a wide range
of social problems; however, the result has been an increase in disagreement on the
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efficacy of the MSF, rather than providing case-study support for the robustness of the
MSF (Herweg et al., 2018; Jones et al., 2016). Jones et al. (2016) performed a content
analysis on research articles utilizing the MSF from 2000 to 2013 and found that how the
MSF was applied across the range of countries, levels of governance, and policy areas
was inconsistent, demonstrating that there was no established method of utilizing the
MSF.
Application of the MSF to terrorism and counterterrorism. The problem
stream of terrorism has a long history in the United States and continues today. Terrorist
attacks from Al Qaeda, other foreign terrorist organizations, and from domestic terrorists
remain an ongoing issue (L. Clarke, 2006; Hewitt, 2003, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Martin,
2018; Nacos, 2016). Hewitt (2003) identified at least 3000 terrorist attacks between 1954
and 2000 in the United States. Birkland (2004, 2006, 2009) applied the MSF to the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, examining the coordinated attacks as a focusing
event and examining the policy change that immediately followed. Following the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, all three streams converged to rapidly produce and
pass the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
The policy stream was active prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
(Birkland, 2004). The national security issue of terrorism was not a new problem and had
been addressed with a variety of policy measures; however, none had been as farreaching as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. Until this point, policy aimed at addressing
terrorism was restricted to foreign terrorist organizations and terrorism funding by State
sponsors. In addition, terrorism was handled through an intelligence and law enforcement
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approach (viz., AEDPA, 1996; Antiterrorism Act, 1990; FCAA, 1992; Federal Civil
Defense Act, 1950; Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act [FISA], 1978; International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, Amendment to the Trading With The Enemy Act,
1977; National Security Act, 1947; Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act,
1986; TWEA, 1917).
Within the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, drafts of provisions
that had been part of the early versions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA) were included (Naftali, 2005). In addition, had established policies
and procedures been properly followed, it was possible that the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks could have been prevented or at least, the damage, fatalities, and
casualties minimized (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
[NCTAUUS], 2004). Therefore, the problem and policy streams of terrorism were active
long before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
The political stream was active before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
but was not as visible until the policy window opened following the attacks. Long before
these attacks, members of the political stream, namely the National Security Staff, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were
focused on the threat from Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda (R.A. Clarke, 2004;
Gunaratna, 2003; Naftali, 2005). Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda had officially declared
war on the United States on August 23, 1996 and had been connected to the bombing at
the World Trade Center in New York City on February 26, 1993, the attack on the USS
Cole on October 12, 2000, and several embassy attacks prior to the September 11, 2001
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terrorist attacks (R.A. Clarke, 2004; Gunaratna, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018;
Nacos, 2016; Naftali, 2005). The political stream was not only focused on the threat from
Al Qaeda, but also concerned with the threat from domestic terrorists (R.A. Clarke, 2004;
Levitas, 2002; Naftali, 2005). For example, R.A. Clarke (2004) specified his role in 1993
during the development of AEDPA as an update to the Antiterrorism Act of 1990.
According to R.A. Clarke, four policy issues dominated the development of AEDPA – (a)
was terrorism an intelligence (CIA) issue or a law enforcement (FBI) issue; (b) what was
the role of the National Security Council and the White House with regards to domestic
terrorism; (c) what role the federal government would have in dealing with victims of
terrorism; and (d) was there a connection between weapons of mass destruction and
terrorism.
Immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the policy window
opened for action, all three streams converged, and the political stream focused on
passing legislation to prevent further attacks (Birkland, 2004, 2006, 2009). The policy
entrepreneurs who had connections to the political stream, along with public pressure to
act in response to the attacks, forced the political stream to act quickly. Seven weeks
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 was
enacted into law (Birkland, 2006; Howell, 2004; Naftali, 2005; Scahill, 2006; USA
PATRIOT Act, 2001). The MSF is a sufficient theoretical framework for describing the
agenda setting and policy process involved in the development of and passage of the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
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Limitations of the MSF. The MSF is not without its detractors. While the MSF
has been used to attempt to explain the policy process by incorporating all of the
elements involved in the creation and implementation of policy, there are areas that the
application of the MSF struggles to explain. One of the primary assumptions of the MSF
is the autonomy of the streams, however in practice; there are policy entrepreneurs that
may operate across the streams at the same time before the streams officially converge
during a policy window (Herweg et al., 2018). Additionally, the majority of the
supporting research for the MSF involved qualitative methods and attempts to apply
quantitative methods had resulted in greater variation in how elements of the MSF were
operationally defined (Jones et al., 2016; Winkel & Leipold, 2016). While Birkland
(2004, 2006, 2009) utilized the MSF to explain the creation of the USA PATRIOT Act in
the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks as a focusing event, the aptness of
such an analysis falls apart when one examines the impact and aftermath of the USA
PATRIOT Act and subsequent U.S. counterterrorism policies.
Thus as a single approach, the MSF would be insufficient to explain U.S.
counterterrorism policy over time. In many cases, the MSF has been combined with other
theories on public policy development; however, researchers using those combinations
have struggled to explain why some areas of public policy were implemented when they
did not fully meet the needs of the country (Beland & Howlett, 2016; Howlett et al.,
2016; Mukherjee & Howlett, 2015; Zohlnhofer et al., 2016). One particular key issue is
that while members of the policy stream are aware of the increased threat of domestic
terrorism, the members of the political stream and the policy entrepreneurs have instead
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enacted policy aimed at preventing international terrorism, which is a much smaller
threat. The MSF alone was insufficient to explain this paradox. It was with that in mind
that I chose to incorporate the power elite theory from conflict theory for this current
study.
Conflict Theory–The Power Elite Theory
The origins of conflict theory from sociology can be found in the writings of
Marx and Weber, yet it gained more notoriety among the sociological community as a
reaction to structural functionalism in the early to mid-20th century (Ritzer & Stepnisky,
2018). Within conflict theory, there are variations in approaches from theorists who
demonstrate closer allegiance to Marxian concepts, to those embracing factors outside of
Marx’s sole focus on economics in the production of class conflict. C.W. Mills was
viewed as a radical sociologist within conflict theory at the time of his writings, in
particular because of his decision to examine power relations (Domhoff, 1970). C.W.
Mills produced several seminal works in sociology from identifying what the purpose and
approach to sociology should be in The Sociological Imagination to his more critical
analysis of power relations in the United States in The Power Elite. It is C.W. Mills’
examination of power relations in the United States that was most appropriate to apply to
this study.
C.W. Mills examined the distribution and use of power in the United States.
According to C.W. Mills (1956), there is a three-level power hierarchy that operates
within the United States. The top level of this hierarchy is called the power elite. Directly
below the power elite is the middle level of power comprised of professional politicians,
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pressure groups, and the upper class. The bottom level of power is occupied by the rest of
society (C.W. Mills, 1956). The power elite is comprised of three circles of influence: the
political elite, the economic elite, and the military elite. Figure 2 shows a graphical
representation of the distribution of power in the United States as described by C.W.
Mills (1956).

Figure 2. The power elite.
Political elite. The political elite are not a form of aristocracy; rather they are the
individuals who occupy the influential political positions. These individuals can come
from local society. While there are a disproportionate number of members of the political
elite that have come from the upper classes; ultimately, it is the authority of the position,
not the person that places an individual as a member of the political elite (C.W. Mills,
1956). Because the political elite are elected as representatives of a region, the members
of the political elite are not able to operate only in the interests of the upper class
members of their region, rather they are held accountable to the members of all strata
through the regular election process.
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For the members of the political elite who are appointed into their positions, they
are held accountable in terms of representing the interests of the constituency of those
who elected the person who appointed them (C.W. Mills, 1956). While C.W. Mills
(1956) predicted a decline in the professional politician, a person who seeks a range of
political office holdings in their career; contemporary society is filled with examples of
the professional politician. It may be that the fact that there are so many professional
politicians, and that engaging in politics and getting elected requires funding from others,
that there is more support for the power elite in contemporary society than not. In
particular, there is more support for the relationship between the political and economic
elite.
Economic elite. The economic elite include the corporate rich who own the
means of production. The economic elite are the wealthiest business owners in the United
States. In some cases, the economic elite are also members of the political elite. Mizruchi
(2017) examined the corporate or economic elite in the United States using the power
elite theory. Mizruchi’s historical analysis demonstrated a shift in the economic elite
from remaining only marginally invested in politics, to organizing for political action in
response to growing globalization and competition beginning in the 1970s. However,
Mizruchi concluded that the economic elite of today differed from the economic elite of
C.W. Mills’ (1956) writing; namely, that the economic elite of today were more prone to
short-sighted self-interest rather than working with the other members of the power elite
to contribute to their interests as well.
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Military elite. The military elite include the leaders within the military. In some
cases, there can be overlap between elite memberships of individuals, which also
contributes to the convergence of elites into one unified power elite. For example, the
U.S. president is commander-in-chief and is the ultimate person in charge of the military;
thus he would be a member of the military elite, if he had actual military experience.
However, the U.S. president is also a politician and thus would be a member of the
political elite regardless of prior military experience or rank. If a U.S. president was a
wealthy business owner, he would be a member of the economic elite as well.
Convergence into the power elite. Both C.W. Mills (1959) and Domhoff (1970,
1990) stated that entrance into any powerful position in the United States relies on one
having the elite habitus (Ledwidge & Parmar, 2017). This habitus secures one’s access to
and inclusion among the power elite, and keeps the power elite as a primarily
homogenous and endogenous group, with only a few exceptions. This is the first step in
the convergence of the power elite.
While Domhoff (1970) has argued that foreign policy and select social policy are
the primary exemplars of the power elite operating in the United States, his initial
analysis was dated and completed in a different sociohistorical context. There are other
areas that may also serve as more recent exemplars; and thus, more accurately represent
the policy process in the United States today. Perhaps the most obvious example of how
the three elites have converged to form one power elite comes from the privatized
military industry.
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There is a billion-dollar industry in security, arms, weapons, and equipment used
for military engagements and activities (de Rugy, 2010; Pillar & Preble, 2010; Singer,
2008). The corporations within these industries operate on a for-profit model and provide
needed equipment to the U.S. government for use by the military. The owners of these
corporations are the economic elite. Because their business depends upon government
purchasing, and the government depends upon the research, development, and supply
from these industries; the corporation owners can attempt to influence the political elite
by raising prices or withholding supplies to the military. The military elite are fully aware
of the need for technologically-advanced equipment; and thus, would apply pressure on
the political elite to purchase from specific corporations that engage in the most
innovative and effective research and development. The military elite would also provide
data and encouragement to the corporations to continue research and development.
The interdependent relations among the power elite are not limited solely to
supplies and equipment. Because the United States has not instituted the draft since the
major protests and backlash following the Vietnam War, the United States depends upon
volunteers to serve in the military. As a result of the past protests and backlash from the
Vietnam War, the political elite are against re-instituting the draft to maintain their
political positions. As a result, there have been times that the number of military
personnel is below what is needed to execute its mission. Instead of re-instituting the
draft, the U.S. government has engaged in the hiring of private security contractors, often
former military, to assist in U.S. military missions. Therefore, the military and economic
elites overlap in members and in interests. Because of the close interdependence among

56
these elites, it is to each’s individual benefit to demonstrate that each is looking out for
the other. This unifies the power elite despite having different primary objectives; the
political elite to govern, the military elite to protect, and the economic elite to increase
profit.
In terms of how the power elite operated with regards to counterterrorism policy,
Abrams (2006) noted that in the five years following the passage of the USA PATRIOT
Act of 2001, all three branches of government engaged in deferral and avoidance
regarding challenges to the law, which resulted in a break-down of the checks and
balances that the three branches of the government were designed to provide upon the
others. Hellmuth (2016) observed the changes in the separation of powers, and
specifically, the use of an ongoing war (i.e., the global war on terrorism), as a way to
continue the power imbalance in the U.S. government that has been recently described as
operating under an imperial presidency. It was in counterterrorism and defense policy
areas that the power elite theory was most clearly applicable.
Critique of the power elite. There have been many attempts to refute C.W.
Mills’ analysis of power in the United States, however, none have produced powerful
empirical evidence to counter his analysis. The strong objection that many sociologists of
the time had against C.W. Mills may have had more to do with the discipline’s reluctance
to examine power relations in a similar manner to what C.W. Mills did (Domhoff, 1990).
Thus rejection of the power elite theory may have been premature, as it had found
support from research conducted by Marxist sociologists, who added a class dimension to
the power elite frame (Domhoff, 1990).
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Whitfield (2014) examined the power elite theory since C.W. Mills’ original
publication, and did not find empirical support for the theory. Whitfield argued that the
executive branch is accountable to the population because of the election process for the
president, regardless of concerns about the Electoral College; and insisted that the
president operates in the best interests of the country, not for self-interest or the interests
of the economic or military elite. However, Whitfield failed to delve deeper into the
decision-making process for decisions, such as going to war, beyond who made the final
decision (i.e., Congress). Whitfield rejected the power elite theory as a model, yet
Whitfield’s analysis was cursory, and can be characterized as buying into the illusion of
society, rather than the reality of society (Kinloch, 2004; Ledwidge & Parmar, 2017).
More recent evaluations of the power elite have supported the basic framework
that C.W. Mills described, but have criticized C.W. Mills and Domhoff for not including
biases based on gender, race, ethnicity, and sexuality (see Ledwidge & Parmar, 2017).
Therefore, it was appropriate to conduct a renewed analysis of the potential usefulness of
C.W. Mills’ analysis of power within the framework of counterterrorism policy.
Application of the power elite to U.S. counterterrorism policy. While the
power elite theory may seem counterintuitive to democracy; instead, the power elite are
able to manipulate the democratic process for their own benefit. Kinloch (2004)
examined the role that policy plays for the power elite. Kinloch asserted that the power
elite manipulate policy in order to serve itself and its own interests. For example, war is
said to be necessary to ensure national security; however, waging wars has benefitted the
power elite by (a) helping maintain an atmosphere of fear to ensure continuity in
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leadership during elections, (b) allowing for profiteering, and (c) maintaining existing
inequalities by restricting civil rights (Kinloch, 2004). Therefore, applying the power elite
theory to examine U.S. counterterrorism policy may expose the inconsistencies found
between the promise of the policy and the reality of its implementation.
Ledwidge and Parmar (2017) asserted that issues of race and ethnicity need to be
considered in the application of the power elite theory to foreign policy. Ledgwidge and
Parmar argued that much of foreign policy is controlled by the power elite and that the
power elite are predominantly male and White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP). Thus,
the power elite used foreign policy to ensure their own dominance. The power elite also
operated to maintain inequality and to nurture conflict within and among non-White
groups, so that these groups could not mobilize to gain power. This began with the antimiscegenation laws and extended into other areas, even after those laws were repealed.
During the FBI’s Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), a major approach was
infiltrating the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and the Black Panther Party, and to sow dissention
from within so that the groups would fragment (Hewitt, 2003; Levitas, 2002). The
majority of domestic terrorism has been perpetrated by White men, yet the arrests and
successful criminal prosecution has been dominated by perpetrators of color (Hewitt,
2003, 2005; Levitas, 2002; Norris, 2017). The majority of foreign terrorist organizations
are non-White or of the lower White races (i.e., Irish), and thus the dominance of concern
in U.S. counterterrorism policy being on international versus domestic terrorism could be
motivated by racism and ethnocentrism in the United States (Ledwidge & Parmar, 2017).
By constructing the main terrorist threat as being non-White and non-Christian, the
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power elite continued the practice of marginalizing distinct racial, ethnic, and religious
groups, keeping them from mobilizing and uniting, while at the same time, it has
empowered White, Christian, domestic terrorists to amass weapons (benefiting the
economic and military elite) and keeping the political elite in power.
The AETA of 2006 was implemented to prosecute radical environmental and
radical animal rights activists, labeled eco-terrorists, under the category of terrorism. This
policy was heavily influenced by the interests of the power elite, namely the economic
elite. The economic elite who owned logging businesses, animal research facilities,
furriers, and who also purchased furs and other luxury animal products that are targeted
by the eco-terrorists, wanted higher penalties for offenses committed by eco-terrorists (Su
& Yang, 2017). While the eco-terrorists’ actions did not often result in high lethality,
they did result in high costs to businesses and insurance companies (Bjelopera, 2017; Su
& Yang, 2017).
In addition, the non-violent protests also cost the government in resources spent to
monitor and/or end the protests. For example, when members of Earth First! occupied
trees near a logging operation, local and state law enforcement as well as emergency
responders were dispatched to forcibly remove the occupiers, and disengage the elaborate
cable system that was set up to suspend the occupiers in the trees. The impact extended
beyond the economic elite to the political elite who were pressured by the economic elite
to bring an end to the costly protests. While this specific case did not explicitly involve
the military elite, to continue the support from the political and economic elite, the
military elite would have supported AETA.
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Synthesizing the MSF and Power Elite for Counterterrorism Policy
At the surface, it may seem like selecting theories from different disciplines
would be difficult to synthesize; however, because of the interdisciplinary nature of the
academic examination of terrorism, the MSF and power elite complement each other.
C.W. Mills’ (1956) power elite theory can be applied to explain the inconsistencies in
strictly applying Kingdon’s (2011) MSF to U.S. counterterrorism policy. As will be
discussed later in this chapter, while the primary threat of terrorism comes from domestic
terrorism, U.S. counterterrorism policy has focused on the threat of international
terrorism. This inconsistency was difficult to explain solely using the MSF; however,
when considering the distribution of power in the United States using the power elite
theory, it was clearer that the relationship between the origin and history of the terrorist
threat in the United States, and the subsequent U.S. counterterrorism policies benefit the
power elite. Figure 3 graphically shows how MSF, the power elite, and U.S.
counterterrorism policy relate to one another.
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Figure 3. The MSF and power elite coverage with U.S. counterterrorism policy.
The MSF helped compensate for weaknesses in the power elite theory. If the
power elite solely engaged in activities that promoted themselves, and served themselves,
then it became difficult to explain why certain policies passed when they did, and why
certain social problems got policy attention while others did not. The MSF explained this
shortcoming by demonstrating how the different streams converged during a policy
window to force policy making, even if such policy did not serve the interests of the
power elite. The application of these two theories was useful in helping explain the
connection between domestic terrorism and the specific U.S. counterterrorism policies
that had been developed and enacted since 2001.
Domestic Terrorism
Terrorism is difficult to define because of the breadth of forms of violence that it
encompasses. States may govern through terror which is called State terrorism or
democide (Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Rummel, 1994). Examples of State terrorism or
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democide include the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) under Lenin and
Stalin, and Cambodia under the rule of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge (Martin, 2018;
Nacos, 2016; Rummel, 1994). States may sponsor terrorism perpetrated by organizations
not openly associated with the State sponsor, such as the role that Libya played with the
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) (Coogan, 1994; Martin, 2018; Nacos; 2016).
Libya provided training, weapons, and financing to the PIRA but did not openly
acknowledge its support of the PIRA (Coogan, 1994; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). NonState terrorism, or terror from below, involves any form of terrorism that is perpetrated
below the levels of established States. In some cases, these groups may perpetrate
violence against other terrorist organizations, as was the case with the PIRA and the
Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), among others (Coogan, 1994). In other cases, groups
may target (a) governments and governmental employees, (b) groups within the
population based upon some social category, and (c) groups or corporations surrounding
some single issue, such as abortion or non-human animal testing. Furthermore,
individuals may engage in terrorism as lone wolves with no official or up-to-date
membership or strong association with a terrorist organization (Enders & Sandler, 2012;
Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016).
Terrorism has also been organized and defined along location of operations,
namely domestic or international. Domestic or homegrown terrorism within this realm
would consist of terrorism perpetrated by the individuals of a country within which they
are a resident and/or citizen (Berkebile, 2012, 2017; Bjelopera, 2017; Enders & Sandler,
2012; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). International, foreign,
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or transnational terrorism involves terrorism perpetrated by citizens of one country
operating and targeting citizens of another country, or the government of another country
(Enders & Sandler, 2012; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016).
Terrorism has also been defined and organized according to ideological
motivations. The ideologies may involve religious, social, economic, and/or political
objectives. Terrorists who engage in terrorism for religious objectives are often engaging
in a cosmic war and/or demonstrating intolerance for other religious belief systems
(Hoffman, 2006; Juergensmeyer, 2003; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). The PIRA had
political and economic objectives, seeking the reunification of Ireland and independence
from British rule (Coogan, 1994; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). As more
ideologies fragmented and evolved, more categories were added to define and classify
terrorism along ideological lines. In addition, some groups encompass several ideological
orientations making a classification system or definition based on ideology impossible.
Any definition of terrorism depends upon the type or form of terrorism being
defined. Therefore, to attempt to develop one definition to encompass all forms of
terrorism would be an exercise in futility. Regardless, there are essential elements to all
of the definitions of the different forms of terrorism. These elements include
premeditation and terror as a means to an end not the end itself. For State terrorism,
terrorism is the premeditated use of terror and fear as the primary method of social
control for the State (Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Rummel, 1994). For non-State
terrorism, Enders and Sandler (2012) define terrorism as “the premeditated use or threat
to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social
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objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate
victims” (p. 4). While this definition of non-State terrorism appears to encompass many
of the types of non-State terrorism, it is limited by not including religious and economic
objectives, which are clear objectives of some terrorists and terrorist organizations.
For this study, domestic terrorism was defined as premeditated, intentional acts,
or threats of acts of violence, intended to intimidate, coerce, or influence the civilian
population and/or the government, to achieve some political, religious, economic,
ideological, and/or social objective(s), and perpetrated by a citizen or resident of the
country within which the acts or threats are aimed. For this study, only U.S. domestic
terrorism was analyzed, therefore, only data of terrorist events that occurred in the United
States and were perpetrated by citizens or residents of the United States were included.
While this operational definition encompasses the range of types of domestic terrorism
that has occurred within the United States, there remain some issues regarding any
definition of U.S. domestic terrorism.
Definitional Issues
Domestic terrorism is socially constructed and thus presents challenges in terms
of definitions. Depending upon the entity defining the phenomenon, there are differences
in terms of what is and what is not considered to be domestic terrorism (Bakker, 2015;
Chermak et al., 2012; Freilich & LaFree, 2016; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos,
2016). For example, the definition that the FBI uses is focused on non-State terrorism
against the United States and has a law enforcement perspective. The U.S. Department of
State does not limit its definition to non-State terrorism aimed at the United States, but
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includes State-sponsored terrorism in the development and implementation of sanctions
and restrictions on access to the United States. As a result, the U.S. Department of State
maintains a list identifying foreign terrorist organizations on its website (Bjelopera,
2017).
Furthermore, domestic terrorism is not a mutually exclusive category from hate
crime, extremism, and cults (Bjelopera, 2017; Freilich & LaFree, 2016; Hewitt, 2003;
Martin, 2018). According to Title 18 of the United States Code, domestic terrorism is
defined as:
activities that (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of
criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended (i) to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur
primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States (Terrorism, 2011,
§2331).
Hate crimes are defined as crimes committed or crimes attempted against any
person “because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin” or
“because of the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,
gender identity, or disability” (Hate Crime Acts, 2009, §249). If a crime that would
qualify as a hate crime is perpetrated with the intention of intimidation or coercion of the
civilian population and/or with the intention to influence the government through
intimidation or coercion, then that hate crime would also qualify as an act of terrorism. If
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the perpetrator was a U.S. citizen and the crime occurred within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States, then it would qualify as an act of domestic terrorism.
However, even in such cases, there has not been much consistency with pursuing
terrorism charges versus hate crime charges. For example, Dylann Roof perpetrated a
mass shooting at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, SC on
June 17, 2015. Roof admitted White supremacist ideology and motivation for the act that
resulted in the deaths of nine African Americans; however, even though this event fit the
definition of domestic terrorism, the U.S. government did not label this event as domestic
terrorism nor sought enhanced penalties for the federal crime of terrorism, instead
choosing to pursue charges for hate crime acts (Bjelopera, 2017; Norris, 2017; USSG,
2018, §3A1.4). Therefore solely relying on cases involving perpetrators charged with
terrorism would not include all events that are domestic terrorism.
More recently, a new category called violent extremism has been used to
encompass not only international terrorists but domestic terrorists (Bjelopera, 2017;
LaFree & Freilich, 2019). This new classification creates controversy in terms of legal
action against such actors and creates confusion for data analysis. For example, according
to the FBI (2019), “violent extremism is ‘encouraging, condoning, justifying, or
supporting the commission of a violent act to achieve political, ideological, religious,
social, or economic goals’” (para 1). The issue is that this definition of violent extremism
can encompass individuals and groups that are otherwise protected against prosecution
under freedom of speech (U.S. Const. amend. I). Because violent extremism is not
included in the United States Code, it is not an offense that is prosecutable at this time;
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however, this terminology may interfere with the prosecution of crimes perpetrated by
domestic terrorists, who may otherwise be described as violent extremists. Carpenter
(2018) suggested that the definition of terrorism in the United States Code be expanded to
encompass hate crimes and homicides to strengthen its usefulness in prosecuting
domestic terrorism. Carpenter noted that as it is currently written, incidents that cross the
line between hate crime and domestic terrorism lead to inconsistent treatment under the
law.
From the definitional issues for domestic terrorism in the United States comes
difficulty in creating baseline data or threat evaluation. Bjelopera (2017) highlighted
three areas of difficulty for domestic counterterrorism policymakers. It is difficult to
amass a dataset or establish a baseline of the threat of domestic terrorism when different
agencies that monitor, interact with, investigate, and prosecute domestic terrorism
employ different definitions and terminology. The second area is that there is no official,
public, governmental specification for domestic groups or ideologies that are labeled as
terrorists or extremists. Agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and FBI operate according to different definitions of domestic terrorism, resulting in
different lists of groups used internally (Bjelopera, 2017). The Southern Poverty Law
Center (SPLC) maintains a database and map of hate incidents in the United States;
however, the methodology used to label some groups as extremist or hate groups, while
others are not labeled as such, is unclear and appears to be driven by the political agenda
of the SPLC administrators. In addition, it is unclear what information was used in the
presentation of statistics on their hate map. Thus, such a dataset is neither valid nor
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reliable, although it can be useful in identifying areas of concern or groups of concern.
The final area for Bjelopera (2017) is that there is no accounting of domestic terrorist
plots or attacks that have been investigated. Furthermore, labeling of terrorism changes
over time and is heavily influenced by power and politics (Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). It
would be to the best interests of the nation if an empirical, evidence-based method was
available for determining the terrorist threat, as well as evaluating counterterrorism
policy.
Regardless of the form and motivation of terrorism, it is important to remember
that at its core, terrorism is a tactic or strategy for social change through violent means
(Bakker, 2015; Bjelopera, 2017; Coogan, 1994; Enders & Sandler, 2012; Enders et al.,
2011; Forest, 2010; Gerwehr & Hubbard, 2007; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin,
2018; Nacos, 2016). When terrorism is conceived of as a tactic or strategy, it allows for a
clearer analysis of the impact of counterterrorism policy. It is important to note that the
motivations of a terrorist are very different than those of a traditional criminal and
therefore, using only a criminal justice approach would not result in the effectiveness that
an interdisciplinary approach would (Bakker, 2015; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006;
Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). While the criminal justice approach has met limited success
against domestic terrorists; alone, it is insufficient to break down a well-organized
terrorist group (Bakker, 2015; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos; 2016).
This could be part of the impetus for developing policies specific to terrorist offenses.
Because of the complexity of terrorism and the intersection of terrorist offenses
with other categories of criminal offenses, the GTD established criteria for inclusion that
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allows for all global acts of non-State terrorism to be documented. The criteria for
inclusion in the GTD allows for inclusion of events that are characterized as terrorism
regardless of criminal proceedings following capture of the perpetrator(s). Thus, the
criteria used allow for a more complete source of data on acts of terrorism.
History of Domestic Terrorism
Domestic terrorism was not added as a classification to the United States Code
until the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Terrorism, 2011; USA PATRIOT
Act, 2001); however, it is not because domestic terrorism had not been in existence prior
to 2001. Between 1954 and 2004, at least 3,120 terrorism incidents occurred in the
United States, the majority of which were perpetrated by U.S. citizens, and thus qualify
as domestic terrorism (Hewitt, 2003, 2005).
Scholars who have studied terrorism have attempted to create categories and
classifications to ease understanding and empirical analysis of terrorism. While these
categories are not mutually exclusive nor do they necessarily encompass all forms that
terrorism may take, they can be useful in attempting to identify trends. Some typologies
focus on ideological variations, i.e. religious, political, nationalistic, etc., others may
focus on group dynamics i.e. lone-wolf, organized group, leaderless resistance, cellbased, hierarchies, etc., and further others may focus on actions, i.e. single-event,
protracted conflict, etc. (Bakker, 2015; Crenshaw, 1995, [1998] 2012; Greenberg, 2011;
Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Naftali, 2005; Sandler, 2014).
Various scholars have attempted to examine commonalities along those
dimensions or identify paradigmatic trends to understand terrorism and possibly predict
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terrorist threats. Hewitt (2003) examined U.S. domestic terrorism as occurring in waves,
comparing active groups with sociohistorical and political contexts. From 1954 to 2000,
the majority of terrorism incidents and fatalities were perpetrated by White
racist/Rightest terrorist ideologies (31.2% incidents, 51.6% fatalities) (Hewitt, 2003).
Revolutionary Leftist terrorist ideologies, which was second to White racist/Rightest,
accounted for 21.2% of incidents and 2.0% of fatalities (Hewitt, 2003). Foreign terrorist
attacks in the United States accounted for less than that perpetrated by the White
racist/Rightist terrorist ideology (20.3% incidents, 11.6% fatalities) from that same time
frame (Hewitt, 2003). Before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the majority of
terrorism in the United States was perpetrated by domestic terrorists.
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(START) issued a background report using data from the GTD to show changes in
ideological motivations for terrorism occurring in the United States from 1970 to 2016
(Miller, 2017). The breakdown of ideologies differed from those used by Hewitt (2003);
however, Miller (2017) found that during 2000 to 2009, the majority of domestic terrorist
attacks were perpetrated by Left-wing extremists including eco-terrorists (i.e. ALF, ELF).
The number of attacks by Left-wing extremists increased by 80% from the prior decade,
but most of those attacks resulted in property damage with no fatalities. During 2000 to
2009 Right-wing extremist terrorism decreased by 40% compared to the previous decade
(Miller, 2017).
Compared to the preceding decade, Miller (2017) found that Left-wing extremist
terrorism decreased from 64% to 12% during 2010 to 2016. During this six-year time
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period, both Right-wing extremism and religious extremism increased dramatically from
the previous decade (Right-wing extremists 6% to 35%, religious extremist 9% to 53%).
It should be noted that there is overlap in motivations for Right-wing extremism and
religious extremism (Miller, 2017). Overall, terrorism in the United States has decreased
since 1970 (Miller, 2017).
After September 11, 2001, a debate arose among terrorism scholars over whether
there was a new form of terrorism that fundamentally differed from terrorism of the past
(Crenshaw, [2009] 2012; Laqueur, 2000). Some scholars argued that new terrorism,
which involves religious motivation and greater lethality made historical interpretations,
approaches, and understandings of terrorism irrelevant and useless (Crenshaw, [2009]
2012; Laqueur, 2000). The differences between old terrorism and new terrorism involved
differences in motivation, goals/aims, methods, organization, and resources. However, it
remains to be seen whether this characterization of terrorism involves more than simply
adaptation to countering the security environment and increased technology.
It is important to remember that just as terrorism is a social construction, so are
these typologies and organizational classifications. Furthermore, terrorist organizations
do not exists in stasis rather they evolve over time; some finding greater longevity, some
transitioning into legitimacy, and others ending abruptly. In some cases terrorist
organizations split up into different organizations, join forces with other terrorist
organizations, or work with other terrorist organizations to execute operations or gain
training and resources (Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Miller, 2017; Nacos,
2016). There has also been an increasing trend in lone wolf terrorism while official
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terrorist organizations in the United States have declined (Bjelopera, 2017; Martin, 2018;
Miller, 2017). This has led to Bjelopera (2017) suggesting that terrorism be
conceptualized in terms of threat rather than as groups. Therefore, for the purposes of this
study, the focus was on domestic terrorism and not broken down further by ideological,
motivational, or form typologies. Terrorists who are part of larger terrorist organizations
as well as lone wolf actors were analyzed in this study.
Empirical Approaches to Studying U.S. Domestic Terrorism
Domestic terrorism has been an area of study for some time but gained renewed
interest in recent years. As interest in the field grew from the interdisciplinary “terrorism
studies” literature, databases were created to keep track of terrorist events (Bakker, 2015;
Crenshaw, 2014). Within terrorism studies, how terrorism was socially constructed and
subsequently how it was studied evolved. Predominantly, transnational terrorism and
terrorism outside of the United States was the focus of much of the terrorism research.
While qualitative studies examined aspects of terrorism were useful in uncovering
perceptions of the threat of terrorism, uncovering some of the internal issues within
terrorist organizations, uncovering some of the motivations of terrorism, and the social
factors that contribute to someone joining, staying, and/or leaving a terrorist organization;
there has been a call for more quantitative work, especially in light of the availability of
data on terrorism (Bassiouni, 1988, 2002; Berkebile, 2012, 2017; Bjelopera, 2017;
Crenshaw, 2014; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; De Cataldo Neuburger & Valentini, 1996;
Dugan & Distler, 2017; Enders & Sandler, 2014; Freilich & LaFree, 2016; Lum et al,
2006; Williams, 2018). Policy makers may use the results from empirical analyses of
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terrorism to develop, or continue more effective counterterrorism policy, or discontinue
ineffective counterterrorism policy.
Researchers frequently use open source data to build terrorism databases. Open
source data are those data taken from unclassified and publicly-available sources, often
media sources, but also legal documentation and other unclassified, public reports
(Dugan & Distler, 2017; LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). Media
sources are especially appropriate sources for information about terrorism because of the
special relationship between terrorism and the media (Altheide, 2006, 2007, 2019;
Bakker, 2015; Hoffman, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Terrorists
want to reach a larger audience to get their message heard, and the media is the ideal
vehicle for broadcasting that message. Terrorists thus aim to attract media attention for
their attacks, in some cases announcing when an impending attack will approximately
occur (Dugan & Distler, 2017; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Furthermore,
the media rely on terrorists because their attacks tend to be sensational and violent, thus
attracting viewers and keeping the media outlet in business (Altheide, 2006, 2007, 2019;
Dugan & Distler, 2017; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Usage of the
internet and social media have extended the reach of reports of terrorist attacks, allowing
individuals to access local news stories and local personal accounts of terrorist attacks
that may not have garnered the attention or been accessible to international media outlets
(Altheide, 2019; Dugan & Distler, 2017).
Researchers are concerned with data validity when examining terrorism
quantitatively. Safer-Lichtenstein, LaFree, and Loughran (2017) highlighted the
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challenges of utilizing empirical data. The primary issue involved the transparency of
coding and inclusion criteria for different datasets that were openly available.
Additionally, some data were only available if the researcher(s) had high security
clearance or classified access. There is a risk of increasing error in analyses when
datasets from different sources are used, because of inconsistencies along definitions,
coding strategies, classifications, and information reliability. Even when restricting to one
dataset, a researcher must deal with missing data. There are events that are believed to
have been perpetrated by terrorists yet have yielded no declaration of responsibility nor
prosecution to elucidate which terrorist was responsible. There are events that may be
terrorism, but also may fall into other crime categories, such as hate crime. It is for these
reasons that solely relying on crime data from legal agents, such as law enforcement,
victimization surveys, and perpetrator reports were not reliable in assessing terrorism
(Dugan & Distler, 2017).
Safer-Lichtenstein et al. (2017) suggested that the managers of datasets need to be
as transparent as possible, and that researchers need to clearly state how missing data was
factored into any analysis. For example, Miller (2017) utilized the GTD to examine
ideological trends in terrorism in the United States and noted in multiple places that 24%
of the data were of unknown ideology and were not included in the analysis. One of the
limitations of the GTD is that the data from 1993 were corrupted and lost, and it is only
estimated that 15% of the original data on terrorist events that occurred globally during
1993, have been recovered and included (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START,
2018b).
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Some researchers have studied terrorism using only a criminological approach
that treats terrorism as another form of crime. Carson, LaFree, and Dugan (2012) utilized
mixed methods to examine the activities of radical environmental and radical animal
rights activists operating in the United States. In their analysis, Carson et al. (2012)
separated activities into two types, terrorist and non-terrorist. As part of this research,
Carson et al. (2012) constructed a new database, the Eco-Incidents Database (EID)
pulling from two primary sources, the Foundation for Biomedical Research database on
criminal cases and the GTD, but also included data from ten additional sources. This
study was useful in identifying a process by which to study a specific type of terrorism
empirically, as well as the importance of their findings for future research and for public
policy.
Quinn (2016) examined terrorist activity in New York City from 1975 to 2015.
Using data from START, Quinn (2016) found that terrorist activity in New York City
decreased steadily since 1975. Quinn examined the geo-spatial patterns of the attacks and
found that the terrorist attacks became less diffuse throughout New York City, with more
concentration among the outer boroughs. Quinn identified movement ideologies, number
and organization of attacks, and methods used over time. Nash (2017) examined the
effectiveness of the Urban Area Security Initiative Program (UASI) in seven urban areas
in the United States from 1970 to 2010. Nash used several time-series analyses to
evaluate the effectiveness of UASI. These studies offered models by which several
variables of terrorism were assessed over time by using open source data.
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LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (2009) examined attack patterns from 1970 to 2004
of foreign terrorist organizations targeting the United States. The authors identified 53
groups as having anti-American sentiment and examined the total number of attacks and
total number of fatal attacks against the United States, and attacks against others. In
addition, LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw examined the trajectories of terrorist attacks and
identified sporadic attacks compared to specific decades. The results provided additional
insight to how terrorist organizations operate. Instead of solely looking at waves as
Hewitt (2003) did, LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw found that anti-American terrorist
organizations operated in either waves or in boom and bust patterns.
Freilich, Adamczyk, Chermak, Boyd, and Parkin (2015) compared homicides
committed by terrorists to homicides that were not motivated by terrorism. Freilich et al.
applied deprivation theory, backlash theory, and social disorganization theory to explain
the differences between homicide motivations at the county level. The limitations of
Freilich et al.’s study included that they only examined one ideological perspective, i.e.
far-Right extremists, even though there was a vast array of ideological motivations for
terrorists in the United States; and they only examined the crime of homicide, even
though many U.S. domestic terrorists do not engage in homicide as a tactic. As noted
earlier, Hewitt (2003, 2005) found that most U.S. domestic terrorism does not result in
fatalities.
Comparing terrorist activity to criminal activity was not the only method
employed when researchers investigated terrorism empirically. Time-series analyses have
been an important component of the terrorism studies literature. Enders and Sandler
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(1993) examined the impact that six specific counterterrorism interventions had on
transnational terrorist activity from 1968 to 1988. Enders and Sandler found that terrorist
organizations adapted their methods in response to specific types of interventions, such as
increased barriers at embassies, increased use of metal detectors at airports, among
others. Without the empirical analysis, justification for increasing target hardening
strategies as part of a counterterrorism approach would rely solely on anecdotal
information. Hsu, Vasquez, and McDowall (2018) used the GTD to examine whether
target hardening in the United States resulted in a shift of terrorist activity from the U.S.
mainland to abroad. Hsu et al. did not find that terrorism was displaced to interests
outside of the United States upon target-hardening interventions implemented within the
United States; thus providing empirical data for policy makers in justifying the use of
these strategies without fear that displacement would occur.
Some empirical analyses focused on the creation of models of trajectories towards
terrorist activity. Klausen, Campion, Needle, Nguyen, and Libretti (2016) examined
specific cases of Al Qaeda-inspired homegrown terrorists in the United States. Klausen et
al. presented a method for translating qualitative data into quantitative data for statistical
analysis to produce a descriptive model for radicalization. Subedi (2017) suggested that
empirical data could be used to establish early warning and early response (EWER)
systems in countries that deal with radicalization and violent extremism. Models, such as
the one used by Klausen et al., are critical to establishing EWERs.
Gonzalez, Freilich, and Chermak (2014) used data from the U.S. Extremist Crime
Database (ECDB) to examine factors that impact women who engaged in U.S. domestic
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terrorism. Gonzalez et al. found that regardless of ideology, most women terrorists
became involved in terrorism due to relationships they had with terrorists or extremists,
and that their activities tended not to produce high casualties, or even intend on killing
others. However, Gonzalez et al. found the ECDB to be limited in gaining more
demographic information on the women perpetrators, which may provide more
information on trends towards radicalization and activity within U.S. domestic terrorist
organizations. As such, Gonzalez et al. recommended employing a mixed method
approach where qualitative interviewing could be used to supplement the data provided
by the ECDB.
Makin and Hoard (2014) used the American Terrorism Study (ATS) to examine
the gender gap in U.S. domestic terrorism. The ATS included data on all FBI
investigations from 1980 to 2002 (Makin & Hoard, 2014). Through their examination,
Makin and Hoard suggested that counterterrorism policy needed to take gender into
consideration, and that there needed to be further research into the role that women play
in U.S. domestic terrorism.
Examining successful terrorist events was not the only empirical approach to
studying terrorism. Comparison of failed plots with successful events provide
information regarding how a terrorist organization evolves its methods, as well as
provided a trajectory of behaviors for law enforcement to watch for as warnings of
potential future terrorist attacks. Utilizing the case of the failed attack by the True
Knights of the KKK in 1997, Kollars and Brister (2014) demonstrated that important
information about the evolution of terrorist tactics could be gained by examining a failed
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mission. While Kollars and Brister only examined a single case study, their methods
could inform policymakers on how to implement effective counterterrorism policy aimed
at curbing Right-wing extremists operating within the United States. Charles and Maras
(2015) examined six case studies to identify how the organizational learning cycles,
community institutions, and security institutions impacted the success or failure of a
terrorist attack. While useful information that has the potential for use by policymakers
was gleaned from these studies, the case study analysis does not lend itself to
generalization. Therefore, these case study analyses may lay the foundation for future
quantitative research focusing on the evolution of terrorist organization tactics. Klein,
Gruenewald, and Smith (2017) used data from ATS to examine the characteristics of
Right-wing extremist terrorism in the United States. Klein et al. (2017) found mixed
results in attempting to develop a trajectory from precursor activities to incident success.
Researchers focusing on the terrorists was not the only area of interest recently.
Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk (2018) examined the use of sting operations for
counterterrorism in the United States from 1989 to 2014. Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk
were interested in how the Oklahoma City bombing terrorist attack and the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks influenced the use of entrapment through sting operations. Through
examination of domestic terrorist prosecutions in the United States, Norris and GrolProkopczyk uncovered the temporal trends in the use of entrapment against Jihadist
terrorists, Right-wing extremists, and all types of domestic terrorism in the United States.
Norris and Prokopczyk found that following the Oklahoma City bombing terrorist attack,
sting operations targeting Right-wing extremists increased greatly, but entrapment
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indicators remained low. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, both sting
operations and entrapment indicators increased (Norris and Prokopczyk, 2018).
Thus far, the majority of studies discussed focused on single nations; however,
researchers have used comparative studies. DeLeeuw and Pridemore (2018) compared
domestic terrorism in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. DeLeeuw and
Pridemore used the GTD to compare these nations to identify dominant configurations of
characteristics for incidents, perpetrator types, and outcomes. DeLeeuw and Pridemore
provided a model for comparing domestic terrorism between nations.
Reed (2013) compared U.S. militia groups to Northern Ireland Ulster Loyalist
paramilitary organizations (Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defense
Association (UDA)) to demonstrate the trajectory that extremism took from ideology to
terrorism. Reed specifically focused on the impact that economic conditions had on
extremist trajectories. Reed found that economic disruption, especially rapid change, can
lead to breaking from mainstream society and entrenching into a specific version of
history that will be defended at all costs.
What this review shows is that empirical research on terrorism is possible and
preferred in terms of informing counterterrorism policy. As L. Clarke (2003) noted when
it comes to learning specific lessons from experience with large-scale terrorist attacks like
the September 11, 2001 attacks, “the lessons are already there but elites have to pay
attention if they are to matter” (p. 2). While several of the studies discussed the policy
implications of their results, none specifically examined U.S. counterterrorism policy and
its impact on terrorist activity. This study addressed this gap in the literature by using the
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GTD to examine changes in domestic terrorist incidents, lethality, and costs following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy since the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks.
The Global Terrorism Database
The GTD is an open source dataset that has logged non-State terrorism incidents
from 1970 to 2017 (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). In order for incidents to be
included within the GTD, they must satisfy all three attributes of the GTD definition of
terrorism, and at least, two of the three inclusion criteria (LaFree & Dugan, 2007;
START, 2018b). A terrorist attack, as defined by the GTD is “the threatened or actual use
of illegal force or violence by a non-State actor to attain a political, economic, religious,
or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (START, 2018b, p.10). Each
included incident must (a) be intentional, (b) involve some level of use of or threat of use
of violence, and (c) be perpetrated by sub-national actors. Furthermore, the three
inclusion criteria from which at least two must be fulfilled are:
Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or
social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not
satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic
economic change.
Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or
convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the
immediate victims. It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if
every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As
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long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to
coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.
Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare
activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by
international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately
targeting civilians or non-combatants). (START, 2018b, p.10)
In the original formulation of the GTD, several existing terrorism databases were
examined (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). Following the
verification and compilation of these sources, beginning in 2011, all data entered into the
GTD were from open sources and compiled by START staff. The data included in the
GTD came from “publicly available, unclassified source materials” (START, 2018b;
p.3). While the origins of the GTD came from pre-existing databases, more recent
additions came from media articles and electronic news archives (START, 2018b). Three
separate sources for each event were required for an event to be included, and those
sources were listed along with the event in the GTD (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan,
2007; START, 2018a, 2018b).
There were some methodological issues that came from using databases built on
open source data. Freilich and LaFree (2016) highlighted the main issues with reliability
of sources, inter-rater reliability issues, failure to include a control group or non-terrorist
group in analyses, how missing values are handled, selectivity bias in database
development and construction, and defining an event in a binary as either terrorism or
not. Ackerman and Pinson (2016) proposed a blueprint for a method for operationalizing
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event validity in open source databases. Their “Source Evaluation Schema” method
addressed the methodological concerns of source reliability, selectivity bias, and event
validity issues. Ackerman and Pinson highly recommended detailed codebooks that were
fully transparent. External raters used a scale to measure the degree of confidence for
various aspects of open source data including individual source credibility, overall event
validity, inherent event uncertainty, and event detail. Two measures were broken down
into two indicators. For individual source credibility, the database creator’s objectivity
and competence were rated. For event detail evaluation, whether the detail on the event
was corroborated and the level of discrepancy between sources were rated (Ackerman &
Pinson, 2016). Ackerman and Pinson suggested that their proposed schema operate as a
starting point for individuals to adapt and expand upon for use with appropriate open
source databases.
Behlendorf, Belur, and Kumar (2016) compared terrorism data across three
publicly-available datasets to check for selection bias. The GTD, the Worldwide Incident
Terrorism System (WITS), and the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) were compared
in their inclusion of incidents from the Maoist insurgency in Andhra Pradesh from 2005
to 2009 (Behlendorf et al., 2016). The data within these terrorism databases were also
compared to official police records for the region. Behlendorf et al. found that there were
a substantial number of Maoist insurgency attacks missing from the GTD, WITS, and
SATP. However, most of the terrorist attacks by the Maoist insurgents were not covered
by the English-speaking national or international media, which may have contributed to
their exclusion in these datasets. While Behlendorf et al. demonstrated that there was
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selection bias for a case of terrorism, because this study was focusing on U.S. domestic
terrorism, the media coverage issue and any language-reporting issues would not
undermine the validity of the GTD.
The GTD codebook includes detailed descriptions of the history of the GTD,
coding methods, and a detailed list of changes made with the release of the updated
database. Not only are the changes listed, but the rationale for the changes along with
adjustments in methodology are also explicitly presented. For example, when dealing
with the issue of whether an incident is terrorism, the GTD has a variable called doubt
terrorism proper, which is checked if there is some question as to whether the event was
an act of terrorism or not (Freilich & LaFree, 2016; START, 2018b). These details are an
essential element for transparency and informing researchers who plan to use the GTD in
their studies, and help researchers address the methodological concerns of using the
GTD, as with any open source database. A detail that was not included in the codebook
was the use of a source evaluation scale and the inter-rater reliability results. Those
measures are used internally by START and not made public, which would be useful for
external researchers using the GTD and in alignment with the recommendations by
Ackerman and Pinson (2016).
Filtering the Dataset for U.S. Domestic Terrorist Incidents
The GTD contains global terrorism data for non-State terrorism, therefore I had to
filter the data to conduct my analysis of U.S. domestic terrorism. Berkebile (2017)
compared several terrorism incident databases in terms of identifying domestic terrorism.
For an incident to be considered domestic terrorism, the perpetrator and target (victim
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and attack location) must match. Berkebile offered one method to classify events from
the GTD as domestic terrorist events. To ensure that only terrorist incidents were
included in his analysis, Berkebile filtered the GTD to include only subnational actors,
noncombatant targets, audience beyond the immediate victims, and whether the event had
a political or social objective. To further filter the GTD for domestic terrorist incidents,
Berkebile examined the state/nationality of the incident location, the nationality of the
target, and the nationality of the perpetrators.
The first step in filtering the GTD was to only include terrorist incidents that
occurred within the territorial boundaries of the United States. Therefore, attack location
was filtered for inclusion if the attack location was in the United States or its territories.
The next step involved perpetrator identity. The GTD does not offer a category
identifying perpetrator nationality in its public dataset. However, the GTD provides
variables that identify incidents as logistically and/or ideologically international, in which
perpetrator nationality is compared with nationality of target. A third variable that
compares location of attack with nationality of victim without information regarding
perpetrator nationality is also available. All three of these variables are coded as yes, no,
or unknown. However, there were some cases in which a domestic terrorist attack was
coded as international, and therefore, I did not these established variables in the filtering
process. Instead, I looked up the perpetrator nationality in the open source citations for
the event in the GTD and/or through open source materials online.
When I was unable to identify the nationality of the perpetrator, I coded those
events as unknown. By including the unknown incidents in a combined analysis with
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known domestic terrorist incidents, an additional source of Type 2 error could have been
introduced which is why I decided to analyze unknown events separately (see Berkbile,
2017). Therefore, I analyzed domestic terrorist events, unknown events, and all terrorist
events (international, domestic, and unknown) separately.
The GTD is an easily accessible and user-friendly database for terrorism research.
The GTD has been used in a range of studies examining various elements of terrorism,
transnational and domestic. This study utilized the data from the GTD to examine the
impact that U.S. counterterrorism policy had on domestic terrorism.
U.S. Counterterrorism Policy
Domestic terrorism has been a problem for a long time in the United States;
however, counterterrorism policy in the United States has focused mainly on the threat
from foreign terrorist organizations. There have been policies aimed at regulating and
managing identified vulnerabilities and hazards that could be exploited by terrorists, and
thus used in an attack, such as regulations on nuclear material (Mitchell, 2003). However,
those policies were only from the scope of preventing a catastrophic disaster, and not
particularly aimed at deterring or preventing terrorism specifically. The overarching
approach to terrorism for the United States has been one of criminalizing activities
associated with terrorism, attempting to identify crimes and ideologies that align with
known terrorist organizations, and preventing terrorist attacks.
Counterterrorism Policy Before 9/11
Provisions regarding State sponsors of terrorism and acts of international or
transnational terrorism had been included in legislation beginning with the Trading With
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the Enemy Act (TWEA) of 1917; however, it was the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 that first
established terrorism as a crime (Antiterrorism Act, 1990; Levitas, 2002; Naftali, 2005;
Trading with the Enemy Act [TWEA], 1917). While the Omnibus Diplomatic Security
and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 addressed the threat of terrorism by authorizing the use of
rewards for intelligence related to terrorism, authorizing United States support in
antiterrorism activities with allies, prohibition of exporting munitions to countries that
sponsor terrorism, established boundaries of U.S. jurisdiction over international
terrorism, and provisions regarding financial support for victims of terrorism, there was
not specific category of terrorism added to the United States Code, but only a
recommendation from Congress for the President to negotiate an international convention
to combat international terrorism.
The Posse Comitatus Act (PSA) of 1878 established a specific limitation on the
use of the army or air force as a posse comitatus, or in any other capacity, to execute laws
without the express approval of Congress (Hewitt, 2003; Levitas, 2002; Posse Comitatus
Act [PSA], 2011). While it may appear that the PSA prohibits the use of the military
against domestic terrorism, there are provisions within the United States Code that allow
for the use of the military against insurrection (Elsea, 2018; Levitas, 2002; PSA, 2011).
The purpose of the PSA was to prohibit the use of the military to execute civilian law, not
to interfere with its duties, even when those duties involve cooperation with law
enforcement in the execution of their duties, which include executing civilian law (Elsea,
2018). Therefore, the military may be used to combat domestic terrorism without
violating the PSA.
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The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) was a
watered-down version of the proposed Omnibus Counter-Terrorism Act of 1995, which
never overcame the opposition within the House of Representatives, even after the 1995
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK (Naftali,
2005). In 1992, the criminal code had the category of international terrorism added
(FCAA, 1992); however, until AEDPA, terrorism had been handled solely through the
criminal code (Hewitt, 2003; Naftali, 2005). While the United States had been dealing
with attacks from domestic terrorists for a long time, it was the threat of international
terrorist organizations that led to the passage of AEDPA (Hewitt, 2003; Naftali, 2005).
It is important to note that even though AEDPA was passed after the Oklahoma
City terrorist attack, its provisions were not motivated by that terrorist attack (cf.,
Wetherbee, 2007). Rather, the provisions were in the making long before the Oklahoma
City terrorist attack occurred, and AEDPA specifically addressed foreign terrorist
organizations, not domestic terrorism (R.A. Clarke, 2004; Naftali, 2005).
Even though AEDPA was a watered-down version of the Omnibus CounterTerrorism act of 1995, it still contained controversial provisions that were challenged as
violating the U.S. Constitution. Under AEDPA, governmental powers were expanded
such that any individual suspected of being a terrorist, or supporting terrorism, could be
denied entry into the United States. In addition, AEDPA allowed for the deportation of
non-citizens suspected of supporting terrorism (Hewitt, 2003; AEDPA, 1996). The
AEDPA also allowed for terrorism to be addressed outside of the criminal code, and
added the ability of the government to prosecute individuals who were identified as
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funding foreign terrorist organizations (AEDPA, 1996; Agarwal, 2004; Hewitt, 2003). In
the end, AEDPA made it difficult for terrorist organizations to use the United States as a
base for financing their activities, while allowing for protections of the civil rights of U.S.
citizens and residents loyal to the United States, versus those who knowingly engaged in
contributing to foreign terrorist organizations (Agarwal, 2004).
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 had a primary focus on international terrorism.
This policy was passed rapidly in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks. Despite its international terrorism focus, the USA PATRIOT Act established
domestic terrorism as a crime, and thus offered expanded investigative abilities and the
opportunity to prosecute acts of domestic terrorism as a separate category from nonterrorist crimes (18 U.S.C. 133B §2331 to 2339D, 2011; Doyle, 2002; Hellmuth, 2016;
Hewitt, 2003; Howell, 2004; Naftali, 2005; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001).
The USA PATRIOT Act included many of the provisions found in the original
Omnibus Counter-Terrorism Act of 1995 that had been rejected (R.A. Clarke, 2004;
Naftali, 2005). The specific provisions within the USA PATRIOT Act taken from the
Omnibus Counter-Terrorism Act of 1995 included the expansion of surveillance powers
for law enforcement and a loosening of requirements regarding obtaining warrants for
suspected terrorists (Doyle, 2002; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001).
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 included ten titles: enhancing domestic security
against terrorism, enhanced surveillance procedures, International Money Laundering
Abatement and Anti-terrorism Financing act of 2001, protecting the border, removing
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obstacles to investigating terrorism, providing for victims of terrorism, public safety
officers, and their families, increased information sharing for critical infrastructure
protection, strengthening the criminal laws against terrorism, improved intelligence, and
miscellaneous. A sunset clause was included under Title II Enhanced Surveillance
Procedures which scheduled this title, with some exceptions, to expire on December 31,
2005 (Doyle, 2002; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001).
The specific provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act which may have impacted
domestic terrorism included the increased funding to update and modernize the FBI’s
technical support center, the enhanced surveillance procedures, increased regulations
found within the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-terrorism
Financing Act of 2001, the removing obstacles to investigating terrorism, increased
information sharing for critical infrastructure protection, strengthening the criminal laws
against terrorism, improved intelligence, and under the miscellaneous provision
limitations on hazmat license issuance and increased critical infrastructure protection
(Doyle, 2002; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001).
One specific provision involved the use of delayed-notice search warrants (Doyle,
2002; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001; Yeh & Doyle, 2006). A delayed-notice search warrant
allowed for law enforcement to execute a search without prior notification to the property
owner, as long as law enforcement did not remove any materials (Yeh & Doyle, 2006).
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 had extended the use of delayed-notice search warrants
to include any criminal investigation (Doyle, 2002; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001; Yeh &
Doyle, 2006).
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Many of the provisions within the USA PATRIOT Act were challenged as
unconstitutional and in violation of civil liberties. Within three years of its passage, the
Supreme Court heard cases involving the rights of detainees to the U.S. legal process
(Rasul v. Bush), the detention and rights of a U.S. citizen captured as an enemy
combatant overseas (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld), and the designation of a U.S. citizen as an
enemy combatant leading to detention under military custody, rather than due process
through the criminal justice system (Rumsfeld v. Padilla) (Abrams, 2006; GorhamOscilowski & Jaeger, 2008; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004; Pious, 2006; Rasul v. Bush, 2004;
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 2004; Schwinn, 2016; Wilke, 2005; Wong, 2006). Additional
challenges to the USA PATRIOT Act involved the expansion of presidential powers, the
extensiveness of the use of surveillance, the use of detention, and the possible violations
to the U.S. Constitution, specifically amendments I, IV, V, VI, and XIV (Abrams, 2006;
Gorham-Oscilowski & Jaeger, 2008; Pious, 2006; Schwinn, 2016; U.S. Const. amend. I,
IV, V, VI, XIV; Wilke, 2005; Wong, 2006).
There is always a delicate balance between national security and civil liberties,
and it was the perceived need for the government to do something in response to the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that allowed for these provisions to not only pass,
but later be extended. The use of sunset provisions replaced informed debate among
legislatures and allowed for the USA PATRIOT Act’s rapid passage. Even though there
were concerns over the constitutionality of the provisions within the USA PATRIOT Act,
when a draft of its successor named the Domestic Security Enhancement Act (DSEA) of
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2003 or the PATRIOT Act II was leaked, it showed that governmental powers would be
expanded at the expense of civil liberties (Hellmuth, 2016; Scahill, 2006).
The DSEA allowed for prosecution with less burden of proof for terrorism-related
charges, expanded criminalization of support for terrorism beyond the provisions enacted
by AEDPA, criminalization of association with suspected terrorists, immigration and
deportation proceedings would have severe limitations on the use of the writ of habeas
corpus, and there would not be oversight or checks and balances in place when the
government engaged in the use of rendition of suspected terrorists to nations that
practiced torture (Hellmuth, 2016; Scahill, 2006). In addition, DSEA included provisions
allowing for an expansion of the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) so that
surveillance of U.S. citizens who may have associations with domestic terrorist groups
would be legally allowed (Hellmuth, 20165; Scahill, 2006). Another noteworthy aspect of
the DSEA was the absence of any sunset provision, which would have allowed for the
entire act to be implemented permanently (Hellmuth, 2016; Scahill, 2006). The absence
of sunset provisions suggested a new era in which terrorism was considered to be a
continued threat without any end. The backlash from the release of the draft of the DSEA
resulted in it not being submitted to Congress, and allowed for it to be redrafted into the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005
In this first renewal act for the USA PATRIOT Act, 16 of the more controversial
provisions were addressed. However, instead of allowing further debate on these
provisions by resetting sunset provisions, 14 of the 16 provisions were made permanent
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(Abrams, 2006; USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 2005; Yeh &
Doyle, 2006). The only provisions that were given a new sunset date were those
regarding FISA and roving wiretaps authorization (Abrams, 2006; USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 2005; Yeh & Doyle, 2006).
The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 more clearly
elucidated the use and role of National Security Letters (NSL), such that the NSLs were
in closer compliance with the U.S. Constitution (Abrams, 2006; USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 2005; Yeh & Doyle, 2006). In the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001, NSLs were another method of obtaining information; however,
they were not subject to judicial review (Doyle, 2002; Schwinn, 2016; USA PATRIOT
Act, 2001). Another notable change included the lone wolf extension. The lone wolf
amendment was part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA)
of 2004, which designated non-U.S. persons as eligible for surveillance, regardless of
whether that individual was officially tied to a foreign terrorist organization (Bazan,
2005; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act [IRTPA], 2004; Yeh & Doyle,
2006). In addition, IRTPA amended FISA (1978) to cover lone wolves and did not
require probable cause for the issuance of authorization for surveillance (Bazan, 2005;
IRTPA, 2004).
Overall, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005
addressed some of the civil liberty concerns by more clearly detailing how intelligence
could be gathered, loosened restrictions on nondisclosure orders for terrorist
investigations and surveillance, clarified vague language, and increased oversight by
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adding additional checks and balances to prevent abuse (Schwinn, 2016; USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 2005; Yeh & Doyle, 2006).
The provisions of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005 that may have impacted domestic terrorism included the changes in what
constituted terrorism to include being trained by foreign terrorist organizations and drug
trafficking to fund terrorism (Yeh & Doyle, 2006). The extension and expansion of use of
roving wiretaps allowed for the incidental surveillance of U.S. citizens who happened to
interact with, or be near the surveillance target. Increased penalties for money laundering
in association with terrorism may also have impacted domestic terrorist operations.
Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act of 2006
Of the 21st century U.S. counterterrorism policies being examined in this study,
AETA of 2006 is the only policy that was aimed specifically at a form of domestic
terrorism. Eco-terrorism involves terrorist activity motivated by radical environmental
and/or radical animal rights ideologies. Among the most active domestic terrorist
organizations are those who engaged in eco-terrorism, including organizations such as the
Animal Liberation Front (ALF), the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), and Stop Huntingdon
Animal Cruelty (SHAC) (Bjelopera, 2017; Carson et al., 2012; Miller, 2017; Su & Yang,
2017). While eco-terrorists are prolific in their attacks, the outcomes of their attacks tend
to involve property damage, rather than human casualties; although, they will engage in
targeting individuals at times. Part of eco-terrorists’ motivation involved making it more
costly and difficult for enterprises that use animals, or are involved in harming the
environment (i.e. logging industry), as a way to coerce those enterprises to stop their
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activities (Bjelopera, 2017; Carson et al., 2012; Lemanski & Wilson, 2016; Su & Yang,
2017).
In 2008, the FBI estimated that eco-terrorists were responsible for between 1,800
and 2,000 domestic terrorist incidents, resulting in over $110 million in damages since
1979 (Bjelopera, 2017; Lemanski & Wilson, 2016). According to the FBI in 2001, as
cited by Su and Yang (2017), ELF alone caused $100 million in damage. According to
data from the GTD, eco-terrorist incidents increased steadily since 1980, spiked in 2001,
and decreased since 2006 (Carson et al., 2012). Miller (2017) compared terrorism data by
decade and found that eco-terrorism had declined from 64% in the 2000 decade to 12% in
the first six years of the 2010 decade. Animal-use industry leaders lobbied Congress to
take more direct action against eco-terrorism, which led to the passage of AETA (Su &
Yang, 2017).
The AETA of 2006 is an amended and expanded version of the Animal Enterprise
Protection Act (AEPA) of 1992, which granted the U.S. government greater legal
authority in identifying and prosecuting environmental and animal rights extremists, who
engaged in criminal activity (Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act [AETA], 2006; Bjelopera,
2017; Su & Yang, 2017). Compared to AEPA, AETA had a broader scope in coverage of
what was considered to be animal enterprises, such that, now animal enterprises included
any businesses that were associated with other businesses that engaged in animal
enterprises (AETA, 2006; Su &Yang, 2017). In addition, AETA identified harsher
penalties for property damage to businesses identified as animal enterprises.
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The AETA (2006) amended the United States Code to make interstate and foreign
travel, or use of mail to perpetrate violence against businesses and other facilities that
engaged in the use of animals, a specific form of crime with specific sanctions. A
noteworthy aspect of AETA was that successful and attempted actions were prosecutable,
as well as threats of harm to individuals (AETA, 2006; Bjelopera, 2017). It was clearly
stated in AETA (2006) that nothing within the act may be used to infringe upon a U.S.
citizen’s constitutional rights, including freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.
However, there remains controversy over labeling radical environmental and
radical animal rights groups as terrorists, as well as why these specific ideologies and
organizations were singled out in legislation, while other domestic terrorist ideologies
and organizations do not have specific legislation addressing their activities (Su & Yang,
2017). Some of the reasoning behind the focus on eco-terrorism may come from its
prolific activities and costs incurred by its targets, which included the economic elite.
Because of their prolific activity, eco-terrorists are also easier to identify than other
domestic terrorists motivated by non-environmental or non-animal rights ideologies.
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
The final report from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (NCTAUUS) was released to the public in 2004, and contained within it,
specific recommendations to prevent another terrorist attack similar to the ones that
occurred on September 11, 2001 (NCTAUUS, 2004). Many of those recommendations
were captured in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007.
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The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
established funding for improvements for homeland security and emergency management
and response; established funding to improve and implement inter-agency emergency
communication systems; included provisions aimed at improving inter-agency
intelligence sharing and cooperation; increased security for border, aviation, maritime,
transportation, and critical infrastructure; implemented more secure identification
documentation; and increased security for materials that could be used as weapons of
mass destruction (Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, 2007).
Compared to the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 had a broader reach in impacting domestic terrorism. The
overall approach included target hardening, increased security, technological
modernization, and improved communication and intelligence sharing. While this act was
not specific to domestic terrorism, its provisions were broad enough to impact all forms
of terrorism, domestic and international.
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015
The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 was passed in response to concerns over law
enforcement and the government’s role in surveilling U.S. citizens (Berman, 2016;
Hellmuth, 2016; Lyon, 2015; Rubel, 2017; Schwinn, 2016; Yoo, 2014). As the sunset
provision to the surveillance provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act approached, it was
disclosed that the U.S. government had been amassing metadata on U.S. citizens, which
created public uproar and calls for action. While the 14-year time frame of the USA
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PATRIOT Act and its subsequent reauthorizations had been filled with a range of
lawsuits alleging civil rights violations and government overreach, it was not until this
information had been released that action was taken to tighten the surveillance provisions
found within the USA PATRIOT Act. It is important to note that the bulk metadata
collection was legal under the USA PATRIOT Act and its subsequent reauthorizations
(Rubel, 2017). Rather than attempting to amend the USA PATRIOT Act, it was allowed
to expire, and was replaced by the USA FREEDOM Act.
The intent of the USA FREEDOM Act was to continue established
counterterrorism strategies outlined in the USA PATRIOT Act; however, with strict
restrictions regarding intelligence collection and surveillance on U.S. citizens (Berman,
2015; Lyon, 2014; Romero, 2015; Rubel, 2017; Yoo, 2014). The government was no
longer permitted to collect information and surveille citizens without warrant (USA
FREEDOM Act, 2015). Instead, the companies that own that metadata were required to
retain that data, and may only turn the data over to law enforcement when a warrant was
served. The restrictions within the USA FREEDOM Act aimed at ceasing the use of the
government in bulk metadata surveillance and storage.
Critics argued that the USA FREEDOM Act missed its mark on attempting to add
oversight to FISA courts (Berman, 2014; Romero, 2015). Berman (2014) suggested that
the USA FREEDOM Act did not adequately address the dual role that the FISA courts
served, and by adding oversight, the efficiency and effectiveness of the FISA courts
would be compromised. Romero (2015) stated that the USA FREEDOM Act did not go
far enough because it only protected phone metadata, while leaving other forms of
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metadata available for collection and surveillance. For domestic terrorists, the USA
FREEDOM Act may allow for greater communication with other domestic terrorists due
to the new restrictions and oversight added, but domestic terrorists may be more
vulnerable to other forms of metadata surveillance.
While U.S. counterterrorism policy continues to be developed, challenged, and
implemented, how effective the existing and past policies were remained inconsistently
explored. In addition, with these counterterrorism policies came greater expense to the
U.S. tax payers. The following sections will address how counterterrorism policy has
been financed and how counterterrorism has been assessed and evaluated.
Financing Counterterrorism
For many governments, one approach to addressing terrorism involves throwing
money at the problem. While it may seem logical that deterrence, prevention, and
response to terrorist attacks require a lot of money, how that money is spent and whether
that spending is justified remains unclear. Empirical evidence does support the
effectiveness in funding counterterrorism operations. In a comparative analysis of 34
countries, including the United States, Danzell and Zidek (2013) found that increased
spending on law enforcement and other aspects of the country’s security apparatus led to
decreased casualties and fatalities due to terrorist attacks, and had a small impact on
reducing terrorism incidence.
Wolfendale (2007) challenged the justification for counterterrorism measures by
arguing that the actual terrorist threat is minimal to an individual civilian, while the threat
of an individual’s loss of civil liberties by counterterrorism strategies, was much greater.
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Yet the rhetoric for the threat of terrorism continued, thus justifying increased restrictions
and narrowed civil liberties for the sake of national security. This rhetoric supported the
power elite by ensuring continued support for the existing political elite, because the
political elite could point out the infrequency of international terrorist attacks in the
United States since the counterterrorism policy was implemented (ignoring the baseline
infrequency of international terrorism attacks in the United States). The military elite
benefited by ensuring research and development into weapons systems, surveillance,
protective equipment, and artificial intelligence for use in the ongoing global war on
terror. The economic elite benefited from the profits earned for private security and
contractor corporations as well as profits from the sale of protective equipment to a
fearful public who have bought into the apocalypse industry and the myths about
terrorism in the United States (Altheide, 2006, 2007, 2019; Bakker, 2015; LaFree, 2011;
Silva et al., 2019). Combined, the power elite supported the increased federal spending
for counterterrorism. The total budget authority for DHS was $37.7 billion at its inception
in 2003 and has steadily increased to the requested $92 billion for FY2020 (Bush, 2003;
Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2017, 2019).
Part of the motivation of allocating a large amount of money to counterterrorism
was due to the costs incurred from terrorist attacks. The GTD provided the amount of
property damage, when available for individual terrorist attacks (START, 2018a, 2018b).
Shellman (2004, 2006) proposed a single model to describe the relationship between
dissident terrorists and governments. Shellman proposed several contextual frameworks,
but within each framework was the government decision-making formula that included
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government costs of action, terrorist dissident costs, and audience/victim costs. While this
model was not appropriate for this study, Shellman’s identification of the different
sources of costs of terrorism was relevant. In addition, J. Mueller and Stewart (2014)
conducted a cost-benefit analysis on counterterrorism spending. From a risk management
perspective, Kunreuther (2002) questioned how justifiable it was to invest a lot of money
into preventing a rare event. While I had originally intended on analyzing the budgetary
appropriations for counterterrorism as well the costs of damage from terrorist attacks,
inconsistencies and missing data made such an analysis not possible at this time. Because
the cost to the victims is not readily available, that element was not included in the
analysis.
Counterterrorism Policy Evaluation
While research on terrorism grew and increased its rigor, the same cannot be said
for research on counterterrorism policy. Many terrorists rely on repressive responses from
governments to their attacks as a way to mobilize the population against the government;
and thus, it is imperative to not only acknowledge this relationship, but identify clear
evaluation of counterterrorism policies (LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Martin, 2018; Nacos,
2016). Solely military responses have been criticized as feeding into the aims of the
terrorists and resulting in backlash effects, rather than deterrence effects (LaFree, Dugan,
& Korte, 2009; LaFree & Freilich, 2019). Legal approaches have had mixed success, but
tended not to produce the same form of backlash effect found from strictly military
approaches.
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Despite ongoing work on counterterrorism, actual policy implementation occurred
on a more reactive basis than on a preventative basis, which is consistent with MSF. As
such, by rapidly passing legislation, there can be major flaws within the provisions of that
legislation which may exacerbate, rather than deter or prevent terrorism. Mitchell (2003)
observed that homeland security strategies tended to have sole focus on defense, rather
than securing vulnerabilities, and on passing legislation that was similar to previously
flawed policies. The focus of the new policies ignored the ineffective nature of the past
policies and held on to its defense-focus at the expense of true security and terrorism
deterrence and prevention (Mitchell, 2003). Therefore, it is essential that counterterrorism
policies are evaluated and that these evaluations be evidence-based and communicated
effectively to policy makers to ensure that mistakes are not repeated with future policy.
There were different approaches to evaluating counterterrorism policy,
particularly because counterterrorism policy did not include any instructions for
evaluation. Individual agencies that are involved in counterterrorism activities may have
independent methods of evaluating success and effectiveness, but those are limited to the
specific agency. While a layperson may say that because there has not been another
terrorist attack exactly like the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, that the policies were
effective; however, considering that the majority of terrorism in the United States is
perpetrated by domestic terrorists, evaluating a rare event with whether that event has
recurred is fraught with error.
The result of having such variation in approaches to evaluating counterterrorism
policy is that it leaves policy makers confused as to whether policy works or not. It
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becomes difficult to compare results when different methodologies yielded different
results. Freese (2014) argued the need for a framework to evaluate counterterrorism
policy so that the inconsistency in methods and results are minimized. It has been
suggested that there needs to be a shift in research towards evidence-based practice in
policy evaluation research to measure the benefit of policy and its effectiveness (Freese,
2017; Lum et al., 2006, 2008).
How one measures effectiveness of a policy is also variable. De Lint and Kassa
(2015) examined different theoretical approaches to counterterrorism policy evaluation.
Policy was evaluated in terms of its returns-on-investment, its ability to meet its
objectives, and its political success (De Lint & Kassa, 2015; McConnell, 2010). At the
heart of all policy implementation and maintenance is funding for the provisions within
the policy, or basically how much it costs to keep this policy going. For counterterrorism
policy, it became difficult to manage the returns of investing in increased security
(Brzoska, 2016; Danzell & Zidek, 2013; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014). It became difficult
to measure the reasonableness of costs for prevention. In addition, it is unknown whether
increased security played a role in thwarting planned attacks, or if there were any planned
attacks in the works for a particular area that now has increased security. Brzoska (2016)
identified impact, outcome, and output as the indicators for effective counterterrorism
financing policy. However, impact is difficult to measure, and while output and outcome
are more easily quantifiable, they do not necessarily correlate with impact (Brzoska,
2016). Additionally, there are regional and temporal variations in terms of law
enforcement’s request for funding for homeland security activities, which may
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complicate an evaluation of solely funding for counterterrorism (T.C. Johnson & Hunter,
2017).
It is important to examine more than just frequency of terrorist attacks to address
whether counterterrorism policy meets its objectives, namely to prevent future terrorism.
An organization may operate frequently using small-scale attacks or amass resources to
execute a single, large-scale attack. Therefore, looking at incident data alone is
insufficient. Incident data must be paired with other variables such as lethality and
extensiveness of damage for a more complete analysis (Danzell & Zidek, 2013). The
growth of availability of open source databases on terrorist attacks makes this approach
more doable than in the past. However, De Klint and Kassa (2015) and Van Dongen
(2011) suggested that attempting to identify indicators of counterterrorism policy
effectiveness was too difficult because of the amount of factors that may influence those
indicators.
In terms of political success, that can be measured by the re-electability of the
politicians who sponsored and supported the policy as well as the general national mood
regarding the policy (De Lint & Kassa, 2015). Another aspect of political success is the
extent to which a policy aligns with the norms, values, and ideals of the nation. This also
can be difficult to measure because how information is socially constructed and presented
can impact whether a policy is considered to be consistent with the societal norms,
values, and ideals or not. For example, when it came to interrogation practices, rather
than calling the practices what they were, torture, the U.S. government called those
practices enhanced interrogation, which quelled public anxiety over the use of torture,
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which is inherently against U.S. values and ideals (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA],
2003; Dorfman, 2004; Janoff-Bulman, 2007; Martin, 2018; Opotow, 2007; Pious, 2006;
Raz, 2013; Vrij et al., 2017). However, this form of measurement does not consider the
impact, positive and negative, that a policy may have had. What follows is a review of
the more recent literature aimed at evaluating counterterrorism policy.
Shor (2016) examined short and long-term incidence of terrorism following
implementation of counterterrorism policy for over 130 countries between 1981 and
2009. The purpose of counterterrorism policy was framed among three alternatives: an
effective tool, window dressing, and promoting terrorism. Shor found that in the shortterm, the window dressing purpose, which was basically the passage of policy to appease
the public and make it appear that the government was acting against terrorism, was the
only statistically significant result. In the long-term, Shor found that the promoting
terrorism via terrorist backlash against policy was statistically significant. While Shor
identified limitations of his study, he suggested future research into the examination
between the balance of civil liberties and counterterrorism policies as a way to combat
long-term increases in terrorism.
Lindahl (2017) proposed a critical terrorism study to evaluating counterterrorism
policy. Lindahl suggested that counterterrorism be viewed as emancipatory, meaning that
counterterrorism was an ongoing process that sought to lead towards emancipation, while
knowing that achieving full emancipation was not possible. Following Weber’s proposals
of ideal types, Lindahl proposed an emancipatory counterterrorism that included five
components: key assumptions, priorities or aims, basic principles, strategies and tactics,
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and evaluation (Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2018). Lindahl’s model was offered as an alternative
to the more violent constructions of counterterrorism by focusing on nonviolence,
freedom, and peace.
Some of the calls for evaluating counterterrorism policy came from concerns that
such policies provoked further terrorist attacks, rather than deterred or prevented future
terrorist attacks (Avdan & Uzonyi, 2017; Dietrich, 2014; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009;
Qvortrup, 2016). This led to a policy evaluation approach over time, where specific
interventions were assessed using empirical data. Such analyses have thus far been
conducted as specific case studies for particular nations, LaFree, Dugan, and Korte
(2009) used Northern Ireland, Barros (2003) used Spain, and Sharvit et al. (2013) used
the Israel/Palestine conflict. The current quantitative study used the case of the United
States. Following the model used by LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009), I examined U.S.
domestic terrorism data (incidence, lethality, and costs) from the GTD in relation to the
implementation of each of the counterterrorism policies.
Summary of Literature Review
Terrorism is a global social problem. In the United States, the primary threat
comes from domestic terrorists but U.S. counterterrorism policy has focused on the rarer
threat of international terrorism. Even though this paradox exists, U.S. counterterrorism
provisions continue to be developed and renewed without any specific empirical data to
support their use. In this study, I fill the gap in the literature by using empirical data from
the GTD to evaluate U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21st century.
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Two theoretical approaches were applied to this study, the MSF from public
policy and the power elite theory as part of conflict theory from sociology. The MSF
provided a model for explaining the policy process, particularly the agenda-setting
portions of the policy process, yet remained flexible enough to be applied to a wide range
of policies at various levels of governance, and across a range of sociohistorical contexts.
Kingdon (2011) proposed that there were three independent streams, a problem stream, a
policy stream, and a political stream which operated autonomously, but converged during
a policy window when policy implementation occurred. Birkland (1997, 2006) extended
Kingdon’s analysis by diving deeper into the role that focusing events played in the
policy process. While the MSF was robust enough to explain many policy areas, it
struggled to address the paradox of why U.S. counterterrorism policy was not addressing
the primary threat from domestic terrorists. To complement the MSF, the power elite
theory from conflict theory in sociology was used as well. According to C.W. Mills
(1956), power in the United States was divided between the power elite and the rest of
society. The power elite contained members of the political elite, the economic elite, and
the military elite who operated in cooperation with each other to serve their own interests.
It is through examining the power relations in the United States and how the power elite
function that explained the discrepancy between counterterrorism policy and the terrorist
threat in the United States.
Terrorist attacks from domestic terrorists are an ongoing issue in the United
States. While the purpose of U.S. counterterrorism policies was to prevent, deter, and
respond to terrorist attacks regardless of their motivation, many of the policies focused on
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threats from international actors. However, there were provisions that had the potential to
impact domestic terrorist operations in the United States. The U.S. counterterrorism
policies that were included in the analysis were those that had provisions that would
impact domestic terrorism, either specifically or as an extension of provisions aimed at
curbing international terrorism. These policies listed in chronological order were: the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act
of 2005, AETA of 2006, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission of
2007, and the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
Despite the implementation of several counterterrorism policies, a systematic
approach to evaluating counterterrorism policy was missing. The gap in the literature was
that U.S. counterterrorism policy had not been evaluated for its impact on domestic
terrorism in general. Researchers suggested that identifying an evidence-based method of
evaluating counterterrorism policy in the United States was needed. Because the
infrequency of international terrorist attacks would undermine the validity and reliability
of any evaluation solely focusing on international terrorism, this study examined the
impact of U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21st century on incidence, lethality, and
costs of domestic terrorism by using the GTD, and following the model used by LaFree,
Dugan, and Korte (2009).
The GTD is an open source database and contains a range of variables for analysis
and sorting. I filtered and analyzed the data using established measures to only include
U.S. domestic terrorist events (Berkebile, 2017; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). I used
descriptive statistics and visual analysis to describe domestic terrorism in relation to U.S.
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counterterrorism policy. I used the series hazard model to analyze the hazard or risk of
domestic terrorism following the implementation of five U.S. counterterrorism policies.
In Chapter 3, I will provide a detailed description of the methodology I chose to address
the research questions for this study.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
The purpose of this longitudinal, quantitative study was to describe U.S. domestic
terrorist incidence, lethality, and cost in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy. I
analyzed domestic terrorism data to reveal the hazard for domestic terrorism following
U.S. counterterrorism policy implementation. Governments around the world and across
time have attempted to establish policies to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist attacks
within their jurisdiction, and the United States was no different. While most of the
terrorist activity in the United States comes from domestic terrorists, U.S.
counterterrorism policy has focused on the more rare threat of international terrorism.
However, there are elements to U.S. counterterrorism policy that may have impact on
domestic terrorist operations.
The gap in the literature was that changes in domestic terrorism have not been
evaluated in relation to the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21st
century. In this study, I addressed this gap in the literature by utilizing empirical data
from the GTD to assess the effectiveness of five U.S. counterterrorism policies (AETA,
2006; Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, 2007; USA
FREEDOM Act, 2015; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001; USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act, 2005). Because the entire population of U.S. domestic terrorist
incidents was available in the GTD, I did not employ a sampling strategy, rather I
analyzed the entire population.
In Chapter 3, I detail the research questions and hypotheses, the research method
and design, the data accessed, the data analysis, and the ethical considerations I made in
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this study. I also discuss my rationale for selecting a longitudinal trend design using
secondary data to address the research questions and to confirm or reject the null
hypotheses.
Research Design and Rationale
This was a quantitative, longitudinal study using secondary data. The independent
variables were the following U.S. counterterrorism policies: the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001 (enacted October 26, 2001), the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization
Act of 2005 (enacted March 9, 2006), AETA of 2006 (enacted November 27, 2006),
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (enacted August 3,
2007), and the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 (enacted June 2, 2015). The dependent
variables were the following indicators of domestic terrorism: incidence, lethality, and
costs.
I used the following operational definition of domestic terrorism, in which
domestic terrorism is the premeditated, intentional acts or threats of acts of violence
intended to intimidate, coerce, or influence the civilian population and/or the government
to achieve some political, religious, economic, ideological, and/or social objective(s) and
perpetrated by a citizen or resident of the country within which the acts or threats are
aimed. For U.S. domestic terrorism, the perpetrators must be U.S. citizens or residents
and the attacks must be planned or executed within the territorial boundaries of the
United States (Berkebile, 2017; Bjelopera, 2017; Carpenter, 2018; Crenshaw, 1995,
[2009] 2012; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; Enders et al., 2011; Gerwehr & Hubbard, 2007;
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Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016;
Norris, 2017; Ronczkowski, 2018; Sandler, 2014).
To measure U.S. domestic terrorism, I evaluated three indicators in relation to the
independent variables. These indicators were (a) incidence of domestic terrorism, (b)
lethality of domestic terrorism as measured by whether there were casualties, fatalities,
and hostages taken during domestic terrorist incidents, and (c) the costs of domestic
terrorism as measured by whether property damage occurred, ransom paid, and monies
budgeted and spent by the U.S. government for counterterrorism policy (Berkebile, 2012,
2017; Bjelopera, 2017; Brzoska, 2016; Crenshaw, 2001; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017;
Danzell & Zidek, 2013; De Lint & Kassa, 2015; Dietrich, 2014; Dugan, 2011; Dugan et
al., 2005; Enders & Sandler, 2012; Enders et al., 2011; Freese, 2014; LaFree, Dugan, &
Korte, 2009; LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Lindahl, 2017; Lum et al., 2006, 2008; McQuire,
2013; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Pokalova, 2015; Qvortrup, 2016; Safer-Lichtenstein et
al., 2017; Sandler, 2014; Schwinn, 2016; Shor, 2016; Van Dongen, 2011; Williams,
2018).
The GTD ranks property damage from a terrorist attack across four categories:
catastrophic (likely equal to or greater than $1 billion), major (likely equal to or greater
than $1 million but less than $1 billion), minor (likely less than $1 million), and unknown
(START, 2018b). Additional variables related to property damage in the GTD included
whether the incident resulted in property damage and the amount of property damage in
U.S. dollars. If there had been kidnapping and/or hostage-taking incidents that included
the payment of ransom, those expenditures would have been analyzed. For the time frame
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of analysis for this study, there were hostage-taking incidents; however, none resulted in
the payment of ransom (START, 2018a).
Prior researchers examining lethality have focused on measuring lethality only as
the number of fatalities; however, casualties (injuries) and hostage-taking should also be
considered when determining lethality (Asal et al., 2015; Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008;
Carson & Suppenbach, 2018; Caspi, Freilich, & Chermak, 2012; Edwards et al., 2016;
Enders & Sandler, 2000; Nilsson, 2018; Olzak, 2016; Palfy, 2003; Phillips, 2017;
Sheehan, 2009; Simon & Benjamin, 2000; Wilson & Lemanski, 2013). Hsu et al. (2018)
specifically noted the importance of utilizing data on injuries and fatalities for future
research. Therefore, in this study I examined fatalities, casualties, and hostages taken to
determine lethality.
In this descriptive study, I used a quantitative, longitudinal trend study of
secondary data. I decided to use secondary data because of the recent research utilizing
the GTD; the accessibility, flexibility, and transparency of the GTD; research supporting
GTD validity and reliability in its use to analyze terrorism; and by my research questions.
Using the procedure developed by Berkebile (2017), I filtered data from the GTD to
include only U.S. terrorist events from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017. I
examined the sources for each event to determine perpetrator nationality, and coded each
event as domestic terrorism, international terrorism, or unknown.
I examined incidence, lethality, and cost data from the filtered GTD data through
descriptive statistics, visual analysis, and by using the series hazard model to describe
how U.S. domestic terrorism had changed along those variables following the
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implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21st century. The entire
population of domestic terrorism events in the United States from the GTD from January
1, 1994 to December 31, 2017 was used in the analysis.
The six central RQs were:
RQ1: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?
RQ2: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following the implementation of
U.S. counterterrorism policy?
RQ3: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?
RQ4: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change
following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?
RQ5: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event occurring change
following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?
RQ6: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
occurring change following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?
I chose this research design and methodology because it permitted me to provide
empirical descriptions of these RQs and the additional SQs, which focused on each
selected U.S. counterterrorism policy. I answered the first three RQs using descriptive
statistics and visual analysis. I used the series hazard model to answer the last three RQs.
My rationale for selecting this research design and methodology was in response to
trends in the field seeking more empirical analyses regarding terrorist behavior,
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especially U.S. domestic terrorists, and seeking evidence-based methods of evaluating
counterterrorism policy.
While the GTD provides terrorism data from 1970 through 2017, I examined only
U.S. domestic terrorism data from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017. The terrorism
data for 1993 was lost, and while parts of the data for that year were reconstructed, it is
estimated that the data for that year only represents 15% of the total global terrorist
activity that occurred (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). In
addition, domestic terrorism activity in the United States for 1970 was at its highest, thus
skewing any baseline data had I included that year and the immediately following years
in my analyses (START, 2018a). I used domestic terrorism data for the United States
from January 1, 1994 through October 26, 2001 to establish a baseline for comparison of
descriptive statistics and visual analysis on incidence, lethality, and costs (see Howell,
2004; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001).
My rationale for choosing to examine all forms of U.S. domestic terrorism rather
than focusing on a specific ideological or methodological approach was because, with the
exception of AETA, among the U.S. counterterrorism policies examined, the goals of the
policies were not limited to specific types of terrorism per se, but to deterring, preventing,
and responding to any terrorist attack. For example, while the USA PATRIOT Act was
enacted out of the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, it was the first
policy to introduce a definition of domestic terrorism (Naftali, 2005; USA PATRIOT
Act, 2001).
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My rationale for selecting five U.S. counterterrorism policies was driven by the
research focus on U.S. domestic terrorism and time constraints in examining all
legislation related to preventing, deterring, and responding to terrorism from 1970 to
2017. I selected the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 as the first policy to examine because
that is when domestic terrorism was added to the United States Code as a separate
category (Naftali, 2005; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001). I reviewed U.S. counterterrorism
policy since the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, and I identified four additional
counterterrorism policies that had the possibility of impacting domestic terrorism activity.
While other U.S. counterterrorism policies have been enacted since 2000, I chose these
five because they were the most relevant to this study, and have garnered media attention
that would allow for its provisions to be more known to the general public.
To assess the impact of U.S. counterterrorism policy, I filtered data from the GTD
to include only U.S. domestic terrorist events, and then analyzed those data using the
series hazard model. Berkebile (2017) offered a model by which GTD data could be
filtered to analyze domestic terrorism data. I used Berkebile’s model to filter the GTD.
The GTD included the citations for the three media sources used to compile the
information on all terrorist events (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START,
2018a, 2018b). For unknown perpetrators, I conducted a supplementary analysis to
identify if more information had been uncovered since the event’s addition to the GTD as
a way to identify perpetrator nationality. All unknown attacks were analyzed separately.
Time and resource constraints played a role in my selection of using a
longitudinal, quantitative design examining secondary data for this study. Policy
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evaluation research can be a time-consuming and labor-intensive endeavor. By focusing
on one policy area and its impact, this study was in greater alignment with the temporal
expectations of a dissertation. In addition, no outside grant monies were sought nor
attained to fund this research, thus limiting my ability to collect new or additional data.
To evaluate policy impact, researchers have used correlation or regression;
however, when utilizing event data over time, neither correlation nor regression was
appropriate. Correlation assumes independence of observations, but terrorist attacks may
influence additional terrorist attacks. Therefore, terrorism event data are not independent,
and thus would not fulfill the necessary assumptions for a correlation analysis.
Regression analyses assume normality of data. When examining terrorism event data,
assumption of normality may not be appropriate, and thus a different form of analysis
was called for. Furthermore, this was a descriptive study, and thus using statistics that
predicted trajectories did not align with the research questions.
In examining longitudinal data to describe changes in variables and to evaluate
policy, researchers have suggested using time-series analyses (O’Sullivan et al, 2017).
However, there are several threats to internal validity when using a time-series analysis,
and an interrupted time-series analysis is often used to evaluate the impact of a discrete
intervention (McDowell, 2011). While there have been many studies that have used the
interrupted time-series analysis to analyze event data (viz., Hsu et al., 2018), the
interrupted time-series analysis requires the analyst to select a fixed time frame for
comparison (Dugan, 2011; McDowell, 2011). Additionally, Shellman (2004, 2006)
identified the subjectivity involved in planning time-series analyses, thus resulting in

118
variation in interpretation of results. Using a time-series analysis introduces the potential
for selection bias by the analyst and undermines the validity of the results.
Because of the nature of terrorism, the presentation of the data from the GTD, and
more recent studies in specifically examining the relationship between terrorism and
counterterrorism policy, I employed the series hazard model for data analysis in this
study (Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). The series
hazard model was a preferable alternative to time-series analyses because the series
hazard model has greater flexibility in providing a more detailed analysis that would
otherwise be lost (Carson, 2014; Dugan, 2011). The series hazard model extends Cox’s
(1972) proportional hazard model to allow for evaluation of policy implementation
(Dugan, 2011). The series hazard model allows for use of controls and evaluation of time
effects since policy implementation, something that time-series analyses cannot do.
The series hazard model has been used in recent quantitative analyses of terrorism
data. Dugan, LaFree, and Piquero (2005) examined airline hijackings from 1931 to 2003.
Carson (2014) examined the impact that legal interventions and sanctions had on radical
eco-terrorist organizations. Sharvit et al. (2013) examined the types of Israeli intervention
on Palestinian terrorism from 2000 to 2006.
The most relevant analysis for this study involved using the series hazard model
to examine the impact of British counterterrorism policies on terrorist activity in Northern
Ireland from 1969 to 1992 (LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). Because of the complexity
involved in changing counterterrorism policy in the United Kingdom (UK), LaFree,
Dugan, and Korte (2009) found the series hazard model to be preferable over other time-
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series analyses, because while there were clear start dates for implementation, end dates
were not as clear. Counterterrorism policy in the United States was similar in which a key
policy was implemented on a specific date, but specific provisions within that policy
ended while others continued as part of different policies. For example, the USA
PATRIOT Act was allowed to expire on June 1, 2015 and was replaced by the USA
FREEDOM Act on June 2, 2015; however, many of the provisions from the USA
PATRIOT Act continued as part of the USA FREEDOM Act. The primary change
between these two acts involved the provisions regarding governmental surveillance
powers and access to data on U.S. citizens. This is similar to Great Britain’s
criminalization policy that officially ended in 1981 with portions of it remaining in place
via the Ulsterization policy (LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). This study was modeled
after the methodology employed by LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009).
Methodology
Population
I analyzed the entire population of data on U.S. domestic terrorism events
between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017 found within the GTD. The unit of
analysis was the terrorist event. There were a total of 749 terrorist attacks in the United
States between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017. Of those, 500 were identified as
being domestic terrorism, 236 were unknown, and 13 were identified as international
terrorism (START, 2018a).
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I did not use any sampling strategy or procedure for selecting which terrorist data
to include in my analysis; rather, I used the entire population of data on U.S. domestic
terrorism events between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017 found within the GTD.
Sampling and Sampling Procedures
I used purposive sampling to identify the U.S. counterterrorism policies that were
evaluated. The counterterrorism policies examined began with the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001, because that was when domestic terrorism was added to the United States Code as
a separate category (Naftali, 2005). I identified four additional U.S. counterterrorism
policies implemented in the 21st century as having the possibility of impacting domestic
terrorism activity. While other U.S. counterterrorism policies were enacted since 2000, I
chose the five which were the most relevant to this study, and which have garnered media
attention that allowed for its provisions to be known to the general public. The five
counterterrorism policies I included in this study in chronological order were the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 (enacted October 26, 2001), the USA PATRIOT Improvement
and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (enacted March 9, 2006), AETA of 2006 (enacted
November 27, 2006), Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007 (enacted August 3, 2007), and the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 (enacted June 2,
2015).
Procedure for Secondary Data
Considering the amount of terrorist attacks that occur in the United States, I used
data from an existing database of terrorist attacks in this study. The GTD is an open
source dataset that has logged non-State terrorism incidents from 1970 to 2017, and
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served as the primary data source for this study (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START,
2018b). In order for incidents to be included within the GTD, they must satisfy three
attributes of the GTD definition of terrorism and at least two of the three inclusion
criteria (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). A terrorist attack, as defined by the
GTD is “the threatened or actual use of illegal force or violence by a non-State actor to
attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or
intimidation” (START, 2018b, p.10). Each included incident must (a) be intentional, (b)
involve some level of use of or threat of use of violence, and (c) be perpetrated by subnational actors. Furthermore, the three inclusion criteria from which at least two must be
fulfilled are:
Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or
social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not
satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic
economic change.
Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or
convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the
immediate victims. It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if
every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As
long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to
coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.
Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare
activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by
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international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately
targeting civilians or non-combatants). (START, 2018b, p.10)
These inclusion criteria were consistent with my operational definition of
terrorism used in this study, which made this database an appropriate source for my
analyses.
The GTD is available to download by request from the START website. I
requested access to the GTD which was approved by the authors of the database on July
31, 2018 (see Appendices A and B). Prior to IRB approval, I only accessed the GTD
codebook. I accessed the GTD data following IRB approval on June 5, 2019.
I identified budget appropriations for counterterrorism by the U.S. government by
reviewing public data and documentation produced by the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) and DHS. I also examined authoritative reports regarding
counterterrorism budgeting by the U.S. government. Initially, I was going to provide
counterterrorism spending by the U.S. government by fiscal year from 1994 to 2017;
however, after I reviewed the public budget data, it was clear that identifying how much
money was allocated towards counterterrorism was not feasible. Aspects of federal
budget usage were classified as well as spread across a range of agencies and entities.
Therefore, I focused on counterterrorism budget spending for fiscal years 2002 to 2017.
Because of issues identified with consistency of reporting and data accuracy, in the end I
chose to present the data from an open source, authoritative report published by the
Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Data (2018).
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Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs
Secondary Data Selection and Collection
Once an event fulfilled the inclusion criteria set by the GTD authors, all known
details of that event were inputted into the database by START researchers (LaFree,
2010; LaFree and Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). The terrorism data within the GTD
include month, day, and year of terrorist incident, an approximate date if the actual date is
unknown or unclear, if the incident lasted beyond 24 hours or within 24 hours, incident
summary, the GTD inclusion criteria met, whether there is uncertainty regarding if the
incident qualifies as terrorism, and if so, additional designation is listed, whether the
incident was independent or part of a series of incidents, and what those related incidents
were (START, 2018a, 2018b). For location of the incident, the country, region,
province/administrative region/state, city, vicinity, location details, latitude and
longitude, and geocoding specificity are noted (START, 2018a, 2018b).
Incidents are further labeled with primary, secondary, and tertiary types of attack,
attack success, and if it was a suicide attack. Attack success was coded in terms of
whether the planned method was executed. It was not coded in relation to the motivation
or long-term goals of the perpetrator or perpetrator group (LaFree, 2010; START,
2018b). Weapon information is also provided including the main four weapon types used,
along with four weapon sub-types used. The target and victim information include
primary, secondary, and tertiary types and subtypes of target, name of target and specific
target or victim, and nationality of target. Perpetrator information include primary,
secondary, and tertiary group and subgroup names, certainty of perpetrator identity,
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unaffiliated individuals, number of perpetrators, number of perpetrators captured,
whether there was a claim of responsibility, the mode of such claim, whether there were
competing claims for up to three groups, and motive of attack (START, 2018a, 2018b).
While perpetrator nationality is not included in the public database as a discrete variable,
perpetrator identity, if known is included as well as the citations for the media sources
used in compiling the information for each event.
Fatalities and injuries are provided for perpetrator and targets. Total numbers are
provided along with the number of U.S. citizens killed or injured. Whether there was
property damage, the magnitude of property damage, and the approximate value of
property damage in U.S. dollars is provided. If the incident involved kidnapping or
hostages, additional data regarding those types of incidents and whether and how much
ransom was paid are included (START, 2018a, 2018b).
Incidents are coded as international along ideological, logistical, miscellaneous, or
any of the above within the GTD (START, 2018a, 2018b). While initially this seemed
like an easy way to filter for domestic terrorist incidents, the method used to code the
data may result in an underestimation of domestic terrorism. For example, for domestic
terrorists that are motivated by an ideology outside of the United States or for
independence, those would be coded as ideologically international, but if the incident
occurred on U.S. territory, it may or may not be coded as international logistically. For
example, the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci᷇on Nacional Puertorreque᷉na (FALN), a Puerto
Rican Independencistas revolutionary group was labeled as logistically and ideologically
international even though the perpetrators were U.S. citizens and the attacks occurred
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within the territorial boundaries of the United States (Martin, 2018; START, 2018a,
2018b). Because of how I operationally defined domestic terrorism in this study, FALN
was coded as a domestic terrorist organization. Therefore, these coding categories from
the GTD were not used in the data filtering process. Instead, I manually coded the events
as being domestic terrorism, international terrorism, or unknown.
The GTD codebook includes detailed descriptions of the history of the GTD,
coding methods, and a detailed list of changes made with the release of the updated
database (START, 2018b). Not only are the changes listed, but the rationale for the
changes along with adjustments in methodology are also explicitly presented (START,
2018b). It was this level of detail and transparency that led to my choice to use the GTD
in this study.
I reviewed public data and documentation produced by the OMB and DHS to
identify U.S. government budget appropriations for counterterrorism. In addition, I
reviewed authoritative reports regarding counterterrorism budgeting. Counterterrorism
spending by the U.S. government as allocated to the DHS was provided by fiscal year
from 2002 to 2017 (Cordesman, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c; Stimson Study Group on
Counterterrorism Spending, 2018).
Operationalization
The independent variables of this study were the following U.S. counterterrorism
policies: the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (enacted October 26, 2001), the USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (enacted March 9, 2006),
AETA of 2006 (enacted November 27, 2006), Implementing Recommendations of the

126
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (enacted August 3, 2007), and the USA FREEDOM Act of
2015 (enacted June 2, 2015). The operational definition of U.S. counterterrorism policy
was federal legislation enacted to deter, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks against
the United States.
The dependent variables were domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs.
The operational definition of domestic terrorism was the premeditated, intentional acts or
threats of acts of violence intended to intimidate, coerce, or influence the civilian
population and/or the government to achieve some political, religious, economic,
ideological, and/or social objective(s) and perpetrated by a citizen or resident of the
country within which the acts or threats are aimed. For U.S. domestic terrorism, the
perpetrators must be U.S. citizens or residents and the attacks must be planned or
executed within the territorial boundaries of the United States (Berkebile, 2017;
Bjelopera, 2017; Carpenter, 2018; Crenshaw, 1995, [2009] 2012; Crenshaw & LaFree,
2017; Enders et al., 2011; Gerwehr & Hubbard, 2007; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006;
Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Norris, 2017; Ronczkowski,
2018; Sandler, 2014).
To measure U.S. domestic terrorism, I evaluated three indicators in relation to the
independent variables. Incidence of domestic terrorism was the first indicator. Incidence
of domestic terrorism was measured by frequency of domestic terrorist events by year
and by time lapse between events in days and in months.
The second indicator was lethality of domestic terrorism. Prior research
examining lethality focused on measuring lethality only as the number of fatalities;

127
however, injuries and hostage-taking should also be considered when determining
lethality (Asal et al., 2015; Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Carson & Suppenbach, 2018;
Caspi, Freilich, & Chermak, 2012; Edwards et al., 2016; Enders & Sandler, 2000;
Nilsson, 2018; Olzak, 2016; Palfy, 2003; Phillips, 2017; Sheehan, 2009; Simon &
Benjamin, 2000; Wilson & Lemanski, 2013). Therefore, in this study, I examined
fatalities, casualties, and hostages taken to determine lethality. Originally, I was going to
assess the magnitude of lethality; however, low numbers violated the criteria of the series
hazard model. Therefore, I coded each event in terms of whether the attack was lethal or
not.
The final indicator of domestic terrorism was costs. I intended to measure costs of
domestic terrorism by the amount of property damage incurred, ransom paid, and monies
budgeted and spent by the U.S. government for counterterrorism. The GTD ranked
property damage from a terrorist attack across four categories: catastrophic (likely equal
to or greater than $1 billion), major (likely equal to or greater than $1 million but less
than $1 billion), minor (likely less than $1 million), and unknown (START, 2018b). If
there were kidnapping and/or hostage-taking incidents that included the payment of
ransom, those expenditures would have been analyzed. For ransom data, the GTD
provided the confirmed amount paid, if known (START, 2018b). Like the lethality
indicator, I had to adjustment how I examined costs after I accessed of the GTD data. As
a result, instead of magnitude of property damage, I examined whether an incident
resulted in property damage or not. I graphically presented counterterrorism spending by
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the U.S. government spending as reported by the Stimson Study Group on
Counterterrorism Spending (2018). I presented all costs in U.S. dollars.
Data Analysis Plan
I used SPSS to analyze all data to describe domestic terrorism in relation to U.S.
counterterrorism policy using descriptive statistics, visual analysis, and by employing
Cox’s proportional hazard test for the series hazard model. Because of some limitations
with SPSS, I used Excel and manual calculations for the creation of needed variables for
the series hazard model. I encrypted, password-protected, and secured the database using
Intercrypto Advanced Encryption Package 2017. All analyses and reports were also
encrypted, password-protected, and secured using Intercrypto Advanced Encryption
Package 2017.
Filtering GTD data. Because the GTD contains all incidents globally from 1970
to 2017, I filtered the dataset to include only events that occurred between 1994 and
2017. Following the procedure proposed by Berkebile (2017), I filtered the data along the
following criteria: perpetrators were subnational actors, target included noncombatants,
intention of attack was to influence larger audience, motivated by political, social,
economic, or religious ideology, the location of the incident was within the jurisdiction of
the United States, perpetrator nationality, and target nationality.
The GTD does not provide a code for perpetrator nationality in its public dataset,
therefore, I conducted supplemental examination of the sources cited in the GTD for each
event and I examined additional open source data to determine perpetrator nationality
when that information was not found in cited sources for the event in the GTD. The GTD

129
does contain references of the three primary sources of information for data inclusion for
each event (START, 2018b). I sought out those references first. For cases in which
perpetrator nationality was unknown, I coded them as unknown and analyzed them
separately. Once the data were filtered to only include events within U.S. jurisdiction, the
database was ready for descriptive statistical and visual analyses. Consistent with prior
studies utilizing the series hazard model and terrorism event data, I created additional
variables, calculated in SPSS, or in Excel or manually if those calculations were not
possible in the version of SPSS that I used. I included all U.S. domestic terrorist data in
my analyses.
Compilation of US counterterrorism spending. Originally, I planned on
compiling the counterterrorism budget data by fiscal year, and present that data
graphically along with being analyzed using descriptive statistics. However, several
inconsistencies and unexpected challenges arose as I reviewed the data before I started
compiling it. Instead of conducting the compilation myself, I decided to present the data
from the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018). The Stimson Study
Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018) noted the same obstacles that I faced in
attempting to compile and present budget data on U.S. government counterterrorism
spending, which led me to concur with their recommendations regarding accountability,
accuracy, and uniform operationalization and conceptualization of concepts.
Research questions and hypotheses. In this study, there were six central
research questions (RQs). For each research question, there were five sub questions
(SQs), one for each specific U.S. counterterrorism policy that was evaluated. The null
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and alternative hypotheses for each RQ and SQ are included below. I answered the first
three RQs using descriptive statistics and visual analysis. I answered the last three RQs
using the series hazard model.
RQ1: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?
H01: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
H11: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S.
counterterrorism policy.
SQ1A: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
H01A: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
H11A: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
SQ1B: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?
H01B: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
H11B: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
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SQ1C: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of the AETA of 2006?
H01C: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of the AETA of 2006.
H11C: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
AETA of 2006.
SQ1D: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007?
H01D: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
H11D: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
SQ1E: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H01E: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H11E: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
RQ2: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following the implementation of
U.S. counterterrorism policy?
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H02: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of U.S.
counterterrorism policy.
H12: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S.
counterterrorism policy.
SQ2A: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
H02A: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
H12A: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001.
SQ2B: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?
H02B: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
H12B: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
SQ2C: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of
the AETA of 2006?
H02C: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the
AETA of 2006.
H12C: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the AETA
of 2006.
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SQ2D: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?
H02D: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
H12D: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
SQ2E: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of
the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H02E: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H12E: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA
FREEDOM Act of 2015.
RQ3: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?
H03: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
H13: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
SQ3A: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
H03A: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
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H13A: domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
SQ3B: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act
of 2005?
H03B: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005.
H13B: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005.
SQ3C: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following implementation of the AETA of 2006?
H03C: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change
following implementation of the AETA of 2006.
H13C: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of the AETA of 2006.
SQ3D: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007?
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H03D: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007.
H13D: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007.
SQ3E: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H03E: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H13E: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
RQ4: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change
following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?
H04: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
H14: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
SQ4A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
H04A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
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H14A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
SQ4B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act
of 2005?
H04B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005.
H14B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
SQ4C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change
following implementation of the AETA of 2006?
H04C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the AETA of 2006.
H14C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of the AETA of 2006.
SQ4D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007?
H04D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007.
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H14D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
SQ4E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H04E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H14E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
RQ5: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event occurring change
following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?
H05: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event increases following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
H15: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event decreases following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
SQ5A: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
H05A: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
H15A: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
SQ5B: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?
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H05B: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005.
H15B: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005.
SQ5C: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the AETA of 2006?
H05C: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the AETA of 2006.
H15C: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following
implementation of the AETA of 2006.
SQ5D: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007?
H05D: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007.
H15D: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007.
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SQ5E: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H05E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H15E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
RQ6: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
occurring change following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?
H06: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
H16: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
SQ6A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
H06A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
H16A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
SQ6B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005?
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H06B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005.
H16B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005.
SQ6C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?
H06C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.
H16C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of the AETA of 2006.
SQ6D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007?
H06D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
H16D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007.
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SQ6E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H06E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H16E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
Statistical analysis plan. I examined the frequency of incidence of domestic
terrorist attacks, lethal attacks, and attacks resulting in property damage using descriptive
statistics and visual analysis for each policy time frame. I used the series hazard model to
examine what the risk or hazard of future U.S. domestic terrorist attacks was following
the implementation of each U.S. counterterrorism policy (Dugan, 2011; Dugan & Yang,
2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). For this part of the analysis, instead of frequency
of domestic terrorist attacks, frequency of lethal attacks, and frequency of costly attacks,
the dependent variable was time between terrorist attacks in days for each indicator
(Dugan, 2011; Dugan & Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; Sharvit et al.,
2013).
The series hazard model extends Cox’s proportional hazard model by replacing
the individual with an event (Cox, 1972; Dugan, 2011). Cox’s proportional hazard model
provides the probability that each unit will experience an event only once; however, this
model does not take into account the exact timing of the event, instead examining the
order of the events (Cox, 1972; Dugan, 2011; M. Mills, 2012). In addition, the
proportional hazards assumption avoids the necessity of imposing any distributional
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assumptions that could force structure on data as would be needed for statistical analyses
that include the assumption of normality (Cox, 1972; Dugan, 2011). The proportional
hazards assumption is that for any two individuals, or events for series hazard, the ratio of
hazards is constant (Cox, 1972; Dugan, 2011). The series hazard model builds on Cox’s
proportional hazard model by adding the element of exact timing in order to measure
probability from a specific intervention (Dugan, 2011). Because time-series analyses
require equidistant measures of time between events and the implementation of policy as
well as the domestic terrorism activities do not occur on such a schedule, time-series
analyses was not appropriate for this study.
The present study fulfilled the criteria needed for using the series hazard model.
The data that I analyzed were discrete events (terrorist attacks) that were recorded such
that duration between events was calculable (see Dugan, 2011). Domestic terrorist attacks
do occur with relative frequency within the United States, which meets the second
criterion for using the series hazard model.
The following formula was used to analyze the data, where the coefficients
associated with the hazard of a new domestic terrorist attack (number of days, Y) was
estimated as a function of an unspecified baseline hazard function and other risk or
protective factors measured at the time of the current attack represented by vectors U.S.
COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY and CONTROLS (LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009).
h (Y) = λ0(Y) exp (β1U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY + β2CONTROLS)
To measure the impact of U.S. counterterrorism policy, I created a series of
dummy variables associated with the specific policy implementation date to the next

(1)

143
policy implementation date where values of “1” were coded as attacks during that time
frame (Dugan, 2011; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). However, with short durations
between some policies and thus small numbers of attacks for that time frame, the
counterterrorism policies were coded as a series of dummy variables associated with the
specific policy implementation date to its end date, if applicable, or to the end of the time
frame of analysis if the policy remained in effect. Therefore, as time passed, there was
overlap across multiple U.S. counterterrorism policies, which were in effect concurrently.
I applied the same diagnostics used for Cox’s proportional hazard model, because
the series hazard model is an extension of Cox’s proportional hazard model (see Dugan,
2011). I examined Schoenfeld’s residuals as the diagnostic to determine if the
proportional hazards assumption was met (Caroni, 2004; M. Mills, 2012; Xue &
Schifano, 2017). I used a likelihood ratio test to identify which model, one including
policy interaction variables with time and one without, was the best fit for the data.
I included the following control variables: time elapsed from start of analysis in
months, success density across three incidents, attack density across three incidents, and
number of days since previous attack. For the domestic terrorism models, I included the
following additional control variables: days since previous domestic attack, success
density across three incidents of only domestic attacks, attack density across three
incidents for only domestic attacks, and months elapsed from start of analysis for
domestic attacks were added. I ran two models for each RQ and SQ, one with policy
interaction variables with time and one without.
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Threats to Validity
Research validity refers to the extent to which what a researcher is trying to
measure is actually being measured. Internal validity refers to the extent to which the
independent variable caused a change in the dependent variable, and that the dependent
variable was an appropriate indicator of the concept it was intended to indicate
(O’Sullivan, Rassel, Berner, & Taliaferro, 2017). External validity refers to the
generalizability of the findings (O’Sullivan et al., 2017).
LaFree (2010) identified challenges with using open source event databases like
the GTD with regards to accuracy of source data. Because terrorism is aimed at gaining
media attention; however, the GTD may have a higher probability of accuracy than other
data involving perpetrators who do not aim for media attention, such as traditional
criminological data (LaFree, 2010). Therefore, data accuracy was not as large of a threat
to internal validity as it would have been for non-terrorism data.
To ensure the most complete database, the variable called doubt terrorism proper
was included in the GTD. This variable identified whether there was any question as to
that event being an act of terrorism or not. While this variable does add validity to the
database, inconsistencies in coding the variable over time undermined its reliability.
Therefore, I did not filter the data such that only those events that were not coded as
doubt terrorism proper were included. I included all events in my analyses, independent
of how the doubt terrorism proper variable was coded.
The primary threats to internal validity for this study are history and maturation
effects. However, the series hazard model allows for considerations involving history and
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maturation effects. Because the data are disaggregated, levels of aggregation are not a
threat as they would be in a time-series analysis (Dugan, 2011). The series hazard model
provides information on the estimated hazard of future attacks based on time since last
attack; therefore, the impact that prior attacks have on future attacks is accounted for
(Dugan, 2011). In addition, because the series hazard model uses time between events as
the dependent variable rather than frequency of events, it is possible to estimate the
impact that policies had on the baseline hazard for future terrorist attacks (Dugan, 2011).
Finally, because the event being measured is a domestic terrorist attack, it does not have
to be assumed that all domestic terrorist attacks are the same; rather, the series hazard
model allows for consideration of specific characteristics of each attack (Dugan, 2011).
With regards to external validity, because this study used the entire population of
data for U.S. domestic terrorism, I did not have the common concerns regarding
generalizability to a larger population. Furthermore, I utilized a model already used in a
range of contexts to explore the impact that some intervention had on a specific type of
terrorism (see Carson, 2014; Carson et al., 2012; Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005;
LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Sharvit et al., 2013). This study
was a descriptive study that utilized the series hazard model for U.S. domestic terrorism
in general, and offered insight as to its applicability for future research.
Ethical Issues in the Use of Secondary Data Analysis Research
I received permission to use the GTD and have no relationship with START, nor
any workers who have been part of the process of inputting data into the GTD (See
Appendices A and B). All information contained within the GTD came from public
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source materials and did not contain any confidential information. Regardless, I chose to
encrypt, password-protect, and secure the database using Intercrypto Advanced
Encryption Package 2017. In addition, I encrypted, password-protected, and secured all
subsequent analyses using the same encryption software. Data and analyses will be
retained for at least five years. I sought and received IRB approval from the IRB at
Walden University before I accessed the GTD and began my analyses.
Summary
The purpose of this study was to describe domestic terrorism incidence, lethality,
and costs in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21st century. In Chapter 3, I
discussed how the gap in the literature was filled. This study filled an important gap in
the literature because I utilizing utilized empirical data and employed the series hazard
model to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism policy. This descriptive,
quantitative, longitudinal trend study involved secondary data analysis as I described in
Chapter 3. I conducted this research only after IRB approval, and in alignment with
ethical standards. I secured all data and analyses. There was no conflict of interest
between the GTD proprietors and myself. Chapter 4 will include the results of the
analyses performed, as well as adjustments and the rationale for adjustments in the
analyses in response to the unanticipated issues I encountered once I accessed the GTD.
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Chapter 4: Results
The purpose of this quantitative, longitudinal trend study was to describe the U.S.
domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs in relation to U.S. counterterrorism
policy in the 21st century using descriptive statistics and the series hazard model. There
were six primary research questions; I answered the first three using descriptive statistics
and visual analysis, and addressed domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs
separately. I answered the final three research questions using the series hazard model to
determine whether there were changes in the hazard of incidence, lethality, and costs in
domestic terrorist attacks in the United States. For each research question there were five
sub-questions, one for each counterterrorism policy examined: USA PATRIOT Act of
2001, USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, AETA of 2006,
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, and USA
FREEDOM Act of 2015. The null and alternative hypotheses for each RQ and SQ are
included below.
RQ1: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?
H01: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
H11: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S.
counterterrorism policy.
SQ1A: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
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H01A: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
H11A: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
SQ1B: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?
H01B: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
H11B: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
SQ1C: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of the AETA of 2006?
H01C: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of the AETA of 2006.
H11C: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
AETA of 2006.
SQ1D: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007?
H01D: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
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H11D: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
SQ1E: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H01E: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation
of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H11E: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
RQ2: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following the implementation of
U.S. counterterrorism policy?
H02: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of U.S.
counterterrorism policy.
H12: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S.
counterterrorism policy.
SQ2A: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
H02A: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
H12A: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001.
SQ2B: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?
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H02B: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
H12B: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
SQ2C: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of
the AETA of 2006?
H02C: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the
AETA of 2006.
H12C: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the AETA
of 2006.
SQ2D: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?
H02D: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
H12D: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
SQ2E: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of
the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H02E: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H12E: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA
FREEDOM Act of 2015.
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RQ3: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?
H03: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
H13: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
SQ3A: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
H03A: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
H13A: domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
SQ3B: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act
of 2005?
H03B: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005.
H13B: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005.
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SQ3C: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following implementation of the AETA of 2006?
H03C: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change
following implementation of the AETA of 2006.
H13C: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of the AETA of 2006.
SQ3D: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007?
H03D: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007.
H13D: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007.
SQ3E: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H03E: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H13E: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
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RQ4: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change
following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?
H04: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
H14: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
SQ4A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
H04A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
H14A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
SQ4B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act
of 2005?
H04B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005.
H14B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
SQ4C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change
following implementation of the AETA of 2006?
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H04C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the AETA of 2006.
H14C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of the AETA of 2006.
SQ4D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007?
H04D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007.
H14D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
SQ4E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H04E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H14E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation
of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
RQ5: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event occurring change
following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?
H05: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event increases following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
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H15: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event decreases following
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
SQ5A: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
H05A: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
H15A: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
SQ5B: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?
H05B: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005.
H15B: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005.
SQ5C: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the AETA of 2006?
H05C: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the AETA of 2006.
H15C: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following
implementation of the AETA of 2006.
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SQ5D: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007?
H05D: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007.
H15D: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007.
SQ5E: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H05E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H15E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
RQ6: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
occurring change following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?
H06: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
H16: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
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SQ6A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
H06A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
H16A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
SQ6B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005?
H06B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005.
H16B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005.
SQ6C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?
H06C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.
H16C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of the AETA of 2006.
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SQ6D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007?
H06D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
H16D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007.
SQ6E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage
change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?
H06E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not
change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
H16E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
In Chapter 4, I present the data collection procedures and results of my analyses.
Results are broken up by incidence, lethality, and costs, with the presentation of the
descriptive statistics and answers to the associated first three RQs, followed by the
presentation of the series hazard model results and answers to the associated final three
RQs.
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Data Collection
Upon receipt of IRB approval (06-05-19-0720342), I accessed the GTD dataset
and began the analyses outlined in Chapter 3’s data analysis plan. Because perpetrator
nationality was not included in the public GTD dataset, once I filtered the dataset to only
include terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States and its territories between
January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017, I manually coded each event as being domestic,
international, or unknown. When sources were available for each attack in the GTD, I
reviewed those sources first. When the GTD was initially created, it involved the
combining of information from other existing databases (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan,
2007; START, 2018b). For the events that were imported from another database, only
that database was listed as the source (START, 2018a). I did not have access to those
databases to check their sources; therefore, I entered each event into a Google search to
identify newspaper items covering the event and its consequences. In addition, I reviewed
the information provided in Hewitt (2005), which was also listed as a source within the
GTD for particular events. I determined perpetrator nationality based on the review of all
of these sources. For organizations that were known to be domestic or international and if
they claimed responsibility for the attack, the event was coded accordingly based on
responsible group. For example, the KKK is a domestic terrorist organization and thus all
events claimed by the KKK were coded as domestic. Table 1 shows the list of identified
organizations and how they were coded.
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Table 1
Terrorist Organizations and Number of Associated Incidents Listed in the GTD
Type of
terrorism
Domestic

Number
of
incidents
2
64
1
48
1
1
32
2
3
1
1
20
6
1
11
1
6
6
1
16
3
1
1
8
1
2
65
2
2
3
1
30
6
2
2
1

Organization
Anarchists
Animal Liberation Front (ALF)
Animal rights extremists
Anti-abortion extremists
Anti-Arab extremists
Anti-environmentalists
Anti-government extremists
Anti-government group
Anti-gun control extremists
Anti-Kim Jong-il extremists
Anti-liberal extremists
Anti-Muslim extremists
Anti-police extremists
Anti-Republican extremists
Anti-Semitic extremists
Anti-technology extremists
Anti-White extremists
Army of God
Aryan Nation
Aryan Republican Army
Black Hebrew Israelites
Black Nationalists
Citizens for Constitutional Freedom
Coalition to Save the Preserves (CSP)
Court Reform Extremists
Earth First!
Earth Liberation Front (ELF)
Environmentalists
Farm Animal Revenge Militia (FARM)
Incel extremists
Jewish extremists
Jihadi-inspired extremists
Ku Klux Klan (KKK)
Maccabee Squad and the Shield of David
Macheteros
Minutemen American Defense
(table continues)
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Type of
terrorism

Number
of
incidents
13
6
1
4
1
1
1
2
2
4
14
1
61
2
24
2

6
International 4
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
Unknown
1
29
1
1
2
4
6
1
1
1
1
2

Organization
Muslim extremists
Neo-Nazi extremists
Organization 544
Phineas Priesthood
Pro-LGBT rights extremists
Republic of Texas
Revenge of the Trees
Revolutionary Cells-Animal Liberation Brigade
Right-Wing extremists
Sovereign Citizen
The Justice Department
United Aryan Empire
Unknown
Veterans United for Non-Religious Memorials
White extremists
White Rabbit Three Percent Illinois Patriot Freedom Fighters
Militia
World Church of the Creator
Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Anti-government extremists
Anti-Israeli extremists
Anti-Trump extremists
Cuban exiles
Iraqi extremists
Palestinians
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Anarchists
Anti-abortion extremists
Anti-Castro group
Anti-environmentalists
Anti-government group
Anti-LGBT extremists
Anti-Muslim extremists
Anti-police extremists
Anti-Sikh extremists
Anti-technology extremists
Earth Liberation Front (ELF)
Environmentalists
(table continues)
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Type of
terrorism

Number
of
incidents
1
1
1
1
182

Organization
Islamist extremists
Pro-LGBT rights extremists
Sons of the Gestapo
Students for Insurrection
Unknown

It should be noted that for many of the unknown events, the targets and method of
operation were consistent with known domestic terrorist activities. For example, several
attacks on abortion clinics were listed as unknown, yet the majority of known attacks on
abortion clinics in the United States have been perpetrated by U.S. citizens or residents.
As shown in Table 1, 48 domestic incidents involved anti-abortion groups, while none
were perpetrated by international terrorists (START, 2018a). The same can be said for
attacks on various places of worship. While not as clearly shown in Table 1 as abortionclinic attacks, there were many attacks on religious figures, religious devotees, and places
of worship perpetrated by groups such as the KKK. Therefore, I displayed the breakdown
of terrorist attacks by target type, as coded in the GTD, in Table 2.
As shown in Table 2, organizations that restricted attacks for single-issues, such
as Army of God targeting abortion clinics, were included in target type analysis. As
shown in Table 2, there were 55 abortion-related incidents perpetrated by domestic
terrorists while none were perpetrated by international terrorists. Similar results were
found for the religious figures and institutions target type, in which 49 incidents were
perpetrated by domestic terrorists and none by international terrorists.
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Table 2
Breakdown of Type of Terror Attack by GTD Target Type
Target type
Abortion related
Airports and aircraft
Business
Educational institution
Food or water supply
Government (diplomatic)
Government (general)
Journalists and media
Maritime
Military
NGO
Other
Police
Private citizens and property
Religious figures/institutions
Telecommunication
Terrorists/non-State militia
Tourists
Transportation
Unknown
Utilities
Violent political party
TOTAL

International
0
2
1
1
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
13

Domestic
55
4
141
36
1
2
44
5
1
13
3
0
22
111
49
2
0
1
4
3
3
0
500

Unknown
61
3
28
5
0
2
29
13
0
2
2
1
5
24
49
0
1
1
3
0
6
1
236

Total
116
9
170
42
1
4
75
18
1
15
5
1
28
140
98
2
1
3
7
3
9
1
749

Coding Inconsistencies with the GTD
The GTD includes a variable entitled “doubt terrorism proper.” This variable was
introduced into the GTD after the initial compilation and has only been systematically
coded for events since 1997 (LaFree, 2010; START, 2018b). When I reviewed the coding
for this variable in the dataset, I found some inconsistencies. For the known domestic
terrorist attacks, 378 were labeled as terrorism, 111 were labeled as doubt terrorism
proper, and 11 were labeled unknown (START, 2018a). When further examining the
events that were labeled as doubt terrorism proper, I found many of those that have been
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labeled by the media and subsequently prosecuted as hate crimes, were labeled as doubt
terrorism proper even if the event met the inclusion criteria of terrorism and met the
definition of terrorism from the United States Code. In addition, there seemed to be an
imbalance of coding where similar incidents perpetrated by persons of color and/or
Muslims were coded as terrorism while incidents involving White perpetrators were
coded as doubt terrorism proper. Interestingly enough, the attack by Dylann Roof on the
Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, SC on June 17, 2015 was
coded as terrorism. Originally, I had planned on only analyzing events that did not meet
the doubt terrorism proper criterion; however, upon noting the coding patterns, I decided
to not remove any of the events labeled as doubt terrorism proper from my subsequent
analyses. When the updated GTD is released with the terrorism data for 2018, it will be
interesting to see how the Tree of Life Synagogue attack in Pittsburgh on October 27,
2018 will be coded.
I encountered some unexpected issues with the GTD data that I had not
previously anticipated, and that led to some adjustments in my research questions and
procedure. However, none of these adjustments were substantial enough to warrant
another review by the IRB. Specifically, in the GTD, there were eight incidents that were
labeled with only a month and year, but no specific day. While I had anticipated
approximate dates, I had not anticipated the approximation being as open-ended as it was.
A total of eight attacks did not have a specifically known date (seven in the pre-USA
PATRIOT Act period, and one after the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted but before the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act was enacted). If I removed these
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attacks from my analyses, I would have introduced additional error into the analyses, and
artificially increased gap times in the series hazard analyses. Therefore, based on
procedures used by past researchers using the series hazard model when encountering this
issue, I assigned the 15th day of the month to those eight attacks (see Carson, 2014;
Dugan, 2011; Dugan & Yang, 2012).
In terms of lethality, I originally intended to examine the magnitude of lethality in
relation to the selected counterterrorism policies. However, due to the low number of
highly lethal attacks, I chose to instead create a dummy variable identifying whether an
attack was lethal (had at least one fatality, injury, or hostage), and based the analyses on
that criterion. Because of this change I adjusted RQ2 and RQ5, such that the questions
asked how lethal domestic terrorism changed rather than how the magnitude of lethality
changed.
Another issue I encountered involved the consistency of coding the data for
property damage. The GTD provides several variables regarding property damage. One
variable identifies whether the event caused property damage, one variable identifies the
level of property damage on the following scale: catastrophic (likely equal to or greater
than $1 billion), major (likely equal to or greater than $1 million but less than $1 billion),
minor (likely less than $1 million), and unknown, and a third variable provides the
amount of property damage if known, in U.S. dollars (START, 2018a, 2018b). The
second and third variables were supposed to be coded only for events that had known
property damage. However, I immediately noted some inconsistencies. For the first
variable of whether the event caused property damage, 522 incidents had known property
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damage, 211 had no property damage known, and 16 were unknown as to whether they
resulted in property damage (START, 2018a). As I more closely analyzed these specific
events, I found that in some cases, the comments or source material specified that
property damage occurred; however, those events were coded as unknown regarding
property damage. Due to the terms of the EULA, changes in the GTD coding scheme is
forbidden, and therefore I was not permitted to change the existing data in the GTD (see
Appendix B).
Because the scaled variable of property damage should have been coded for only
those events that had known property damage from the first variable, and because that
scale included a category for unknown amounts, I expected to find 522 events coded
within that variable. Instead only 443 events were coded according to the specified scale
(START, 2018a). I do not know why 79 events with known property damage were
moved to system missing for this variable, instead of being coded in the unknown
category. In addition, when I examined the third variable specifying the amount of
property damage in U.S. dollars, I found that only 313 events had an amount listed, and
of those, 142 had an unknown amount of property damage (START, 2018a).
Furthermore, in some cases, events were coded as having an unknown amount of
property damage, but were simultaneously coded as having minor or major property
damage in the second variable. Because specific dollar amounts are used to separate
minor from major damage, how those determinations were made is unclear.
As a result of these issues, I created a new dummy variable for property damage
where “1” indicated cases of known property damage, “0” had no known property
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damage, and the 16 unknown cases were coded as system missing. Originally, I had
intended on examining magnitude of property damage as coded in the second variable
described above, but due to the issues listed, I only ran property damage analyses using
the newly-created dummy variable and adjusted RQ3 and RQ6 to reflect that change.
Prior researchers using the series hazard model to examine policy effects on
terrorism data restricted their analyses to one year after policy implementation as a way
to account for whether policies had specific end dates or if policies occurred in rapid
succession, thus eliminating the issues of overlapping policy effects (see Carson, 2014;
LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). When I examined the incidence of U.S. domestic
terrorist attacks within one year of each policy enactment, the number of events were too
small to analyze with any confidence. Therefore, even though there may be overlapping
effects of policies on terrorism, I analyzed incidence, lethality, and property damage for
the entire known period within which each policy was in effect. The USA PATRIOT Act
was the only policy examined with a known end date within the scope of this analysis,
that being June 1, 2015, the day before the USA FREEDOM Act was enacted.
SPSS Version 25.0.0.2 Limitations
I determined early in my analyses that there were several limitations in using
SPSS with the series hazard model. As a result, I had to complete some calculations
either by hand or in Excel, and then I had to import or manually entered those
calculations and data into SPSS for analyses. Specifically, I was required to complete
manual and Excel computations for success densities. I had to manually correct all gap
times for events that occurred on the same day. Because the GTD does not list event
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order by time of day, the ordering of events listed on the same day needed to be adjusted
so that each same-day event had the same gap time for next event and previous event
beyond that date (see Dugan, 2011; Dugan and Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte,
2009). In addition, while the statistical software used by Dugan (2011), Dugan and Yang,
(2012), and LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) allowed for use of the exact marginal
strategy to resolve tied data or attacks occurring on the same day to account for all
possible orderings, that option was not available in the version of SPSS that I used.
To examine Schoenfeld’s residuals diagnostic for the series hazard model, I had
to create individual graphs of residuals by time for each covariate separately for all
iterations of the series hazard models that I ran, and I had to visually analyze those graphs
to determine whether the proportional hazard assumption had been met. The proportional
hazard assumption was met if the slope of Schoenfeld’s residuals was zero. Additionally,
to determine which model was the best fit for the data, I had to manually calculate the
likelihood ratio tests, and then check with the χ2 distribution table through SPSS. All of
these issues with SPSS introduced additional error into the analyses that could have been
avoided if I had used a different statistical software package.
Results
Incidence
Between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017, there were 749 terrorist attacks
perpetrated in the United States (START, 2018a). Figure 4 shows the breakdown of
domestic, international, and unknown terrorist attacks. As shown in Figure 4, the majority
of terrorist attacks in the United States were perpetrated by domestic terrorists. When
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examining the features of the unknown attacks, many shared the modus operandi of
domestic terrorism rather than international terrorism. Considering the dearth of attacks
perpetrated by international terrorists and the overarching challenges of conducting
terrorist operations in foreign countries; it is reasonable to presume that most, if not all of
the unknown attacks were perpetrated by domestic terrorists. However, without
verification I did not complete an analysis of attacks using the combined domestic and
unknown terrorist attacks, and instead I analyzed the unknown terrorist attacks separately
from domestic terrorist attacks and all terrorist attacks regardless of perpetrator
nationality.

Figure 4. Terrorist attacks in the United States from January 1, 1994 until December 31,
2017 by perpetrator type.

170
Figure 5 shows the incidence of terrorist attacks for the time frame of analysis and
in relation to the counterterrorism policies examined. As shown in Figure 5, there was a
general decrease in terrorist attacks in the United States from 1994 until 2006. There has
been an increasing trend in terrorist attacks in the United States from 2007 to 2017.
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Figure 5. Terrorist attacks in the United States from January 1, 1994 until December 31,
2017 in relation to counterterrorism policy.
To address RQ1, Figure 6 shows the incidence of terrorist attacks in the United
States by type: international terrorism, domestic terrorism, and unknown. As shown in
Figure 6, international terrorist attacks in the United States occurred rarely with many
years of no known international terrorist attacks. Domestic terrorist attacks occurred
frequently and at least yearly. For unknown attacks, there have been a few years without
any unknown attacks, but like domestic terrorist attacks, they occurred with some
regularity.

171

Terrorist Attacks in the United States by Type
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Figure 6. Terrorist attacks in the United States by type from January 1, 1994 until
December 31, 2017 in relation to 21st century counterterrorism policies.
As shown in Figure 6, domestic terrorist attacks spiked in 1999, 2002, and 2017.
Following the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the FBI increased investigation into
militia groups and anti-government groups. Prior to the Oklahoma City bombing, two
sieges with federal law enforcement served as inspiration for retaliatory attacks against
the U.S. government. The Ruby Ridge siege in Naples, Idaho began on August 21, 1992
and ended on August 31, 1992 (Hewitt, 2003, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018). The
siege in Waco, TX between law enforcement and the Branch Davidian cult members
occurred February 28 to April 19, 1993 (Hewitt, 2003, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Martin,
2018). Anti-government groups responded by increasing their activities in retaliation for
Ruby Ridge and Waco. It may be the backlash from the increased FBI investigations
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following these events that may have led to the spike in domestic terrorist attacks that
occurred in 1999.
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks there was a distinct rise in
anti-Muslim and anti-Arab terrorism, including attacks against Sikhs and others who
were mistakenly identified as Arab or Muslim (Martin, 2018; START, 2018a). After
hitting a low in 2011, domestic terrorist attacks have been steadily increasing (see Figure
6). This rise in domestic terrorism may be attributed to two factors, the re-election of
President Barack Obama and the rise of the birther conspiracy theory in 2012, and the
racist and anti-immigrant presidential campaign announcement by Donald J. Trump on
June 16, 2015. The birther conspiracy theory questioned the place of birth and thus
eligibility and legitimacy of Barack Obama as president (Pham, 2015; Warner & NevilleShepard, 2014). Trump was one of the major figures who headlined and publicly
supported the birther conspiracy theory, which laid the foundation for his later
presidential campaign and administration. The rhetoric used by the Trump campaign and
subsequent administration has been one in support of White nationalism, nativism, and
fear-inducing anti-Muslim sentiment (Montgomery, 2019; Newman, Shah, &
Collingwood, 2018). Many White supremacists, White nationalists, and neo-Nazis were
given greater legitimacy from the Trump campaign and election, and further fueled by
Trump’s comments following the violent clash of protesters at the Unite the Right rally in
Charlottesville, VA on August 11-12, 2017, which resulted in one death after one of the
Unite the Right protestors drove his car into a crowd of counter-protestors (J. Johnson,
2018; Perry, 2018).
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Tables 3 and 4 show the number of terrorist attacks by type for each policy
period. Table 3 shows the incidence of terrorism as represented in how I analyzed the
data.
Table 3
Incidence of Terrorist Attacks Included in Counterterrorism Policy Analysis
Domestic
terrorism
218

Pre-USA PATRIOT act (January 1,
1994 to October 25, 2001)
USA PATRIOT act (October 26,
186
2001 to June 1, 2015)
USA PATRIOT Improvement and
206
Reauthorization act (March 9,
2006 to December 31, 2017)
AETA (November 27, 2006 to
202
December 31, 2017)
Implementing Recommendations of 197
the 9/11 Commission act
(August 3, 2007 to December
31, 2017)
USA FREEDOM act (June 2, 2015 96
to December 31, 2017)
Note. There are overlaps across policies.

International Unknown Total
terrorism
7
117
342
4

58

248

5

93

304

5

93

300

5

92

294

2

61

159

Table 4 shows only the number of attacks between policy implementation periods.
Only the USA PATRIOT Act had a specified end date. All other policies were in effect
through the end of 2017 at least.
As shown in both Tables 3 and 4, 45.7% of terrorist attacks in the United States
occurred in the seven years prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. Compared to
that baseline, there was a decrease in the frequency of terrorist attacks in the United
States since the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act (54.3% of attacks occurred over a 16year time frame). These results supported the acceptance of H11 that incidence of
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domestic terrorism changed following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy for
RQ1.
Table 4
Incidence of Terrorist Attacks Between Counterterrorism Policies
Domestic
terrorism
218

Pre-USA PATRIOT act (January 1,
1994 to October 25, 2001)
USA PATRIOT act (October 26,
76
2001 to March 8, 2006)
USA PATRIOT Improvement and
4
Reauthorization act (March 9,
2006 to November 26, 2006)
AETA (November 27, 2006 to
5
August 2, 2007)
Implementing Recommendations of 101
the 9/11 Commission act
(August 3, 2007 to June 1, 2015)
USA FREEDOM act (June 2, 2015 96
to December 31, 2017)
Note. There are no overlaps across policies.

International Unknown Total
terrorism
7
117
342
1

26

103

0

0

4

0

1

6

3

31

135

2

61

159

While Tables 3 and 4 show a change in incidence of domestic terrorism following
the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, those
results may have been affected by later policy initiatives. Therefore, I was not able to
reject the null hypothesis for SQ1B.
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for the intervention variables. I created
dummy variables for each counterterrorism policy, such that “1” indicated that a specific
policy was in effect.
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for Intervention Variables for Incidence

USA PATRIOT act
Any attack
Domestic only
International only
Unknown only
USA PATRIOT Improvement
and Reauthorization act
Any attack
Domestic only
International only
Unknown only
AETA
Any attack
Domestic only
International only
Unknown only
Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission act
Any attack
Domestic only
International only
Unknown only
USA FREEDOM act
Any attack
Domestic only
International only
Unknown only

N

M

SD

Min
value

Max
value

749
500
13
236

.33
.37
.31
.25

.471
.484
.480
.431

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

749
500
13
236

.41
.41
.38
.39

.491
.493
.506
.490

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

749
500
13
236

.40
.40
.38
.39

.490
.491
.506
.490

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

749
500
13
236

.39
.39
.38
.39

.489
.489
.506
.489

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

749
500
13
236

.21
.19
.15
.26

.409
.394
.376
.439

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
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Keeping in mind that the policy periods overlap, 33% of any type of terrorist
attack occurred during the USA PATRIOT Act, 41% during the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 40% during AETA, 39% during the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and 21% during the USA
FREEDOM Act. For domestic terrorism, 37% of attacks occurred during the USA
PATRIOT Act, 41% during the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act,
40% during AETA, 39% during the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act, and 19% during the USA FREEDOM Act. Considering that AETA was
the only policy specifically aimed at domestic terrorism, it is noteworthy that there was
not a greater reduction in domestic terrorism after AETA was enacted.
Within RQ1, there were five SQs, one for each policy. The USA PATRIOT Act
of 2001 was the focus for SQ1A. As discussed, incidence of domestic terrorism did
change following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act and therefore these
results supported the acceptance of H11A. The USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005 was assessed in SQ1B. Based on Figure 6 and Table 5, there
was no immediate change in domestic terrorism following the implementation of the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.
For SQ1C, AETA of 2006 was evaluated. AETA was enacted eight months after
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act which created some
challenges for interpreting whether the policy had an impact independent of the USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act. There were only four domestic
terrorist attacks that occurred between the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement

177
and Reauthorization Act and AETA and there were only five domestic terrorist attacks
that occurred between the passage of AETA and the Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. Because of the sparse data and possible influence of
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act and later policy initiatives, I
was not able to reject the null hypothesis for SQ1C.
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 was
addressed by SQ1D. As shown in Figure 6, incidence of domestic terrorism did change
following the implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act. Therefore the null hypothesis was rejected and H11D accepted. The
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 was addressed by SQ1E. As shown in Figure 6, the
increasing trend in domestic terrorism continued after the passage of the USA
FREEDOM Act, exceeding the incidence of domestic terrorism in 1999. While the trend
in domestic terrorist attacks immediately preceding the passage of the USA FREEDOM
Act was increasing, the pattern shows that there would be an increase one year, followed
by a slight decrease the next year. The slope of the increasing trend in incidence of
domestic terrorism is steeper after the USA FREEDOM Act was passed. That, in
combination with the data in Tables 3, 4, and 5 led me to reject the null hypothesis for
SQ1E.
I present the results of the series hazard model analysis for RQ4 and its SQs. The
series hazard model addressed whether the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack changed
following the implementation of counterterrorism policy. I present the results in the same
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manner and format as prior researchers using the series hazard model (see Dugan et al.,
2005; Dugan, 2011; Dugan & Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009).
The series hazard model required the creation of several variables. The dependent
variable was the number of days from the current terrorist event to the next terrorist
event. For analysis of domestic terrorist events, the dependent variable was the number of
days from the current domestic terrorist event to the next domestic terrorist event. For
analysis of unknown terrorist events, the dependent variable was the number of days from
the current unknown terrorist event to the next unknown terrorist event. A censor or
status variable was needed for the model to identify which cases should be included in
the analyses. Utilizing the methods outlined by Dugan (2011) and Dugan and Yang
(2012), I created censor variables such that only the last terrorist event was censored out
of the analysis (because it is unknown when the next event occurs). I created separate
censor variables for analyses of all attacks regardless of perpetrator type, domestic
terrorist attacks, and unknown attacks, because the last event for each differed, and thus
needed to be coded appropriately.
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable of days until
next attack for all attacks regardless of type, domestic attacks, international attacks, and
unknown attacks.
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics on Terrorist Attacks in the United States, 1994 to 2017

Days until any next attack
Days until next domestic attack
Days until next international
attack
Days until next unknown attack

N

M

SD
19.686
27.799
841.806

Min
value
0
0
0

Max
value
188
252
2731

748
498
12

11.70
17.57
712.08

235

36.81

80.903

0

895

As shown in Table 6, the mean number of days between terrorist attacks in the
United States (with standard deviations in parentheses) was 11.70 (19.686) with no more
than 188 days passing between attacks. For international terrorist attacks, the mean
number of days between attacks was 712.08 (841.806) days or 23.4 (27.7) months with
no more than 89.8 months or 7.5 years between attacks. For domestic terrorist attacks, the
mean number of days between attacks was 17.57 (27.799) with no more than 252 days or
8.3 months between attacks. Even the unknown attacks have a greater frequency than
international attacks, yet U.S. counterterrorism policies continue to focus on the threat
from international terrorism.
I created several control variables for the series hazard model analysis (see Table
7). As with the dependent variable and censor variables, I created control variables for
each type of attack: any or all, domestic, and unknown. I included the number of days
from the previous terrorist event to the current event to control for momentum and
backlash, and to account for dependency between events. I created separate control
variables for gap time from previous event for domestic attacks and unknown attacks, as
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well as any attack. I included the number of months from the start of the analysis to
control for the passage of time.
Success density was a variable appeared in all prior terrorism studies utilizing the
series hazard model (see Carson, 2014; Dugan et al., 2005; Dugan, 2011; Dugan and
Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, and Korte, 2009). I included success density in my analysis
because success of immediately preceding attacks may impact future attacks. The
formula I used to calculate success density is shown in Equation 2.
P(success for current and two previous attempts)
(event datecurrent – event date2nd previous)/365

(2)

The GTD coded attack success in terms of whether the planned method was
executed. It was not coded in relation to the motivation or long-term goals of the
perpetrator or perpetrator group (LaFree, 2010; START, 2018b). Of the 749 terrorist
attacks, 606 were coded as successful and 143 were coded as unsuccessful (START,
2018a). The values of success density ranged from 0 to 365. A value of 365 indicated 3
consecutive successful attacks executed on the same day. A value of 0 indicated 3
consecutive unsuccessful attacks.
I included a control variable of attack density. I measured attack density as the
amount of time between three incidents, the current event and the second preceding
event, regardless of attack success (see Dugan, 2011; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). I
used this variable to determine if there was momentum from successive attacks
independent of success. Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics for the control variables I
used in the series hazard models examining incidence. International terrorism statistics
were not included because its rare occurrence violated one of the criteria of using the
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series hazard model. As shown in Table 7, all terrorist attacks occurred with greater
frequency, greater success, and less attack density than domestic and unknown attacks.
Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables

Days since any previous attack
Days since previous domestic
attack
Days since previous unknown
attack
Success density for any attack
Success density for domesticonly attacks
Success density for unknownonly attacks
Attack density for any attack
Attack density for domestic-only
attacks
Attack density for unknown-only
attacks
Months for any attack
Months for domestic-only attacks
Months for unknown-only attacks

N

M

SD
19.686
27.782

Min
value
0
0

Max
value
188
252

748
498

11.70
17.54

235

36.81

80.903

0

895

747
498

59.38
51.22

96.99
95.96

0
0

365
365

234

31.01

67.64

0

365

747
498

23.43
35.14

30.30
43.84

0
0

233
314

234

73.77

122.06

0

936

749
500
236

135.43
137.75
130.72

98.24
95.56
104.21

1
1
3

288
288
287

I determined the coefficients for the series hazard model by running Cox’s
proportional hazard model in SPSS using days until next terrorist attack as the dependent
variable. Table 8 shows the results for incidence of terrorism by type for the series hazard
model. I ran separate series hazard models for any terrorist attacks, only domestic
terrorist attacks, and unknown terrorist attacks with the appropriate dependent and control
variables.
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Table 8
Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox’s Proportional Hazard Model for Incidence of
Terrorism in the United States, 1994 to 2017

Counterterrorism policies
USA PATRIOT act
USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization act
AETA
Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission act
USA FREEDOM act
Control variables
Days since previous attack
Success density
Attack density
Months
Days since previous domestic attack
Success density domestic only
Attack density domestic only
Days since previous unknown attack
Success density unknown
Attack density unknown
Note. *p ≤ 0.05. **p ≤ 0.01. ***p < 0.001.

All
(N=749)

Domestic
only
(N=500)

Unknown only
(N=236)

-0.293
0.169
-1.151
0.598
0.718
0.715
0.381
0.428
0.650*
0.275

-0.478*
0.205
-0.920
0.545
0.525
0.690
0.153
0.472
0.102
0.330

-0.503
0.341
-0.732
1.170
----

0.003
0.003
0.001**
0.001
-0.003
0.002
-0.001
0.002

0.003
0.005
0.001
0.001
0.004
0.003
0.001
0.002
-0.010**
0.004
0.001
0.001
-0.001
0.002

0.008
0.006
0.002
0.001
-0.006
0.004
-0.005
0.003

1.320
1.221
0.875
0.553

0.001
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
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For any terrorist attacks, only the coefficients for the USA FREEDOM Act and
success density were statistically significant. Therefore following the implementation of
the USA FREEDOM Act, the hazard of another terrorist attack increased (p=0.018);
however, the start date of the USA FREEDOM Act was confounded with the presidential
campaign announcement by Trump, and so it is unclear whether the shift in terrorist
attacks are due to the USA FREEDOM Act alone. The statistically significant success
density suggests a contagion component whereby prior successful terrorist attacks
increased the hazard of another terrorist attack (p=0.002).
For only domestic terrorist attacks, the hazard of another terrorist attack decreased
following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act (p=0.020). As the days since
the previous domestic terrorist attack increased, the hazard of another domestic terrorist
attack decreased (p=0.010). While the overall series hazard model for unknown terrorist
attacks was statistically significant from a null model (p<0.001), none of the individual
coefficients were statistically significant.
I ran another set of series hazard models that included policy interaction variables
with time. These interaction variables between policy and number of months can be used
to estimate how the baseline hazard changes as a result of time elapsing after policy
implementation. The coefficients for these interaction variables can be used to determine
whether the policy effect is gradual, immediate, temporary, or permanent (see Dugan,
2011). Table 9 shows the results for the series hazard model for each type of terrorism
including these interaction variables.

184
Table 9
Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox’s Proportional Hazard Model with Interaction
Variables for Incidence of Terrorism in the United States, 1994 to 2017

Counterterrorism policies
USA PATRIOT act
USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization act
AETA
Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission act
USA FREEDOM act
Control variables
Days since previous attack
Success density
Attack density
Months
USA PATRIOT act x months
interaction
USA PATRIOT Improvement x
months interaction
AETA x months interaction
Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission x months
interaction
USA FREEDOM act x months
interaction
Days since previous domestic attack
Success density domestic only

All
(N=749)

Domestic
only
(N=500)

Unknown only
(N=236)

1.888*
0.768
-4.437***
1.118
0.704
0.717
0.057
0.457
2.807
2.796

3.394***
0.943
-6.131***
1.267
0.512
0.691
-0.259
0.511
3.119
3.687

-2.944*
1.498
0.306
2.093
----

0.002
0.003
0.001**
0.001
-0.002
0.002
-0.002
0.002
-0.018**
0.007
0.025***
0.007
-------

0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.005
0.004
0.001
0.003
-0.034***
0.009
0.042***
0.009
-------

0.010
0.006
0.001
0.001
-0.007
0.004
-0.010*
0.004
0.023
0.013
-0.012
0.014
-------

-0.019
0.012

-0.032*
0.016
-0.008*
0.004
0.001
0.001

0.022
0.021

1.333
1.247
-1.521
4.797

(table continues)
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All
(N=749)
Attack density domestic only
Days since previous unknown attack
Success density unknown
Attack density unknown

Domestic
only
(N=500)
0.001
0.002

Unknown only
(N=236)

0.001
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001

Note. *p ≤ 0.05. **p ≤ 0.01. ***p < 0.001.
For all three types of terrorism, coefficients for AETA x months interaction and
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act x months were linearly
dependent or constant resulting in a reduction of degrees of freedom to 0 and no value
reported by SPSS. In the unknown terrorism model, the AETA intervention was also
found to be linearly dependent or constant.
By including these interaction variables, the impact of the specific policies
changed from the models without these variables. For any terrorist attack, the hazard for
another attack increased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act (p=0.014).
However, the hazard of any terrorist attack decreased following the passage of the USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act (p<0.001). These two results are
mirrored for only domestic terrorist attacks but at a greater magnitude. The hazard of
another domestic terrorist attack increased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT
Act (p<0.001). The hazard of another domestic terrorist attack decreased following the
passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act (p<0.001). For
unknown terrorist attacks, the hazard of another unknown terrorist attack decreases
statistically significantly following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act (p=0.049).
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Similar results for any terrorist attack and domestic terrorist attacks were found
for the interaction variables of the USA PATRIOT Act x month and the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act x month variables. The hazard of a terrorist attack
decreased as time since the USA PATRIOT Act had been implemented elapsed
(p=0.008). The hazard of a terrorist attack increased as the time since the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act had been implemented elapsed (p=0.001). While
the direction of change was similar from any attack to domestic attacks, the magnitude
for domestic attacks was amplified. The hazard of a domestic terrorist attack decreased as
time since the USA PATRIOT Act had been implemented elapsed (p<0.001). The hazard
of a domestic terrorist attack increased as the time since the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act had been implemented elapsed (p<0.001).
Success density was found to increase the hazard of any terrorist attack (p=0.001).
For domestic terrorist attacks, the interaction between the USA FREEDOM Act x months
was statistically significant which showed that as time passed since the USA FREEDOM
Act had been implemented, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack decreased (p=0.041).
In addition, as days from previous domestic terrorist attacks increased, the hazard of a
domestic terrorist attack decreased (p=0.043). For the unknown attacks, the time
component was found to be statistically significant indicating that as months pass, the
hazard of another unknown terrorist attack decreased (p=0.021).
I conducted a likelihood ratio test between the models with and without the
interaction variables to determine which model was a better fit to explain the data. For all
terrorist attacks and for domestic terrorist attacks, the model with the interaction variables
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was the best fit (p<0.01). For the unknown attacks model, the model with the interaction
variables was not statistically significant, thus the addition of the interaction variables did
not significantly improve the fit of the model; and therefore, the simpler model was the
best fit. I analyzed Schoenfeld’s residuals to ensure that the covariates fulfilled the
proportional hazard assumption and found that the proportional hazard assumption was
fulfilled.
As shown in Table 9, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack did change as a
function of counterterrorism policies, thus the null hypothesis for RQ4 was rejected.
Because the coefficients for the USA PATRIOT Act and the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act were statistically significant, the null hypotheses
for SQ4A and SQ4B were rejected. With no statistical significance for AETA,
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and the USA FREEDOM
Act, the null hypotheses were retained for SQ4C, SQ4D, and SQ4E.
Lethality
To determine if an event was a lethal event, the event needed to have at least one
fatality, injury, or hostage. I created a dummy variable to identify events that fulfilled the
lethal criteria or not. If an event had missing information for one of the items (fatalities,
injuries, or hostages) but had at least one fatality, injury, or hostage in the remaining
items, then I coded that event as lethal. Only events that had missing information and
zeroes for the remaining items were excluded from the analysis.
From January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017 there were 18 incidents involving
hostages, 13 perpetrated by domestic terrorists, 4 by international terrorists, and 1 by an
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unknown perpetrator (START, 2018a). Ten of the hostage incidents occurred prior to the
passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, six perpetrated by domestic terrorists and four
perpetrated by international terrorists. Three hostage incidents occurred between the
passage of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act and the
USA FREEDOM Act, two perpetrated by domestic terrorists and one by an unknown
perpetrator. Five hostage incidents occurred since the USA FREEDOM Act was
implemented and were all perpetrated by domestic terrorists.
Figure 7 shows lethal terrorist attacks in the United States by type and in relation
to counterterrorism policies. As shown in Figure 7, there were no lethal attacks in 2003,
2004, 2005, and 2007. After an initial spike in 2002, lethal domestic terrorist attacks
decreased to 0 until the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization
Act. While there was a decrease in lethal domestic terrorist attacks between AETA and
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, the numbers were so
small as to question whether there was a significant impact from the passage of AETA.
Additionally, most eco-terrorism involved property damage over lethality, and thus any
impact on lethal domestic terrorism by AETA would be small. Lethal domestic terrorist
attacks have been increasing since 2011. From 2014 to 2015, lethal domestic terrorist
attacks decreased before resuming an increasing trend.
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Lethal Terrorist Attacks in the United States by Type
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Figure 7. Lethal terrorist attacks in the United States from January 1, 1994 until
December 31, 2017 in relation to 21st century counterterrorism policies and by type of
attack.
Table 10 shows the counts and descriptive statistics for lethal terrorist attacks by
type. In general, most terrorist attacks in the United States were non-lethal attacks. The
trends in lethal attacks are mirrored for any attack type and for domestic attacks. The
differences occurred from the baseline period to after the USA PATRIOT Act was
enacted. For any attack, there was a decrease in lethal attacks but for domestic attacks,
lethal attacks increased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. The number of
days to next lethal attack was lowest for any lethal attack and highest for unknown
attacks.
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Table 10
Descriptive Statistics for Lethal Terrorist Attacks in the United States, 1994 to 2017
All
(Total
N=183)

Domestic
only
(Total
N=137)
138
362

Unknown only
(Total N=36)

61 (12)
105 (1)

51 (9)
91 (1)

7 (2)
11 (0)

104 (0)
104 (48)

90 (0)
90 (41)

11 (0)
11 (5)

56 (56)

49 (49)

6 (6)

Pre-USA PATRIOT act

67

38

24

Mean days to next lethal attack
(Standard deviation in parentheses)

47.52
(125.058)

63.48
(158.197)

237.47
(458.676)

Lethal attacks
Non-lethal attacks
System-missing
Counterterrorism policies
USA PATRIOT act
USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization act
AETA
Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission act
USA FREEDOM act

184
563
2

37
196
3

Table 11 shows the descriptive statistics for the intervention variables for lethal
attacks. As shown in Table 11, for any lethal attack, domestic lethal attacks, and
unknown lethal attacks, the means were the same for the USA PATRIOT Improvement
and Reauthorization Act, AETA, and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act and higher than the means for types of lethal attacks for the USA
PATRIOT Act and the USA FREEDOM Act.
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Table 11
Descriptive Statistics for Intervention Variables for Lethal Terrorist Attacks in the United
States, 1994 to 2017

USA PATRIOT act
Any attack
Domestic only
Unknown only
USA PATRIOT Improvement
and Reauthorization act
Any attack
Domestic only
Unknown only
AETA
Any attack
Domestic only
Unknown only
Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission act
Any attack
Domestic only
Unknown only
USA FREEDOM act
Any attack
Domestic only
Unknown only

N

M

SD

Min
value

Max
value

184
138
37

0.33
0.37
0.19

0.472
0.484
0.397

0
0
0

1
1
1

184
138
37

0.57
0.66
0.30

0.496
0.476
0.463

0
0
0

1
1
1

184
138
37

0.57
0.65
0.30

0.497
0.478
0.463

0
0
0

1
1
1

184
138
37

0.57
0.65
0.30

0.497
0.478
0.463

0
0
0

1
1
1

184
138
37

0.30
0.36
0.16

0.461
0.480
0.374

0
0
0

1
1
1

As shown in Figure 7, Table 10, and Table 11, lethal domestic terrorism changed
following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy in general. Therefore, the
null hypothesis was rejected for RQ2. Lethal domestic terrorist attacks increased
following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and the USA FREEDOM Act (49
attacks in 2 ½ years compared to 51 attacks in approximately 14 years). Therefore, the
null hypotheses for SQ2A, SQ2D, and SQ2E were rejected. Lethal domestic terrorist
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attacks did not substantively change following the passage of the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act and AETA; therefore, I retained the null
hypotheses for SQ2B and SQ2C.
Table 12 shows the descriptive statistics for the additional control variables for
the series hazard model beyond the values listed in Table 7. The dependent variable for
the series hazard models was days until next lethal attack. Table 7 shows the values for
the control variables regardless of lethality for days since previous attack, success
density, and attack density. Table 12 includes the control variables by type for only lethal
attacks. Control variables regardless of lethality were included in case there was a
contagion effect based on attacks in general, not just lethal attacks. As shown in Table 12,
there were longer gaps between previous lethal attacks to current lethal attacks than
incidence of attacks (see Table 7). As with attack incidence regardless of lethality, any
lethal attack occurred with less time between attacks than domestic or unknown. Success
densities for any lethal attack and lethal domestic attacks were similar, and success
densities for unknown lethal attacks were low. Attack density reflected the same pattern
shown with days since previous attack.
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Table 12
Descriptive Statistics for Additional Control Variables for Lethal Terrorist Attacks in the
United States, 1994 to 2017

Days since previous lethal attack
Days since previous lethal
domestic attack
Days since previous lethal
unknown attack
Success density
Success density for lethal
domestic
Success density for lethal
unknown
Attack density
Attack density for lethal domestic
Attack density for lethal
unknown
Lethal months
Lethal months for domestic
Lethal months for unknown

N

Mean

SD
125.058
158.197

Min
value
0
0

Max
value
1338
1400

748
137

47.52
63.48

36

237.47

458.676

0

2445

182
136

44.528
45.000

98.080
103.280

0.25
0

365
365

35

10.612

21.329

0.11

91.25

182
136
35

95.47
127.16
485.86

184.026
232.928
717.112

0
0
4

1485
1547
3340

184
138
37

164.14
181.07
108.68

103.048
100.536
98.253

2
2
2

287
287
286

The series hazard models for lethal attacks were used to answer RQ5. The rare
occurrence of unknown lethal attacks violated the criteria for the series hazard model.
While statistical significance was found for the full model at p < 0.01 and for specific
variables, the results were not reliable due to the small number of events. Therefore, the
focus of the interpretation that follows will be on any lethal attack and lethal domestic
attacks. Table 13 shows the results of the Cox’s proportional hazard model for lethal
attacks.
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Table 13
Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox’s Proportional Hazard Model for Lethal
Terrorism in the United States, 1994 to 2017

Counterterrorism policies
USA PATRIOT act
USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization act
AETA
Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission act
USA FREEDOM act

All
(N=138)

Domestic
only
(N=135)

Unknown only
(N=34)

-1.560***
0.474
-1.314
1.764
0.910
1.748
----

-3.966***
0.873
1.007
1.948
0.979
1.711
----

-3.390*
1.550
-0.388
2.786
----

-1.230*
0.599

-3.599***
0.982

-3.085
2.393

0.011*
0.005
0.009
0.012
0.002
0.002
0.001
0.008
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.002
0.001
0.001
-0.008
0.009

0.015
0.014
-0.166*
0.066
-0.002
0.011
0.077
0.040

----

Control variables
Days since previous lethal attack

0.001
0.001
Success density for lethal attacks
0.001
0.001
Attack density for lethal attacks
0.001
0.001
Months of lethal attacks
0.010*
0.004
Days since any previous attack
0.001
0.008
Success density for any previous attack 0.001
0.001
Attack density for any previous attack 0.003
0.004
Days since previous lethal domestic
attack
Success density lethal domestic only
Attack density lethal domestic only
Days since previous domestic attack

(table continues)
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All
(N=138)
Success density domestic only
Attack density domestic only
Days since previous lethal unknown
attack
Success density lethal unknown
Attack density lethal unknown
Days since previous unknown attack
Success density unknown
Attack density unknown

Domestic
only
(N=135)
-0.002
0.002
0.008
0.006

Unknown only
(N=34)

0.001
0.001
-0.018
0.034
-0.001
0.001
-0.008
0.007
0.030
0.025
0.12
0.007

Note. *p ≤ 0.05. **p ≤ 0.01. ***p < 0.001.
For all three types of terrorism, coefficients for Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act were linearly dependent or constant resulting in a reduction
of degrees of freedom to 0 and no value reported by SPSS. For all lethal terrorist attacks
and domestic lethal attacks, only the coefficients for the USA PATRIOT Act, the USA
FREEDOM Act, and the months of lethal attacks were statistically significant. For any
lethal terrorist attack, the hazard of another lethal terrorist attack decreased following the
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act (p=0.001) and following the implementation
of the USA FREEDOM Act (p=0.040). For lethal domestic terrorist attacks, the hazard of
another lethal domestic terrorist attack decreased following the implementation of the
USA PATRIOT Act (p<0.001) and following the implementation of the USA
FREEDOM Act (p<0.001). However, as time passed, the hazard of any lethal terrorist
attack (p=0.012) and the hazard of lethal domestic terrorist attacks (p=0.028) increased.
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Considering the differences in magnitude of the coefficients for the USA PATRIOT Act
and the USA FREEDOM Act between any lethal attack and domestic lethal attacks, it
appeared that domestic lethal attacks were more affected by these policies than any lethal
attack in general.
I ran the series hazard model with the inclusion of intervention variables for
lethality. Because of the small N, the series hazard model results for unknown lethal
attacks, while statistically significant (p<0.01) are unreliable, and thus were not further
interpreted. Table 14 shows the results of the Cox’s proportional hazard model for lethal
terrorist attacks including the policy intervention variables.
For all models, coefficients for Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act, the AETA x months interaction and the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act x months were linearly dependent or
constant resulting in a reduction of degrees of freedom to 0 and no value reported by
SPSS. The only statistically significant coefficient was found for lethal domestic terrorist
attacks after the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted. As shown in Table 14, there were no
statistically significant coefficients in the model for any lethal terrorist attack. For lethal
domestic terrorist attacks, the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act decreased the hazard of
another lethal domestic terrorist attack (p=0.024).
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Table 14
Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox’s Proportional Hazard Model with Interaction
Variables for Lethal Terrorism in the United States, 1994 to 2017

Counterterrorism policies
USA PATRIOT act
USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization act
AETA
Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission act
USA FREEDOM act

All
(N=749)

Domestic
only
(N=135)

Unknown only
(N=34)

2.426
3.845
-4.480
4.948
1.483
1.849
----

-10.607*
4.708
6.169
5.363
1.136
1.744
----

4.725
8.186
-15.622
11.032
----

-1.798
6.080

-13.055
6.826

-17.836
15.309

0.002
0.008
0.006
0.012
0.002
0.002
0.001
0.008
0.066
0.041
-0.52
0.43
-------

0.002
0.017
-0.194**
0.070
-0.005
0.011
0.081
0.042
-0.082
0.086
0.120
0.081
-------

----

Control variables
Days since previous lethal attack

0.001
0.001
Success density for lethal attacks
0.001
0.001
Attack density for lethal attacks
0.001
0.001
Months of lethal attacks
0.006
0.005
Days since any previous attack
0.001
0.008
Success density for any previous attack 0.001
0.001
Attack density for any previous attack 0.002
0.004
USA PATRIOT act x lethal months
-0.038
interaction
0.037
USA PATRIOT Improvement x lethal 0.043
months interaction
0.039
AETA x lethal months interaction
---Implementing Recommendations of
---the 9/11 Commission x lethal
months interaction

(table continues)
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All
(N=749)
USA FREEDOM act x lethal months
interaction
Days since previous lethal domestic
attack
Success density lethal domestic only
Attack density lethal domestic only
Days since previous domestic attack
Success density domestic only
Attack density domestic only
Days since previous lethal unknown
attack
Success density lethal unknown
Attack density lethal unknown
Days since previous unknown attack
Success density unknown
Attack density unknown

-0.021
0.041

Domestic
only
(N=135)
0.075
0.045
-0.001
0.001
0.001
0.002
0.001
0.001
-0.006
0.009
-0.002
0.002
0.008
0.006

Unknown only
(N=34)
----

0.002
0.001
0.001
0.037
-0.001
0.001
-0.008
0.007
0.026
0.025
0.014
0.007

Note. *p ≤ 0.05. **p ≤ 0.01. ***p < 0.001.
I conducted a likelihood ratio test between the models with and without the
interaction variables to determine which model was a better fit to explain the data for
lethality. None of the models with the interaction variables were statistically significant,
thus the interaction variables did not significantly improve the fit of the models in
explaining lethality. Therefore, the series hazard model in Table 13 was used to answer
RQ5 and its SQs. I analyzed Schoenfeld’s residuals to ensure that the covariates fulfilled
the proportional hazard assumption and found that the proportional hazard assumption
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was fulfilled. As shown in Table 13, lethal domestic terrorism changed following the
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy, thus I rejected the null hypothesis for
RQ5. The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act and the USA FREEDOM Act decreased
the hazard of another lethal domestic terrorist attack; therefore, I rejected the null
hypotheses for SQ5A and SQ5E. However, as time passed in months for lethal terrorist
attacks, the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist attack increased. The lack of statistical
significance for the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, AETA, and
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act led to retaining the null
hypotheses for SQ5B, SQ5C, and SQ5D.
Costs from Property Damage
Costs of terrorism in the United States include the costs of property damage,
ransom paid, and counterterrorism spending. Counterterrorism spending will be
elaborated on in the next section. From January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017 there were
18 incidents involving hostages (START, 2018a). No incidents resulted in payment of
ransom. Therefore, I analyzed costs for whether property damage was sustained in
attacks.
Figure 8 shows the terrorist attacks resulting in property damage by type in
relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy. As shown in Figure 8, domestic terrorist attacks
that resulted in property damage decreased in 2004 and then began a slow increasing
trend following the passage of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act. The increasing trend in domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property
damage became less noisy after the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act.
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U.S. Terrorist Attacks Resulting in Property Damage by Type
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Figure 8. Terrorist attacks in the United States that resulted in property damage from
January 1, 1994 until December 31, 2017 in relation to 21st century counterterrorism
policies and by type of attack.
Unlike the results on lethality, the trends for attacks resulting in property damage
differed by type of terrorism. For all terrorist attacks resulting in property damage,
attacks increased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act and then decreased. For domestic terrorist attacks resulting in
property damage, attacks decreased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act.
For unknown terrorist attacks resulting in property damage, after the initial decrease
following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, attacks increased following the USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act and then decreased.
Table 15 shows the descriptive statistics for terrorist attacks that resulted in
property damage. As shown in Table 15, the majority of terrorist attacks for each type
had higher incidence of attacks resulting in property damage than attacks that did not
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result in property damage. Additionally, attacks resulting in property damage, regardless
of type decreased following the passage or the USA PATRIOT Act.
Table 15
Descriptive Statistics for Terrorist Attacks Resulting in Property Damage
All
(Total
N=521)

Unknown only
(Total N=182)

522
211
16

Domestic
only
(Total
N=329)
330
155
15

153 (69)
190 (1)

112 (54)
111 (1)

39 (15)
77 (0)

189 (3)
186 (80)

110 (2)
108 (55)

77 (1)
76 (23)

106 (106)

53 (53)

53 (53)

Pre-USA PATRIOT act

263

165

91

Mean days to next attack with property
damage
(Standard deviation in parentheses)

16.78
(28.769)

26.57
(43.354)

47.41
(101.854)

Attacks with property damage
Attacks without property damage
System-missing
Counterterrorism policies
USA PATRIOT act
USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization act
AETA
Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission act
USA FREEDOM act

183
52
1

As with lethal attacks, attacks resulting in property damage for all types had a
greater number of days to next attack with property damage compared to incidence of
another attack regardless of outcome. As with incidence and lethality results, time to next
attack with property damage was shortest for any attack with property damage and
longest for unknown attacks with property damage. Table 16 shows the descriptive
statistics for the intervention variables by type.
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Table 16
Descriptive Statistics for Intervention Variables on Terrorist Attacks that Resulted in
Property Damage in the United States, 1994 to 2017

USA PATRIOT act
Any attack
Domestic only
Unknown only
USA PATRIOT Improvement
and Reauthorization act
Any attack
Domestic only
Unknown only
AETA
Any attack
Domestic only
Unknown only
Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission act
Any attack
Domestic only
Unknown only
USA FREEDOM act
Any attack
Domestic only
Unknown only

N

M

SD

Min
value

Max
value

522
330
183

0.29
0.34
0.21

0.456
0.474
0.411

0
0
0

1
1
1

522
330
183

0.36
0.34
0.42

0.482
0.473
0.495

0
0
0

1
1
1

522
330
183

0.36
0.33
0.42

0.481
0.472
0.495

0
0
0

1
1
1

522
330
183

0.36
0.33
0.42

0.479
0.470
0.494

0
0
0

1
1
1

522
330
183

0.20
0.16
0.29

0.403
0.368
0.455

0
0
0

1
1
1

As shown in Table 16, regardless of attack type, the percentage of attacks for the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, AETA, and the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act was constant or nearly constant. For
domestic terrorist attacks with property damage, the percentage of attacks decreased from
33-34% in prior policy periods to 16% after the USA FREEDOM Act. For any terrorist
attack resulting in property damage and unknown attacks resulting in property damage,
the percentage of attacks were lower for the USA PATRIOT Act and USA FREEDOM
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Act periods. I rejected the null hypotheses for RQ3, SQ3A, SQ3D, and SQ3E based on
the results shown in Figure 8, Table 15, and Table 16. Because the change in domestic
terrorist attacks that resulted in property damage did not change substantially after the
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act and
AETA, I retained the null hypotheses for SQ3B and SQ3C.
I created additional control variables for the analysis for property damage to
account for the influence of previous attacks, success density, and attack density
regardless of property damage, the descriptive statistics for which are shown in Table 17.
Table 17
Descriptive Statistics for Additional Control Variables for Terrorist Attacks that Resulted
in Property Damage in the United States, 1994 to 2017

Days since previous attack with
property damage
Days since previous domestic
attack with property damage
Days since previous unknown
attack with property damage
Success density
Success density for domestic with
property damage
Success density for unknown
with property damage
Attack density
Attack density for domestic with
property damage
Attack density for unknown with
property damage
Months with property damage
Months for domestic with
property damage
Months for unknown with
property damage

N

Mean

SD
28.769

Min
value
0

Max
value
237

521

16.78

329

26.57

43.354

0

329

182

47.41

101.854

0

1036

520
328

53.348
45.948

93.061
93.531

0
0.65

365
365

181

28.098

65.363

0

365

520
328

33.60
53.27

45.423
66.338

0
0

427
427

181

94.65

154.243

0

1096

522
330

125.19
122.21

98.878
93.395

0
2

287
287

183

132.06

108.966

2

286

204
I ran the series hazard model for each type of terrorism using the days until the
next attack with property damage as the dependent variable. Table 18 shows the results of
the Cox’s proportional hazard model for attacks with property damage. For the unknown
attacks with property damage, the coefficient for AETA was linearly dependent or
constant resulting in a reduction of degrees of freedom to 0 and no value reported by
SPSS. For any terrorist attack resulting in property damage the only statistically
significant coefficient was for the USA PATRIOT Act (p=0.012), which indicated that
the hazard for another terrorist attack resulting in property damage decreased following
the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act. For domestic attacks resulting in property
damage, statistical significance was found for the USA PATRIOT Act and the attack
density from any previous attack regardless of property damage. These results indicate
that the hazard of a domestic attack resulting in property damage decreased after the USA
PATRIOT Act was enacted (p<0.001), but increased when the attack density from any
previous attacks increased (p=0.040). For unknown attacks that resulted in property
damage, statistical significance was found for the USA FREEDOM Act and months of
attacks with property damage. For unknown attacks resulting in property damage, the
hazard of another unknown attack resulting in property damage increased following the
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act (p=0.002), but decreased as time passed
(p=0.001).
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Table 18
Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox’s Proportional Hazard Model for Terrorism
Resulting in Property Damage in the United States, 1994 to 2017

Counterterrorism policies
USA PATRIOT act
USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization act
AETA
Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission act
USA FREEDOM act
Control variables
Days since previous attack with
property damage
Success density for attacks with
property damage
Attack density for attacks with
property damage
Months of attacks with property
damage
Days since any previous attack

All
(N=518)

Domestic
only
(N=326)

Unknown only
(N=180)

-0.519*
0.208
-1.326
1.201
0.891
1.286
0.696
0.608
0.646
0.347

-0.887***
0.253
-1.090
1.120
1.091
1.308
0.033
0.821
-0.170
0.425

0.063
0.468
1.463
1.374
----

0.001
0.002
-0.006
0.007
0.001
0.002
0.009*
0.005
0.004
0.003
0.002
0.002
-0.003
0.002
-0.010
0.006

-0.013***
0.004
0.010
0.007
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.005

0.001
0.004
0.002
0.001
-0.002
0.003
-0.003
0.002
-0.002
0.005
Success density for any previous attack -0.001
0.001
Attack density for any previous attack 0.001
0.004
Days since previous domestic attack
with property damage
Success density domestic only with
property damage
Attack density domestic only with
property damage
Days since previous domestic attack

-0.216
1.437
2.298**
0.734

(table continues)

206

All
(N=518)
Success density domestic only
Attack density domestic only
Days since previous unknown attack
with property damage
Success density unknown with
property damage
Attack density unknown with property
damage
Days since previous unknown attack
Success density unknown
Attack density unknown

Domestic
only
(N=326)
-0.001
0.003
0.001
0.004

Unknown only
(N=180)

0.001
0.001
0.002
0.003
-0.001
0.001
-0.004
0.003
-0.003
0.003
0.002
0.001

Note. *p ≤ 0.05. **p ≤ 0.01. ***p < 0.001.
Table 19 shows the coefficients of the series hazard model for attacks with
property damage by type including interaction variables. For all three types of attacks
resulting in property damage, coefficients for the AETA x months interaction and the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act x months were linearly
dependent or constant resulting in a reduction of degrees of freedom to 0 and no value
reported by SPSS. For unknown attacks resulting in property damage, the coefficient for
AETA was linearly dependent or constant resulting in a reduction of degrees of freedom
to 0 and no value reported by SPSS.
As shown in Table 19, the inclusion of the interaction variables decreased the
number of interventions that were statistically significant. For any terrorist attack
resulting in property damage, the only coefficient that was statistically significant was the
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time component of months of attacks with property damage indicating that the hazard of
any attack with property damage decreased over time (p=0.012). For domestic attacks
with property damage, the only statistically significant coefficient was for attack density
for any previous attack regardless of property damage (p=0.021). As the attack density
for any previous attack decreases, the hazard of a domestic attack with property damage
increases.
The model for unknown attacks with property damage was the only model that
had multiple coefficients that were statistically significant after the inclusion of the
interaction variables. As shown in Table 19, the hazard of an unknown attack resulting in
property damage decreased following the USA PATRIOT Act (p=0.009) and decreased
over time (p<0.001), but increased for the interactions of the USA PATRIOT Act with
months of attacks with property damage (p<0.001) and the USA FREEDOM Act
interaction with months of attacks with property damage (p=0.018). This indicates that
the increase in hazard of an unknown attack resulting in property damage was short-term
for the USA PATRIOT Act and USA FREEDOM Act.
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Table 19
Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox’s Proportional Hazard Model with Interaction
Variables for Terrorism Resulting in Property Damage in the United States, 1994 to 2017

Counterterrorism policies
USA PATRIOT act
USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization act
AETA
Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission act
USA FREEDOM act
Control variables
Days since previous attack with
property damage
Success density for attacks with
property damage
Attack density for attacks with
property damage
Months of attacks with property
damage
Days since any previous attack

All
(N=518)

Domestic
only
(N=326)

Unknown only
(N=180)

-0.331
1.004
-3.012
1.692
0.942
1.286
0.303
0.642
-0.835
3.403

-0.289
1.212
-2.990
1.826
1.153
1.303
-0.219
0.858
-6.189
5.201

-6.209**
2.391
2.733
2.876
----

-0.002
0.003
-0.008
0.007
0.001
0.002
0.010*
0.005
-0.004
0.011
0.013
0.011
----

-0.031***
0.006
0.015*
0.006
0.001
0.001
-0.003
0.005
0.060**
0.019
-0.21
0.019
----

----

----

0.001
0.004
0.002
0.001
-0.001
0.003
-0.006*
0.002
-0.002
0.005
Success density for any previous attack -0.001
0.001
Attack density for any previous attack 0.001
0.004
USA PATRIOT act x property damage 0.001
months interaction
0.009
USA PATRIOT Improvement x
0.011
property damage months interaction 0.009
AETA x property damage months
---interaction
Implementing Recommendations of
---the 9/11 Commission x property
damage months interaction

-0.399
1.531
-5.916
5.480

(table continues)

209
All
(N=518)
USA FREEDOM act x property
damage months interaction
Days since previous domestic attack
with property damage
Success density domestic only with
property damage
Attack density domestic only with
property damage
Days since previous domestic attack
Success density domestic only
Attack density domestic only
Days since previous unknown attack
with property damage
Success density unknown with
property damage
Attack density unknown with property
damage
Days since previous unknown attack
Success density unknown
Attack density unknown

0.005
0.015

Domestic
only
(N=326)
0.019
0.021
0.005
0.003
0.001
0.002
-0.003
0.002
-0.010
0.006
-0.001
0.003
0.001
0.004

Unknown only
(N=180)
0.063*
0.027

0.001
0.001
0.001
0.003
0.001
0.001
-0.005
0.003
-0.001
0.003
0.004*
0.002

Note. *p ≤ 0.05. **p ≤ 0.01. ***p < 0.001.
I conducted a likelihood ratio test between the models with and without the
interaction variables to determine which model was a better fit to explain the data for
property damage. For the unknown attacks model, the model with the interaction
variables was the best fit for property damage (p<0.01). For all terrorist attacks and for
domestic terrorist attacks, the model with the interaction variables was not statistically
significant, thus the interaction variables did not significantly improve the fit of the
model for property damage. Therefore, the series hazard model in Table 18 was used to
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answer RQ6 and its SQs. I analyzed Schoenfeld’s residuals to ensure that the covariates
fulfilled the proportional hazard assumption and found that the proportional hazard
assumption was fulfilled.
I rejected the null hypothesis for RQ6 because the hazard of a domestic terrorist
attack with property damage changed in relation to the implementation of U.S.
counterterrorism policy. As shown in Table 18, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack
with property damage decreased following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT
Act; therefore, I rejected the null hypothesis for SQ6A. The only other statistically
significant variable for the series hazard model for domestic terrorist attacks resulting in
property damage was the attack density for any previous attack. As the attack density for
any previous attack increased, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack resulting in
property damage increased. The lack of statistical significance for the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act, AETA, the Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act, and the USA FREEDOM Act led to retaining the null
hypotheses for SQ6B, SQ6C, SQ6D, and SQ6E.
Counterterrorism Spending
Determining U.S. government counterterrorism spending was more complicated
than I initially anticipated due to inconsistencies across budget reports by the OMB and
DHS. Additionally, before the creation of the DHS, counterterrorism responsibilities
were found mainly within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of
Justice (DOJ). As such, identifying how much funding was allocated and appropriated by
the DOD and DOJ was not possible. Therefore, I focused on U.S. government
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counterterrorism spending since the creation of the DHS. While the DOD and DOJ
continued to contribute to counterterrorism efforts, the majority of the funding earmarked
for counterterrorism was allocate and appropriated to the DHS. Thus the spending
displayed was conservative and offered a glimpse into the minimum amount of spending
by the U.S. government for counterterrorism efforts.
Because of these difficulties and the fact that several government reports and
academic articles refer to the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending, the
following data on counterterrorism comes from the Stimson Study. It should be noted that
the obstacles I faced were the same obstacles that the Stimson Study Group on
Counterterrorism Spending encountered in compiling their report (Stimson Study Group
on Counterterrorism Spending, 2018). The four key findings from the Stimson Study
Group on Counterterrorism Spending were that (a) total counterterrorism spending came
to $2.8 trillion from 2002 to 2017, (b) no clear definition exists for U.S. counterterrorism
spending, (c) the trend is that counterterrorism spending is increasing over time, and (d)
that “an accurate evaluation of total and programmatic counterterrorism spending
requires a reinstitution of governmentwide tracking by OMB, clarity of terms and
definitions used, and more rigorous control of what should and should not be included in
the CT budget” (p.8).
The Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018) identified four
major counterterrorism budget categories: government-wide homeland security budget
authority, defense emergency and overseas contingency operations (OCO), war-related
state/USAID, and other foreign aid. Government-wide homeland security budget
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authority referred to budgetary appropriations to DHS along with other agencies. Defense
emergency and OCO were funded primarily by the DOD. War-related state/USAID was
funded by the Department of State. Other foreign aid was funded by accounts for specific
foreign counterterrorism initiatives (Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending,
2018). Figure 9 shows the breakdown of counterterrorism spending by fiscal year for
each of these major categories.
Total U.S. Counterterrorism Spending (in billions) FY 2002-2007
Other Foreign Aid,
12.4, 0%

War-Related
State/USAID,
137.7, 5%

Governmentwide
Homeland Security
Budget Authority,
978.5, 35%
Defense
Emergency and
Overseas
Contingency
Operations, 1702.5,
60%

Figure 9. Total U.S. counterterrorism spending (in billions) by categories from FY2002
to FY2017. From “Protecting America While Promoting Efficiencies and Accountability”
by the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending, 2018. Open source
document retrieved from https://www.stimson.org/content/counterterrorism-spendingprotecting-america-while-promoting-efficiencies-and-accountability.
Figure 10 shows U.S. counterterrorism spending by fiscal year from 2001 to
2017. The large increase in spending for defense emergency and OCO coincided with the
2007 surge of U.S. forces into Iraq. The decrease in spending for defense emergency and
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OCO coincided with troop reductions with the Obama administration. As shown in
Figure 8, for DHS and other agencies tasked with counterterrorism duties, there was an
increasing trend from FY2002 to FY2017 in budget spending, although there were some
years where the budget remained relatively unchanged.

Counterterrorism Spending
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0

Other Foreign Aid

Fiscal Year

Figure 10. Counterterrorism spending by categories from FY2001 to FY2017. From
“Protecting America While Promoting Efficiencies and Accountability” by the Stimson
Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending, 2018. Open source document retrieved from
https://www.stimson.org/content/counterterrorism-spending-protecting-america-whilepromoting-efficiencies-and-accountability.
These data show that counterterrorism spending, in combination with the property
damage data support the expensive nature of counterterrorism operations. However, as
the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018) noted, there lacks a
systematic evaluation of whether the increased spending was justified.
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Summary
From January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017, 66.76% of terrorist attacks in the
United States were perpetrated by domestic terrorists. International terrorism accounted
for 1.74% of attacks for the same time frame. Many of the unknown attacks shared the
same method of operation as domestic terrorism; however, those attacks were analyzed
separately and accounted for 31.51% of attacks. The results of the descriptive analyses
were not surprising as prior research had also noted the higher incidence of domestic
terrorism compared to international terrorism. Considering the contextual factors, the
trends seen in domestic terrorism were not wholly unexpected. What was surprising was
that AETA had not shown greater impact on reducing domestic terrorism considering that
the sole goal of AETA was to target and prosecute domestic eco-terrorists.
The results of the series hazard models were surprising, especially in comparison
to the data in Figure 6. While trends appeared to show greater amounts of terrorism, the
series hazard model demonstrated that the actual hazard of a domestic terrorist attack did
not systematically align with the visual analysis of the frequency of incidence, lethality,
and costs over time in relation to the specific U.S. counterterrorism policies. Therefore,
including the series hazard analysis to examine the impact that policy has on terrorism
should always be included because it adds greater depth in understanding how terrorism
is impacted by policy interventions.
I rejected the null hypotheses for all six central RQs. The USA PATRIOT Act
was the only policy that resulted in rejection of the null hypothesis for all six SQAs. The
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act changed the hazard of the
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incidence of domestic terrorism (SQ4B), but did not result in changes in domestic
terrorism for SQBs for RQs 1-3 and RQs 5-6. I retained the null hypotheses for the
impact that AETA had on domestic terrorism for all six RQs. The Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act changed domestic terrorism incidence,
lethality, and costs resulting in my rejection of the null hypotheses for the SQDs for RQs
1-3, but did not change the hazard of domestic terrorist attacks in terms of incidence,
lethality, and costs resulting in my retention of the null hypothesis for the SQDs for RQs
4-6. The USA FREEDOM Act changed domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs
resulting in my rejection of the null hypotheses for the SQEs for RQs 1-3. The USA
FREEDOM Act changed the hazard of lethal domestic terrorist attacks resulting in my
rejection of the null hypothesis for SQ5E, but did not change the hazard of domestic
terrorist attacks in terms of incidence and costs resulting in retaining the null hypothesis
for SQ4E and SQ6E.
In Chapter 5, I will further elaborate on the results of this study. In addition, I will
relate the results of this study back to the literature review and theoretical frameworks
employed for this study, MSF and the Power Elite. I will discussion the limitations of this
study as well as future directions for continued research. Finally, I will explain the
positive social change implications of this study.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Terrorism is a ubiquitous problem that has existed since antiquity (Hoffman,
2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Domestic terrorism involves terrorism perpetrated by
citizens of the nation of which and within which they are targeting. A majority of terrorist
attacks against the United States have been perpetrated by domestic terrorists. However,
when examining U.S. counterterrorism policy, the policy focus has been on threats from
international terrorists. While most of these policies have focused on international
terrorism, elements of these policies may have impact on the operations of domestic
terrorists in the United States.
Additionally, while researchers have attempted evaluation of U.S.
counterterrorism policy, they have not universally employed evidence-based evaluation
using empirical data. Because of the diversity of approaches to evaluating
counterterrorism policy, the results of such evaluations have been mixed. The gap in the
literature was that U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21st century had not been
empirically evaluated in terms of its impact on domestic terrorism in general. In this
study, I filled an important gap in the literature and utilized empirical data to examine the
impact that 21st century U.S. counterterrorism policies had on domestic terrorism.
To address this gap in the literature, I conducted a quantitative, longitudinal trend
study involving the analysis of secondary data. The purpose of this quantitative,
longitudinal trend study was to describe the U.S. domestic terrorism incidence, lethality,
and costs in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21st century using the
empirical data from the GTD, and using descriptive statistics, visual analysis, and the
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series hazard model for data analysis. This study contributed to positive social change by
providing an empirical model for evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy’s impact on
domestic terrorism, and by providing an evidence-based, non-partisan, non-political
method for quantifying the terrorist threat.
I analyzed domestic terrorism data for incidence, lethality, and costs for the
United States from the GTD from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017 in relation to
five U.S. counterterrorism policies: USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, AETA of 2006, Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, and USA FREEDOM Act of
2015. The first three RQs addressed how U.S. domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and
costs changed in relation to the selected U.S. counterterrorism policies, and were
answered using descriptive statistics and visual analysis. The final three RQs addressed
how the implementation of the U.S. counterterrorism policies listed affected the hazard of
a domestic terrorist attack occurring, a lethal domestic terrorist attack occurring, and a
domestic terrorist attack with property damage occurring. These final three RQs were
answered using the series hazard model. Each research question had five SQs, one for
each U.S. counterterrorism policy.
Domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs changed as a result of the
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. Specifically, U.S. domestic terrorism
incidence, lethality, and costs changed following the implementation of the USA
PATRIOT Act, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and
the USA FREEDOM Act. The hazard of domestic terrorist attacks, lethal domestic
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terrorist attacks, and domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property damage changed as a
result of U.S. counterterrorism policy. Specifically, the hazard of a domestic terrorist
attack and the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist attack, and the hazard of a domestic
terrorist attack resulting in property damage changed following the implementation of the
USA PATRIOT Act. The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act
changed the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack. The USA FREEDOM Act changed the
hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist attack.
In some cases, the results from the series hazard model did not appear to align
with the visual analysis of frequency of domestic terrorist attacks, lethal domestic
terrorist attacks, and domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property damage. This
demonstrated that the aggregation of terrorism data may obscure the threat of terrorism.
Additionally, when running the series hazard model analyses, I identified and included
additional control variables that may impact domestic terrorism, such as the passage of
time, the passage of time in relation to specific policies, attack density, and days since
prior attacks. Furthermore, because the series hazard model produced an estimate of the
hazard of a terrorist attack, the series hazard model results are akin to an empirical model
to measure the terrorist threat. From the results of this study, I demonstrated the need to
include a series hazard model analysis in combination with descriptive statistics to
uncover the depth of impact that policy interventions have, as well as to offer an
empirical method to measure the terrorist threat.
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In Chapter 5 I provide my interpretation of the findings presented in Chapter 4. I
will elaborate on the limitations of this study, as well as provide recommendations for
future research. Finally, I discuss the positive social change implications of this study.
Interpretation of Findings
Between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017 there were 749 terrorist attacks
perpetrated in the United States (START, 2018a). Of these, 500 attacks (66.76%) were
perpetrated by domestic terrorists, 13 (1.74%) by international terrorists, and 236
(31.51%) had unknown perpetrators (START, 2018a). When examining the features of
the unknown attacks, many shared the same modus operandi of domestic terrorism rather
than international terrorism. Considering the dearth of attacks perpetrated by international
terrorists, and the overarching challenges of conducting terrorist operations in foreign
countries, it was reasonable to presume that most of the unknown attacks were
perpetrated by domestic terrorists. However, I did not combine the unknown with the
domestic terrorist attacks in my analyses, rather I analyzed the attacks separately. These
data supported earlier studies’ identification of the higher incidence of domestic terrorism
in the United States compared to international terrorism.
Relative to the incidence of terrorism prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT
Act, the incidence of terrorism is decreasing. In the 7 years prior to the passage of the
USA PATRIOT Act, the United States had 45.7% of all terrorist attacks from 1994 to
2017; of which 63.7% were perpetrated by domestic terrorists, 2% were perpetrated by
international terrorists, and 34.2% had unknown perpetrators. Compared to the 54.3% of
terrorist attacks that occurred over the 16-year time frame following the passage of the
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USA PATRIOT Act, it was clear that in general, terrorism was decreasing in the United
States. Since the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, 69.2% of terrorist attacks have been
perpetrated by domestic terrorists, 1% by international terrorists, and 29.2% by unknown
perpetrators. These data further show that the threat from international terrorism is very
low compared to the threat from domestic terrorism and highlight why the MSF on its
own was insufficient to explain U.S. counterterrorism policy.
When considering incidence, lethality, and costs, I found that the majority of U.S.
domestic terrorist attacks are non-lethal (N = 362) and do result in property damage (N =
330). These results support prior findings (Bjelopera, 2017; Su & Yang, 2017). When I
examined data on domestic terrorism in the United States in relation to U.S.
counterterrorism policy, I found that domestic terrorism in general, and lethal domestic
terrorist attacks increased in 2002, were at their lowest levels in 2011, steadily increased
until 2014, and rapidly increase beginning in 2015 after a brief decrease (see Figures 6
and 7). Domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property damage showed only slight
increase in 2002, but sharply increase in 2003 followed by a sharp decrease and a slow
increase beginning in 2011 turning into a sharp increase in 2015 (see Figure 8).
The spikes in domestic terrorism in 2002 and 2003 may be explained in terms of
backlash against the September 11, 2001 attacks perpetrated by Al Qaeda and the truther
conspiracy theory. Following those attacks, there were increased domestic terrorist
attacks targeting Muslims, Arabs, and those mistaken for Muslim and/or Arab. In
addition, the emergence of the truther conspiracy theory fed into anti-government
ideology, and may have led to increases in domestic terrorist attacks perpetrated by anti-
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government individuals or groups. The truther conspiracy theory in its most basic form
involved the belief that the Bush administration, namely Chaney, Rumsfeld, and
Wolfowitz, staged the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and subsequently used those
attacks as rationale for invading Iraq, seizing control of oil, and engaging in profiteering
from the global war on terror (Warner & Neville-Shepard, 2014).
The increase in domestic terrorism in 2011 may be explained by Obama’s reelection campaign and the growth of the birther conspiracy theory. The birther conspiracy
theory, which was spearheaded by Donald Trump, involved the belief that Obama had
been born in Kenya, that his birth certificate showing his place of birth in Hawaii was
forged, and thus Obama was not eligible to be president (Pham, 2015; Warner & NevilleShepard, 2014).
There were several factors that may explain the sharp increase in domestic
terrorism beginning in 2015. The increase in domestic terrorism beginning in 2014 may
be due to the additional restrictions found in the USA FREEDOM Act regarding
surveilling U.S. citizens, although that impact was confounded by the presidential
campaign announcement of Trump 2 weeks following the passage of the USA
FREEDOM Act. The rhetoric used by the Trump campaign and subsequent
administration has been one in support of White nationalism, nativism, and fear-inducing
anti-Muslim sentiment (Montgomery, 2019; Newman et al., 2018). Many White
supremacists, White nationalists, and neo-Nazis were given greater legitimacy from the
Trump campaign and election, and were further fueled by Trump’s comments following
the violent clash of protesters at the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, VA on
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August 11-12, 2017 that resulted in one death after one of the Unite the Right protestors
drove his car into a crowd of counter-protestors (Johnson, 2018; Perry, 2018).
While the descriptive statistics and visual analysis of the aggregated terrorism
data tell one story, the results from the series hazard model tell a different story. By
examining the temporal occurrence of events and using the series hazard model, I was
able to better uncover the role that time played, as well as additional control variables in
describing how policy intervention impacted domestic terrorism. With the dependent
variable being number of days until the next attack, the series hazard model provides the
hazard or risk of another attack occurring based on the data regarding the gap time
between attacks. This outcome is akin to measuring the threat of terrorism, as the series
hazard model provides the risk of another terrorist attack.
For the central RQs related to the hazard of domestic terrorist attacks, I found that
U.S. counterterrorism policy changed the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack, a lethal
domestic terrorist attack, and a domestic terrorist attack resulting in property damage.
Specifically, the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act increased the hazard of a domestic
terrorist attack (p < 0.001). The hazard of a domestic terrorist attack decreased following
the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act (p < 0.001).
However, for both of these acts, the change in hazard was temporary. As time passed
from when the USA PATRIOT Act had been implemented, the hazard of a domestic
terrorist attack decreased (p < 0.001). As time passed from when the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act had been implemented, the hazard of a domestic
terrorist attack increased (p < 0.001). While there was no statistically significant impact
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by the USA FREEDOM Act on the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack, as time passed
since the USA FREEDOM Act had been implemented, the hazard of a domestic terrorist
attack decreased (p = 0.041). In addition, as days from previous domestic terrorist attacks
increased, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack decreased (p = 0.043).
These results indicate that the immediate effects of the USA PATRIOT Act, the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, and the USA FREEDOM Act on
the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack reverse as time passes. This suggests that
domestic terrorism is sensitive to U.S. counterterrorism policy implementation but also to
time effects. These results were consistent with the visual analysis of domestic terrorist
attacks discussed above (see Figure 6).
For lethal domestic terrorist attacks, the hazard of another lethal domestic terrorist
attack decreased following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act (p < 0.001)
and following the implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act (p < 0.001). However, as
time passed, the hazard of lethal domestic terrorist attacks (p = 0.028) increased. While
similar results were found for all terrorist attacks, considering the differences in
magnitude of the coefficients for the USA PATRIOT Act and the USA FREEDOM Act
between any lethal attack and lethal domestic attacks, it appears that lethal domestic
attacks were more affected by these policies than any lethal attack in general. These
results are not consistent with the visual analysis of lethal domestic terrorist attacks (see
Figure 7). While the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist attack decreased following the
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act, Figure 7 shows an increase in incidence of
lethal domestic terrorist attacks. One of the complications in comparing the selected
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policies involved the short time frame for evaluating the USA FREEDOM Act. While the
USA PATRIOT Act had 14 years of data to use to evaluate its impact on domestic
terrorism, the USA FREEDOM Act only had two years of data. Therefore, by using the
series hazard model, I provided additional detail when considering the impact of policy
initiatives.
For domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property damage, the hazard of a
domestic terrorist attack resulting in property damage decreased after the USA PATRIOT
Act was enacted (p<0.001), but increased when the attack density from any previous
attacks increased (p=0.040). Because of the lack of statistical significance for the policy
interaction variables with time and the time variables, these results indicated that
domestic terrorists engaging in attacks that result in property damage were more affected
by the USA PATRIOT Act than the other U.S. counterterrorism policies. I was
particularly surprised by this result because eco-terrorists tended to engage in attacks that
predominantly resulted in property damage, yet their activities were not significantly
affected by the passage of later U.S. counterterrorism policies, specifically the one aimed
at domestic eco-terrorists, AETA. In addition, the series hazard model was able to handle
the spike in domestic terrorist attacks in 2003, such that the hazard of domestic terrorist
attacks was not overly influenced by this spike in attacks (see Figure 8). Like with the
lethality results, the results of the series hazard model for domestic terrorist attacks
resulting in property damage were not consistent with the visual presentation of
frequency of domestic terrorist attacks involving property damage shown in Figure 8.
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Like with lethality, this could be due to the short time frame in assessing the impact of
the USA FREEDOM Act compared to the other U.S. counterterrorism policies.
The results of this study support the importance of investigating event data
utilizing the series hazard model beyond aggregating data without consideration of the
time component. This is glaringly obvious when a visual analysis of aggregated terrorism
data by year appear to show one trend, while the series hazard model reports a more
sophisticated expectation in terms of the risk of future terrorist attacks. The series hazard
model thus provides an empirical, evidence-based method of measuring the threat of
terrorism.
Considering that 522 of the 749 terrorist attacks in the United States between
1994 and 2017 resulted in property damage, terrorist attacks are expensive (Bjelopera,
2017; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Su & Yang, 2017; START, 2018a). In combination
with the results from the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018), it
becomes clear that U.S. counterterrorism efforts are costly. The series hazard model in
addition to descriptive and visual evaluation of frequency of terrorist attacks was used to
provide evidence-based information that may be used to evaluate how justified
counterterrorism spending is, and whether the increased spending translated to a safer
nation. The results from using the series hazard model can better inform and rationalize
the money spent for counterterrorism in relation to the actual threat of terrorism and
where that threat originates.
The results of this study support the disconnect between the advertised threat of
international terrorism and the subsequent focus of U.S. counterterrorism policy, and the
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actual threat of domestic terrorist attacks in the United States. It was excruciatingly clear
that international terrorists rarely attack the United States within its territorial boundaries,
instead focusing on targets abroad such as embassies and military targets. There were 13
international terrorist attacks from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017, four of which
were the September 11, 2001 attacks. While the NCTAUUS found glaring issues that
allowed for the planning and execution of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, issues
regarding barriers to safe and efficient response, rescue, and recovery efforts, and offered
recommendations, some of were which implemented through the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, these initiatives were aimed at a rare
event. As such, attempting to evaluate U.S. counterterrorism policy based on its focus of
reducing an already rare event is not possible. Furthermore, this leads to questions as to
how much money should be spent to counter a rare event (Kunreuther, 2002).
Meanwhile, domestic terrorism continued to flourish and even increase in recent
years. While the statistically significant results for the hazard of lethal domestic terrorist
attacks decreased following the USA FREEDOM Act, I would caution the full
acceptance of these results, namely due to the short time frame and relatively lower
numbers of domestic terrorist attacks involved in its evaluation. Recommendations such
as those identified in the REAL ID Act of 2005 would be completely irrelevant for
domestic anti-government groups and individuals like Sovereign Citizens who already
dismiss the need for official credentials, and refuse to acknowledge and follow the laws
established and enforced in the United States at all levels of governance (Martin, 2018;
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Nacos, 2016). I recommend that the same careful investigation and analysis needs to be
conducted on domestic terrorist attacks.
I was able to explain the policy process using the MSF, while also being able to
explain the disconnect between the real terrorist threat and the counterterrorism policies
by adding the power elite theory. Consider who benefits from a policy like AETA? It is
mainly business owners as AETA expanded the definition for what types of businesses
qualified as animal enterprises, including third-party entities, and thus could reap victims
of terrorism benefits for any attacks, as well as more severely prosecute those who attack
them or threaten them.
In addition, one of the rallying calls of the Trump campaign and administration
was to battle against “radical Islamic terrorism,” yet such forms of terrorism rarely occur
in the United States (Montgomery, 2019). Of the 500 known cases of domestic terrorism
in the United States, only 43 or 8.6% were perpetrated by “radical Islamic terrorists” (see
Table 1). Contrast that with 82 or 16.4% White nationalists, White extremists, Neo-Nazi
attacks and 56 or 11.2% anti-government attacks. Similar to Miller (2017), these results
support the dramatic increase in domestic terrorism by White supremacist groups.
Of the motivation types, eco-terrorism occurred the most (147 or 29.4%) which
aligned with the passage of AETA, although I was unable to show a significant decrease
in domestic terrorism following the implementation of AETA. It is here where the
contribution of the power elite was most appropriate. Bjelopera (2017) noted that public
data on eco-terrorism was more readily available in recent years than other forms of
domestic terrorism, leading to the possibility of underreporting of the other forms of
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domestic terrorism. While Bjelopera noted the lack of conformity in prosecuting
domestic terrorism; anecdotally, I noticed that the media were quick to assign the label of
terrorist to non-White perpetrators and use other criminal labels for White perpetrators.
Thus, the disconnect between the political and media narrative on the terrorist
threat and what the empirical data show may lead to a potential connection with the
systemic racism found in U.S. society. Following a cursory examination of recent
domestic terrorist attacks, I found that White perpetrators were charged with hate crimes
while perpetrators of color, if they survived, were charged with terrorism. That cursory
examination may be supported by the coding practices for the doubt terrorism proper
variable in the GTD. When further examining the events that were labeled as doubt
terrorism proper, I found that many of those were labeled by the media and subsequently
prosecuted as hate crimes, even if the event met the inclusion criteria of terrorism and
met the definition of terrorism from the United States Code. In addition, there seemed to
be an imbalance of coding where similar incidents perpetrated by persons of color and/or
Muslims were coded as terrorism, while incidents involving White perpetrators were
coded as doubt terrorism proper. Interestingly enough the attack by Dylann Roof on the
Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, SC on June 17, 2015 was
coded as terrorism. When the updated GTD is released including the terrorism data for
2018, it will be interesting to see how the Tree of Life Synagogue attack in Pittsburgh on
October 27, 2018 will be coded.
These possible racial discrepancies were supported by Hewitt’s (2003)
examination of domestic terrorism. For U.S. domestic terrorism from 1955 to 2000,
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Hewitt noted the discrepancy in treatment of domestic terrorism by ideological category,
finding that the ratio of arrests to incidents for the KKK was 0.39 and for Black militants
was 0.61. Sentencing also differed for deadly offenses with Black militants getting an
average of 37.0 years compared to the average 17.0 years for White racists and KKK
(Hewitt, 2003). Conviction rates were also higher for Black militants compared to the
KKK, with Black militants being convicted in 51.1% of any offense and 75.4% for
deadly offenses, while the KKK were convicted in 47.8% of any offense and 29.7% for
deadly offenses (Hewitt, 2003). While Hewitt’s analysis cited ideological category
differences, when examining the ideology for the KKK, White racists, and Black
militants, there was also a clear racial gap.
Alone, MSF was inadequate to explain how policy can be implemented that is in
direct contradiction with both the problem and policy streams. The question of influence
of the political stream may be what is really connected to the power elite. Kinloch (2004)
asserted that the power elite manipulate policy in order to serve itself and its own
interests. For example, war is said to be necessary to ensure national security, however
waging wars have benefited the power elite by helping maintain an atmosphere of fear to
ensure continuity in leadership during elections, allowing for profiteering, and
maintaining existing inequalities by restricting civil rights; a perfect trifecta of benefit for
the political, economic, and military elites (Kinloch, 2004). Abrams (2006) noted that in
the five years following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, all three
branches of government engaged in deferral and avoidance regarding challenges to the
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law which resulted in a break-down of the checks and balances that the three branches of
the government were designed to provide upon the others.
Recent events highlight presidential overreach by Trump declaring a national
emergency to provide funding for a border wall along the U.S. border with Mexico once
Congress refused to allow for such funding. Hellmuth (2016) observed the changes in the
separation of powers and specifically, the use of an ongoing war (the global war on
terror) as a way to continue the power imbalance in the U.S. government that has been
described as now operating under an imperial presidency. This is especially concerning
considering the rhetoric and practices of the current Trump administration.
While troop withdrawals and a shift in approach to the global war on terror were
hallmarks of the Obama administration, aggressive rhetoric, troop increases, and framing
of the global war on terror to include illegal immigrants, the Trump administration may
have had a greater impact on domestic terrorism in the United States beyond what the
results of this study provided (Montgomery, 2019; Newman et al., 2018; Pham, 2015;
Warner & Neville-Shepard, 2014). In addition, while the Mueller Report concluded that
there was no collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia, had the actions of
Trump been those of anyone who was not a currently-serving President of the United
States, that person would have faced charges of obstruction of justice (R.S. Mueller,
2019). Regardless of one’s political ideology, that behavior is concerning and lends
credence to the need for an analysis of how the Trump presidency compares with other
presidencies in relation to terrorism, specifically domestic terrorism.
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Ledgwidge and Parmar (2017) argued that much of foreign policy is controlled by
the power elite and that the power elite are predominantly male WASPs, and thus the
power elite uses policy to ensure their own dominance. The majority of foreign terrorist
organizations are non-White or of the lower White races (i.e. Irish) and thus the
dominance of concern in U.S. counterterrorism policy being on international versus
domestic terrorism could be motivated by racism and ethnocentrism in the United States
(Ledwidge & Parmar, 2017). By constructing the main terrorist threat as being non-White
and non-Christian, the power elite continued the practice of marginalizing distinct racial,
ethnic, and religious groups keeping them from mobilizing and uniting, while at the same
time, it has empowered White, Christian domestic terrorists to amass weapons (benefiting
the economic and military elite) and keeping the political elite in power. In addition, by
constructing the terrorist threat as being non-White and non-Christian, White
supremacists and White nationalists find rationalization for their hatred and intolerance
towards non-White and non-Christian people (J. Johnson, 2018).
Therefore, the combination of the MSF and the power elite theory served to
explain the discrepancy between the empirical data and the focus of U.S.
counterterrorism policy. The MSF explained how different streams converged to create
policy and the power elite theory addressed the unequal influence of some in directing the
substance of the developed policy, even when not supported by evidence. In addition, by
adding the consideration of race and ethnicity, the trends I identified in the results are
elucidated further. While these results were compelling, there were limitations to this
study which I will elaborate on in the following section.
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Limitations of the Study
Following IRB approval, once I accessed the GTD and began working on the data
filtering and analysis, I uncovered additional limitations to this study that I had not
anticipated. There were four primary limitations that will be elaborated in this section: (a)
issues with the GTD data, (b) issues with public reporting of counterterrorism spending,
(c) issues with the proximity of counterterrorism policy and paucity of data to evaluate
the policy in accordance with past studies, and (d) issues with SPSS version 25.0.0.2.
While I addressed some of my assumptions about the GTD in Chapter 1, issues I had not
anticipated became apparent as I began working with the data.
One of the primary limitations of the present study involved the selected data
source. While the GTD has been shown to be reliable and valid, I found myself
questioning that reliability as I uncovered inconsistencies in the coding. Some of these
inconsistencies may be explained by changes in practice and in the retro-coding of new
variables added; however, others may be related to implicit bias among coders. While the
GTD codebook is very detailed, perhaps additional detail addressing these
inconsistencies would be useful for future researchers seeking to use the GTD to analyze
domestic terrorism. For incidence and for many of the variables that I did not explore in
this study, I believe the GTD is an excellent database and it offers compatibility with
statistical analysis software packages that increase the efficiency of conducting
quantitative analyses with the data. Just because the variables I intended to analyze did
not conform with my expectations when planning this study does not mean that the entire
dataset is unreliable or invalid.
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A second major limitation to this study involved the accuracy and reporting of the
U.S. government counterterrorism spending. While there are many public documents
available including annual budget by agency and department from the OMB, those data
were inconsistent with the budget reports available from DHS. The Stimson Study Group
on Counterterrorism Spending (2018) noted the same inconsistencies and had more
deeply explored how counterterrorism was defined among and within agencies, through
which they uncovered inconsistencies that may contribute to the data inconsistencies
found in the public documents. As a result of these inconsistencies, my planned analysis
of counterterrorism spending was not feasible for the current study.
A third limitation involved the selected U.S. counterterrorism policies. Similar to
LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009), four of the interventions did not have an end date.
While I attempted to utilize the same procedure to avoid confounding the analyses by
having overlapping policy effects by using a one-year time frame following policy
implementation, when I filtered the data to that level, the amount of data was too small to
analyze with confidence (see Dugan, 2011; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). In addition,
the rapid passage of counterterrorism policy led to difficulties in identifying whether
those policies had any impact (i.e., USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization
Act, AETA, and Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act). For the
series hazard analyses, there were several cases in which SPSS would not report a value
for those policies or their interaction variables with time due to being constant or linearly
dependent. However, removing them from the analyses did not seem like it would solve
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the problem of their possible influence. I was particularly reluctant to remove AETA as
that was the only policy that focused on domestic terrorism.
A fourth limitation involved the introduction of additional error to the analyses.
While I had anticipated some additional error due to manually coding events as domestic,
international, or unknown, I had not anticipated the challenges in running the series
hazard model using SPSS version 25.0.0.2. As such, there were several times the filtered
dataset became corrupted as I attempted to add or merge data calculated in Excel with the
SPSS data, thus resulting in several occasions in which I had to re-filter the data, and at
least one occasion of recoding the entire dataset. As a result, I had to calculate certain
variables in Excel, which then I had to manually enter into SPSS. This manual data entry
led to additional error because even though I triple-checked the data entry, there is still a
possible chance that an error was made. Because of limitations in computing variables in
SPSS, I had to conduct some calculations by hand, and while I triple-checked those
calculations, there is still a possible chance that I made a mistake. Hopefully future
versions of SPSS will offer a more comprehensive and complete method of conducting
the variable creation and analysis for the series hazard model that would not require
outside calculations either by hand or by using other software packages. The other
researchers who have used the series hazard model have used different statistical software
packages and did not appear to encounter the same types of additional work and
calculation that this version of SPSS required.
While there were these limitations that may add caution to accepting the results, I
do not believe that these limitations substantially undermined the purpose of this study
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nor its applicability for positive social change. I believe that the strength of the effects
found compensated for the additional error due to manual calculation and manual data
entry. If anything, these limitations will guide future research and offer a wide range of
recommendations for future research.
Recommendations
I have many recommendations for future research from looking at specific aspects
of the GTD data coding process to testing additional theories to further modifications in
the series hazard model. While working on the data analysis and interpretation, I was able
to find several areas that should be explored, the results of which may contribute to
positive social change. I will begin with discussing identifying or supplementing data
sources for analysis of U.S. domestic terrorism.
One of the first recommendations for future research involves combining multiple
data sources for analyses. For example, Carson (2014) utilized both the GTD, the EID,
and supplemented the information from those databases with additional, open source
chronologies. Another option would be to choose a different dataset such as the
Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the United States (TEVUS) database that pulls from
information from the GTD along with other databases and studies. Included in TEVUS
are biographical and demographic information on perpetrators which would be useful in
extending the current analysis to evaluate factors involving race, ethnicity, and religion
(START, 2018c).
Another direction for future research involves examining domestic terrorism and
counterterrorism policy focusing on race and ethnicity, as well as potentially theories
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from the sociology of race and ethnic relations. Those theories may better explain the
racial disparity than the power elite theory alone. A global analysis could be done to
evaluate racial and ethnic stratification for different countries in relation to domestic
terrorism for those countries.
A specific area of study could involve a systematic examination of the coding of
the doubt terrorism proper variable in the GTD in relation to racial, ethnic, religious, and
other social minorities. It would be interesting to identify if the pattern from my cursory
and unsystematic examination of the events coded as doubt terrorism proper are
systematically present. This potential research could examine if there is an imbalance of
incidents labeled as doubt terrorism proper when perpetrators are among the dominant
strata, whereas similar incidents are labeled as terrorism when perpetrators are among the
minorities or lower strata. The results could be used to assist START project managers in
improving interrater reliability for coding events, as well as perhaps suggest sensitivity to
implicit bias among coders.
While Hewitt (2003) examined waves of domestic terrorism in relation to
presidential administrations, considering the unusual nature of the Trump administration
compared to all previous presidential administrations, an updated analysis would be
useful. In particular, it would be useful to conduct an analysis of the impact of the Trump
campaign and administration on White supremacists, White extremists, and new-Nazis,
as well as on the counter-movement, the Anti-fascists (J. Johnson, 2018; Montgomery,
2019; R.S. Mueller, 2019; Newman et al., 2018; Perry, 2018; Pham, 2015; Warner &
Neville-Shepard, 2014).
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Further research may also seek to employ examining the rational choice,
backlash, and deterrence theories with regards to the impact that these specific U.S.
counterterrorism policies have had on domestic terrorism broken down into similar
ideological/motivational categories, target types, and in relation to opposing groups. For
example, it may be useful to identify if a highly-publicized domestic terrorist attack
perpetrated by a particular racial, ethnic, and/or religious group is followed by retaliatory
attacks by domestic terrorists that oppose those groups (e.g., White supremacist activity
following the September 11, 2001 attacks or anti-government activity following the
incidents at Waco and Ruby Ridge).
Furthermore, by breaking down domestic terrorism further, the DHS, FBI, and
DOD could get a better sense of which groups or ideologies are sensitive to federal
counterterrorism policy. Such research may also result in providing policy makers and
law enforcement with expectations of potential retaliation in response to attacks, the
potential for copycats, areas in need of additional hardening of targets, and areas in need
of additional surveillance and/or police presence. If such retaliatory and/or copycat
actions occur, such research could be used to better inform the media to report more
responsibly about terrorist attacks.
It would be very useful to examine how the series hazard model or another model
may be used to evaluate policy when policy periods overlap. It would be useful to
identify a control variable for the overlapping impact of multiple policies. While the oneyear time frame was possible for LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009), it was not feasible in
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the present study. One potential approach to addressing overlapping policy effects could
be the use of multilevel models (B.D. Johnson, 2017, LaFree & Bersani, 2014).
Finally, there should be more investigation into how the series hazard model can
be used as an evidence-based, non-partisan, non-political, quantitative measure of
terrorist threat. As long as the assumptions and criteria for the series hazard model are
met (viz., Dugan, 2011), it shows great promise in aiding counterterrorism agencies
including the DHS and FBI in identifying, preventing, and responding to threats, as well
as to policy makers in justifying costly counterterrorism spending and in the development
of future counterterrorism policy. This final recommendation will be elaborated on in the
next section.
Implications
The present study offers an evidence-based method for evaluating U.S.
counterterrorism policy and its impact on domestic terrorism which was the purpose of
this study. This is an important step as prior attempts to evaluate U.S. counterterrorism
policy have varied greatly in approach, data, and results. In addition, the series hazard
model provides a mechanism by which the threat of terrorism can be quantified, which
was an unanticipated benefit of this study. By utilizing empirical data, the present study
offers a stronger evaluation of U.S. counterterrorism policy than those restricted to
theoretical assertions. Not only is this method useful for policy makers, the DHS, and the
FBI, but the results themselves inform these stakeholders as to what the counterterrorism
priorities should be in relation to the actual terrorist threat.
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As U.S. counterterrorism policies that focus on international terrorist threats come
up for renewal or challenge, the data from this study can be used as support for the
development and enactment of policy focusing on the threat of domestic terrorism. This
is especially important considering the costs of countering the terrorist threat and
justifying increasing spending to protect against the rare event of international terrorism,
rather than the more frequent event of domestic terrorism (Bjelopera, 2017; Kunreuther,
2002; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014). In addition, the series hazard model allows for the
consideration of the impact of a range of other contextual or control variables such as
other policy initiatives, time elapse, the impact of successful attacks, the impact of time
since the last attack, and others. It is those factors specifically that lend its use to
quantifying the threat of terrorism.
Terrorists are comprised of a spectrum of sociodemographic characteristics and
by focusing on a foreign threat, while making it easier to profile international terrorists, it
does not make the country safer. Creating additional labels that separate and disconnect
the breadth of motivations and actions of terrorists undermines the safety of the nation.
Terrorism, extremism, hate, cults, and other labels are not mutually exclusive categories
and there needs to be a more systematic examination of how these terms are used to
frame the threat, and how criminal prosecution follows from terrorist events, planned or
executed (Bjelopera, 2017). By establishing an empirical, evidence-based method for
evaluating counterterrorism policy and by offering an evidence-based, non-partisan, nonpolitical method of quantifying the terrorist threat, policy makers will have easier access
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to the evidence that should inform counterterrorism policy and counterterrorism
operations.
Policy makers need to be aware that terrorism is a social construction and a
complex social problem that requires a complex analysis. The political stream, policy
entrepreneurs, and the media would also benefit from such elucidation. The series hazard
model provides a complex analysis for evaluating policy and other interventions that may
be aimed at countering the terrorist threat, and it removes the partisan and political
influences in defining and prosecuting domestic terrorism.
For the sake of clarity, I would recommend that policy makers draft a new piece
of legislation rather than amending existing policies. The new policy should address not
only the findings from this study but extend the recommendations from Bjelopera (2017)
and the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018). The following
should be addressed in this new policy: (a) establishing one systematic definition of
counterterrorism spending to be utilized by all agencies, (b) establishing accuracy and
accountability in reporting counterterrorism spending, (c) establishing a public list of
domestic terrorist organizations, (d) clearly instructing prosecutors regarding charges of
domestic terrorism versus hate crime, (e) providing a statement of the overlap of
terrorism, extremism, and hate crime, (f) establishing an evidence-based method of
defining the terrorist threat (i.e. use of the series hazard model), (g) establishing clear
procedures for evidence-based evaluation of the effectiveness of existing
counterterrorism policy along with a reasonable timeline of compliance, and (h) requiring
all future counterterrorism policy to include an evidence-based evaluation of the
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effectiveness of future counterterrorism policy. By establishing a new policy that
specifically addresses issues of accountability and clarity in existing counterterrorism
policies and for future counterterrorism policies, the media will be provided with a clear
way of communicating the new policy to the general public.
If policy makers intend on making the nation safer, they need to listen to all of
the academics, researchers, and others among the policy and problem streams, and take to
heart what the empirical evidence show. Since at least 2011, Bjelopera (2017) has been
submitting annual reports for members and committees of Congress through the
Congressional Research Service regarding a range of criminal justice and terrorism
issues including overviews of domestic terrorism with updates. In the most recent report,
Bjelopera repeated his argument for the need for better access by policy makers to the
empirical data, as well as the need for a systematic method for determining the terrorist
threat. The question becomes whether the power elite are exerting pressure to ignore the
empirical data, and thus Congress is ignoring the threat and data, or is Congress not
prioritizing this threat as imminent even though the data show otherwise. We do not need
to wait for another catastrophic attack in order to act on creating and implementing
effective counterterrorism policy. The data exist, now is the time to use the data to make
the nation safer.
Conclusion
The United States faces an ongoing struggle with domestic terrorism, yet
counterterrorism policy does not align with the threat. In addition, efforts to characterize
domestic terrorism as being mutually exclusive from extremism and hate crime (which it
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is not) give the public the illusion that domestic terrorism is not an issue in the United
States. Yet, according to my results, on average there is a terrorist attack occurring in the
United States every 11.70 (standard deviation: 19.686) days (see Table 6).
Without an accurate understanding of the complexity of the social problem that is
domestic terrorism, and without alignment between actual threat and counterterrorism
policy, domestic terrorism will continue to thrive and negatively impact lives of U.S.
citizens and residents, undermining any prospect of approaching a peaceful society. If
counterterrorism budget priorities continue to focus on the rare event of international
terrorism, and if those priorities replace other policy initiatives, the United States will
continue to struggle with the real threat and continue to remain unsafe. As long as
agencies continue to operate with non-public lists and the lack of systematic definitions,
U.S. counterterrorism agencies will continue to operate in a reactive rather than proactive
fashion against domestic terrorism, and prosecutions against domestic terrorists will
continue in a non-uniform manner, undermining public trust in the criminal justice
system.
By offering an evidence-based method of evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy
based on empirical data, policy makers may make better use of tax-payer money and
provide greater protection from the harm of a domestic terrorist attack. It is essential to
note that a complex social problem such as terrorism requires a complex analysis that
includes a range of factors at various levels of influence. The series hazard model offers
that complexity while remaining feasible to execute using public data.
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In addition, the series hazard model allows for an evidence-based, systematic
method of characterizing the terrorist threat, as long as all of the criteria and assumptions
of the series hazard model are met (viz., Dugan, 2011). Such a method has remained
elusive but with this model, those days may be over. This model allows for non-partisan
and non-political evaluation of the threat of terrorism. By using such a model, the politics
of how certain entities come to be listed as terrorist organizations or as extremist
organizations are removed. For example, the Department of State’s list of foreign terrorist
organizations is a politically-motivated list with notable countries that, while known to
support terrorism, remain off of the list. An evidence-based, non-partisan, non-political
method of determining the terrorist threat is especially needed when the Trump
administration continues to support the ideologies and actions of White supremacists,
White nationalists, and Neo-Nazis (J. Johnson, 2018; Newman et al., 2018; Pham, 2015;
Perry, 2018; Warner & Neville-Shepard, 2014).
The results from this study and others that show the strength and benefits of using
the series hazard model would be especially useful to the DHS and the FBI. Until there is
a systematic method of examining U.S. counterterrorism policy, the U.S. government, as
well as U.S. citizens and residents remain distracted from the actual threat and run the
risk of being surprised by another, catastrophic terrorist attack, this one perpetrated by
domestic terrorists. While the balance between national security and civil liberties remain
precarious in countering a terrorist threat, ignoring the threat will not make it go away.
Action must be sought and that action should be based on empirical data and replicable
evidence. If the U.S. government and its citizens and residents truly aspire to living in a
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peaceful democracy, then the U.S. government needs to clearly address the significant
threat that is domestic terrorism.
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